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Towards the New Jerusalem: Manchester Politics During the Second World War. 
Abstract 
This thesis examines the impact of the Second World War on the politics of one of 
the country's most important cities, Manchester. The thesis focuses on two broad 
themes. The first theme assesses the impact of the War on the nature of party politics in 
the city and, in particular, asks whether the experience of total war fostered a new 
consensus on social and economic issues amongst the various Manchester political parties. 
The second theme examines popular political attitudes in the city during the War and 
seeks to chart and explain the movement of public opinion that resulted in a landslide 
electoral victory for the Labour Party in 1945. 
The thesis is written against the background of an ongoing historiographical 
debate surrounding the impact of the War on British politics. The first view of wartime 
poliýics, advanced primarily by Addison, argues that the War had a decisive impact on the 
shape of British politics, instigating a cross-party consensus that formed the bedrock of 
policy making for the next thirty years. The second view, put forward by an increasingly 
strong revisionist movement dominated by Jefferys and Fielding, Thompson and Tiratsoo, 
suggests that the impact of the War was far less dramatic. All studies of wartime British 
politics have focused almost exclusively on high politics (that is, Cabinet and 
Parliamentary level), and this thesis aims to add to the debate by testing these various 
hypotheses at a local level. 
The thesis concludes that the War had no significant impact on party politics in 
Manchester; inter-party relations remained unaffected by the War and the existence of an 
all-party coalition government, and a consensus signally failed to develop. It also 
suggests that Labour's 1945 success was attributable to a strong mood of 
anti-Conservatism rather than to any great enthusiasm for Labour, with support for 
Labour largely confined to the industrial working4, c'lass. 
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The debate surrounding the impact of the Second World War on British high politics has 
been a central feature of political historiography for over twenty years. In this time, two 
dominant models of wartime politics have emerged. The Addison model argues that the 
War, combined with the existence of an all-party coalition government, instigated a 
lengthy period of consensus on social and economic issues between the leaderships of the 
major parties; simultaneously the War engendered Labour Party values in unprecedented 
numbers of the electorate, resulting in Labour's landslide election victory in 1945.1 In 
more recent years this orthodoxy has been challenged by the Jefferys/Fielding, Tiratsoo 
and Thompson model, which contends that the War had little or no long-term impact on 
British politics and that Labour's election victory did not signify widespread enthusiasm 
for the Party. 2 This revisionist model currently dominates the historiography of wartime 
politics. 
Cabinet disagreements, parliamentary debates, intra-party conflict and the private 
views of prominent contemporary politicians have been well rehearsed, and there can be 
I 
little additional material still awaiting the attention of historians. In contrast, the picture 
away from the hothouse of Westminster and Whitehall during the Second World War has 
been largely neglected. The high politics perspective has resulted in an 
over-concentration on political elites at the expense of knowledge of the solid bedrock of 
politics in the communities. The dissertation partly corrects this imbalance by applying 
these models to the city of Manchester and asking; What was the impact of the Second 
World War on low (defined here as 'grass-roots'/Iocal) politics? The thesis focuses on 
two broad themes. The first addresses the Manchester political community and, in 
particular, the political parties, and asks to what extent the existence of a national 
coalition Government affected inter-party relationships at a local level, and whether the 
beliefs and policies of the Manchester parties converged as a consequence of the wartime 
experience. The second theme examines the movement of popular opinion in the city 
and charts and explains Labour's progress from the subordinate position of 1939 to their 
full role, as England's third city, in the war effort as the home of various major industrial 
plants; the city endured its own Blitz; it played host to a large number of American 
servicemen; Manchester contained the full spectrum of the electorate from solid, industrial 
working-class constituencies such as Gorton and Platting to middle-class suburbs such as 
Rusholme and Withington; furthermore Manchester had strong political traditions for 
although predominantly Conservative (the city represented a typical example of Lancastrian 
working-class Conservatism), it also possessed a strong Labour Party and had been the home 
of free-trade Liberalism; 3 finally, the city tended to mirror national electoral trends, no more 
so than in 1945. Manchester can be considered representative of urban Britain. 
To demonstrate how political trends developed as the War progressed, the thesis runs 
chronologically, and is divided into six chapters. Chapter One examines the 
historiographical debate surrounding British politics in the Second World War and the 
movement of opinion leading to the election result of 1945 via the two models referred to 
earlier. Chapter Two outlines the architecture of Manchester's politics by an analysis of 
employment structure, levels of unemployment and poverty, the condition of the housing 
stock and electoral trends at both Parliamentary and municipal level during the inter-war 
period. Chapter Three explores political developments from the outbreak of war up to the 
publication of the Beveridge Report in December 1942, and asks whether the early years of 
war fostered a spirit of unity among Mancunians. The chapter questions popular attitudes 
towards social and economic reconstruction and politics in general, and examines party 
relations and policies during the initial years of the Churchill Coalition. Late 1942 is 
generally recognised as a turning point, both militarily and in terms of Government planning 
for reconstruction, making it a logical end point for the first phase of analysis of wartime 
Manchester. Chapter Four examines the period from late 1942 to the end of 1943, analysing 
the effect of the improving military situation and the political fallout from the publication of 
the Beveridge Report on public attitudes towards social reform and political loyalties. With 
reconstruction becoming a more pressing and visible issue, the chapter also analyses the 
reactions of the Manchester parties to Beveridge and other reconstruction issues to ascertain 
whether or not a local consensus was emerging. Chapter Five deals exclusively with 1944, 
examining the reaction of Manchester's press, public, political parties and interest groups to 
the publication of a range of White Papers on Britain's post-war future. It also provides a 
2 
reform and political loyalties. With reconstruction becoming a more pressing and visible 
issue, the chapter also analyses the reactions of the Manchester parties to Beveridge and 
other reconstruction issues to ascertain whether or not a local consensus was emerging. 
Chapter Five deals exclusively with 1944, examining the reaction of Manchester's press, 
public, political parties and interest groups to the publication of a range of White Papers 
I on Britain's post-war future. It also provides a detailed study of the Rusholme 
by-election, which gave a significant pointer to the result of the following year's general 
election. The final chapter focuses on the 1945 General Election, examining the policies 
advocated by the respective local parties and how the Manchester electorate perceived the 
various parties and the election itself, before finishing with a detailed analysis of the 
results. 
The dissertation argues that the War did not instigate a consensus on Britain's 
social and economic future between the Manchester political parties and that, in reality, 
the divide between the parties at local level was greater than that which existed between 
the respective national leaderships. This became particularly apparent from 1943 
onwards when the parties began to address the question of social and economic 
reconstruction. The Conservative Party, having enjoyed a highly successful decade in 
the 1930s, saw no reason to change a winning programme in the midst of the unique 
circumstances of total war and remained committed to a strong emphasis on 
neo-liberalism throughout the War. The Labour Party, meanwhile, was concerned about 
the increasing popularity of the Communist Party and later of the success of the Common 
Wealth Party. In consequence, Labour refused to contemplate any compromise of party 
policies aligning them too closely with the Conservatives, which could lead to the Party 
being outflanked on the left. The thesis argues the possibility of consensus was further 
i undermined 
by the stability of party politics in the city. All the parties saw the Coalition 
Government as a strictly short-term measure, and consequently political relationships in 
the city remained fraught with bitter disputes occurring regularly as each party sought to 
gain or maintain a political advantage. With the basis of politics remaining 
unchallenged by the War, cross-party consensus was never likely to extend beyond a 
shared desire to see the successful prosecution of the War. 
Addressing the second strand of the thesis, Labour benefited from massive 
popular interest in social and economic reconstruction, which was a major feature of the 
country from 1940 onwards. However, it is argued that this popular interest was 
tempered by class considerations, with Labour's 1945 election victory being attributable 
not to the support of a broad-cross section of the electorate but to a significantly 
increased level of support amongst the ranks of the manual working-class and younger 
voters of all classes. Established middle-class Conservative voters overwhelmingly 
remained loyal to their party throughout the War. Therefore, younger voters aside, the 
War further polarised the electorate along class lines; this polarisation began in the 
inter-war years but was intensified by class antagonisms during the War. 1943 is 
identified as the crucial turning point in popular political views, and by the end of 1944, 
the Conservatives' defeat was inevitable. The dissertation also rejects the view that 
Labour's victory marked the culmination of left-wing fervour. Rather, there was a 
strong mood of anti-Conservatism, as opposed to any real enthusiasm for Labour, which 
was responsible for the Party's success. 
The dissertation therefore supports revisionist interpretations of wartime party 
politics and the success of the Labour Party in 1945. 
All works published in London unless otherwise stated. 
I P. Addison, The Road to 1945 (Jonathan Cape, 1975). 
2 K. Jefferys, The Churchill Coalition and Wartime Politics 1940-1945 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1991). N. Tiratsoo, S. Fielding & P. Thompson, England 
Arise! The Labour P=y and Popular Politics in 1940s Britain (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1993). 
3 Working-class Conservatism was particularly strong in Lancashire. This was largely 
due to antagonism towards Irish immigrants and their Catholicism, as a strain of militant 
Protestantism ran through many working-class communities in 19th Century Lancashire. 
The Church of England was promoted by the Conservatives, along with the Monarchy, as 
symbols of English national pride, and patriotism, Protestantism and the Conservative 
Party were united in an ideology with significant populist appeal. 
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A Decisive Watershed? The Historiography of Domestic British 
Politics *n the Second World War. 
Introduction. 
To place Manchester in its wider political context, it is necessary firstly to explore the 
historiographical debate surrounding Second World War British politics. -The chapter 
will address two major historiographical themes: the issues of wartime consensus and the 
I swing to the left' in popular opinion. The chapter begins by analysing the 'orthodox' 
view of consensus, including its manifestations, origins and consequences, before turning 
its attention to the revisionist interpretations of wartime politics that cast doubt on the 
existence of any significant degree of inter-party agreement. It progresses to an analysis 
of the debate surrounding the movement in popular opinion that led to the Labour Party 
landslide election victory of 1945. It demonstrates how 1945 was orthodoxically 
portrayed as the consequence of wartime radicalism, before examining the views of 
revisionists who claim that Labour, despite their victory, held little appeal for the 
majority of voters. 
The Historiography of Consensus. 
Until the publication of Addison's The Road to 1945 (1975), British politics during the 
Second World War was a relatively barren area of historical research. For three decades 
a widespread view existed that, with the major parties agreeing an electoral truce on 23 
September 1939 and then the formation of an all-party coalition government in May 
1940, 'normal' politics had been suspended 'for the duration' with all energies 
concentrated instead on winning the War. The period consequently lacked a single, 
comprehensive political study, with the historiography of the Second World War 
focusing on the military, diplomatic and social (especially life during the Blitz) aspects of 
the War. Addison's study dramatically reversed this trend, spawning a plethora of 
further analyses and engendering a continuing debate. I 
Far from being a period of little interest to the political historian Addison 
concluded that the Second World War had tremendous repercussions on the course of 
British politics. He argued that the War initiated a period of consensus at elite level that 
underpinned policy decisions by successive governments for a generation. He accepts 
that differences between the Labour and Conservative parties, particularly at grass-roots 
and back-bench level remained profound, but between the front benches the pressures 
and experiences of the Home Front led to the emergence of a Whitehall consensus around 
an agreed framework of core values. Even between front benches Addison concedes that 
there were sharp differences, but claims these were ultimately subjugated to an agreed 
vision for post-war Britain. Addison has subsequently revisited and marginally revised 
his original thesis, but this central conclusion remains. 2 This consensus emerged not 
from a period of sharp political conflict but from the inter-war Baldwinite consensus of 
I safety first' which rejected bold state action in economic and social policy, in spite of the 
massive problems afflicting Britain's traditional industrial regions. The new, 
progressive consensus that emerged from the War would have appeared almost 
revolutionary in 1939 but by 1945 was, Addison argues, approved by all the major 
parties. Labour's victory in the 1945 general election was, therefore, not decisive in 
shaping the post-war settlement, for Attlee's administration was simply completing and 
consolidating legislation agreed during the wartime Coalition. 'Mr Attlee's Consensus' 
centred on the provision of a comprehensive, universal, welfare state (including a free 
National Health Service) to provide cover from 'cradle to grave'; a commitment to full 
employment; an acceptance of a mixed economy of public and private enterprise and the 
adoption of Keynesian economic policies of demand management. Advocates of the 
consensus thesis claim these core policies formed the basis of both Conservative and 
Labour government thinking until at least the election of Heath's administration in 1970 
and possibly as late as Thatcher's premiership in 1979.3 
Although the first to popularise the thesis, Addison was not the first to identify a 
wartime consensus. In 1945, a number of contemporary writers and politicians found 
little apparent difference between the main political protagonists. The sociologist Mark 
Abrams, reviewing the 1945 election in its immediate aftermath, wrote; "From an 
examination of the campaign literature officially provided by the headquarters of the 
parties it was difficult to discover any basic conflicts separating the left from the right. "4 
Even Winston Churchill, in his first speech as the Leader of the Opposition, remarked; 
"Here and there, there may be differences of emphasis or view, but in the main no 
parliament has ever assembled with such a mass of agreed legislation. "5 Amongst 
historians, ten years before the appearance of The Road to 1945, Beer was discussing the 
beginnings of 'policy convergence' during the War in his Modem British politiCS, 6 while 
in the late 1960s Calder also identified the Second World War as the begetter of a 
political consensus. He argued; 
From the consensus which was now developing sprang the ideology which 
was to govern the practice of both parties after the war. Capitalism, and 
with it a system of powerful private interests, must be preserved; but the 
state would take a positive role in promoting its efficiency, which would 
include measures of nationalization. In effect, this consensus included 
the whole of the centre of the British political life; Cripps and Eden, 
Herbert Morrison and R. A. Butler, the Liberal Action Group and the Tory 
Reformers, William Beveridge and William Temple and many influential 
members of the Fabian Society ... Superficially, party strife was recovering from 1942 onwards, and the Beveridge debate came to symbolize in the 
public mind the difference between Labour and Conservatives. Yet at the 
same time the coalition was laying the foundations of a post-war policy 
which both parties accepted, but which it fell to Labour to execute. 7 
In 1974 Gamble took up the consensus 'torch', demonstrating how Conservative attitudes 
had shifted during the War and how a group of Conservatives, who had been on the 
margins of British politics in the 1930s, such as Harold Macmillan and R. A. Butler, 
became some of the major shapers of the direction of poliCy. 8 
In the twenty-four years since the publication of The Road to 1945 many other 
studies have re-affirmed Addison's central thesis. Seldon agrees that the War replaced 
one consensus with another, arguing that a consensus existed in the 1930s until the early 
years of World War Two, with the Conservatives then having to accept a leftward move 
in the policy agenda in the 1940s. 9 Kavanagh and Morris have also identified large areas 
of agreement between Conservatives and Labour from the mid-1940s to the mid-1970s, 
again recognising the critical role of the War as its instigator. Indeed, they have widened 
the scope of consensus to incorporate two areas of Policy left untouched by The Road to 
19A5, foreign policy and industrial relations. 10 In a recent British political textbook, 
Jones and Robins have argued; "What was created during the war years and immediately 
afterwards was a political consensus that was to characterise British political culture for 
three decades", while Burch and Wood accept that out of the War emerged a consensus 
on an increased role for the state in economic and social policy. II Deakin has suggested 
that a consensus emerged in 1943, while Marquand dates the starting point of consensus 
as June 1944, when the Coalition published its White Paper on post-war employment 
policy. 12 Other advocates of the wartime consensus thesis include Searle, Ingle, and 
Dorey. 13 
Whilst most studies examine a broad range of policies in arriving at their 
conclusion, others have looked in more detail at specific policy areas, and have also 
found a large degree of continuity. In separate studies, Marquand and Hill have argued 
that the welfare state that emerged after the War was in large part a consolidation of 
measures already enacted or accepted in principle. 14 Meanwhile Middlemas, in his 
magisterial study of the politics of industry has identified the War as instigator of 
66 corporate bias". In his view, the 1944 Employment White Paper was the key to the 
post-war settlement, and the basis of a new social contract between trade unions, 
employers and the Government. Although the terms of this contract were subject to 
re-negotiation, the contract itself represented a new style of economic management, 
accepted by all administrations between 1945-74.15 
The Origins of Consensus. 
All these studies recognise the decisive role played by the War in the creation of a 
consensus which dominated British politics. But how did such a consensus emerge? 
The answer, consensus advocates suggest, lays in the nature of total war. A range of 
inter-related factors combined to produce a new policy direction, but one must begin by 
looking at what may best be described as the wartime spirit. 
For advocates of the consensus thesis, 1940 is one of the great turning points in 
the twentieth century. Calder, for example, states; "A consensual memory of 1940 was in 
fact an important basis for the political consensus which was achieved after the war. "; 
and Clarke has argued; "National unity, in the face of the grimmest threat the country had 
ever faced, pushed aside ordinary party politics; yet it is hardly too much to say that 1940 
brought a political revolution. "16 Put simply, the prevailing view contended; "1940 
marked the end of the 'bad times' and the beginning of the 'good times"'. 17 The popular 
view of British society from this point to the end of the War is of a people united as never 
before in defiance of a common enemy. From the time of Dunkirk the British people 
were, in the famous phrase, "all in it together" and united by a spirit of self-sacrifice. 
This was very much, in Churchill's phrase, the "people's war" in which everyone was 
involved, regardless of sex, age, class or ethnicity, sharing the same risks and hardships. 
People were thrown together into the melting pot of war and developed a greater sense of 
community and companionship towards their fellow man. Government policies served 
to reinforce these tendencies. Rationing, evacuation, conscription and communal 
air-raid shelters were believed to have strengthened social cohesion. 'Equality of 
sacrifice' was the cry. 
It is, of course, the Blitz that most catches the imagination. The enduring image 
of the Blitz is that of a tightly knit community standing shoulder-to-shoulder in defiance 
of German bombs. Bombs were the great equaliser, incapable of distinguishing between 
rich and poor and the folk-memory remains of communal singing in the underground 
shelters where people of all walks of life took their nightly refuge, of shop signs reading 
'Open as Usual' despite bomb-damage from the night before, of the King and Queen 
visiting the bombed East End after their own "House" was damaged in the ultimate 
symbol of equality of risk, and an overall atmosphere of brave, cheery resolution that 
ensured Londoners (and inhabitants of other cities) would not be intimidated by Hitler. 
In the summer of 1940, R. H. Tawney told the American people that the War had brought 
to the surface those 'elementary decencies' which bound British society together: 'good 
faith; * tolerance; respect for opinions which we do not share; consideration for the 
unfortunate; equal justice for all. '18 A. J. P. Taylor believed that 'England Arose', a 
theme also propagated by Orwell's The Lion and the Unicorn, and in 1942 the Labour 
historian, G. D. H. Cole wrote of the 'deep sense of national unity which holds us together 
as a people'. 19 
This belief was not confined to contemporaries, for modem historians have 
repeated the claim. Brooke, in his comprehensive study of the wartime Labour Party 
suggests; "During the war, the question of class versus community was resolved 
forcefully in favour of the latter" and that "the war emphasised Britain's essential 
unity.,, 20 Marquand contends; "There is plenty of evidence to suggest that a 
class-divided, socially-fragmented people discovered reserves of solidarity which it had 
not known it possessed; and that part of the reason was that, in however muddled a 
fashion, the political nation accepted an ethic of equality of sacrifice. ', 21 Ordinary 
people were the basis of the war effort and for Calder the fact that the ruling classes now 
needed the help of the everyday 'man in the street' was crucial to the post-war settlement. 
He argues; 
Between them, the threat of invasion and the actuality of aerial 
bombardment had exaggerated a tendency noted in the previous world 
war. In a conflict on such a scale, as 1914-18 had shown, the nation's 
rulers, whether they liked it or not, depended on the willing co-operation 
of the ruled, including even scorned and underprivileged sections of 
society, manual workers and women. This co-operation must be paid for 
by concessions in the direction of a higher standard of living for the poor, 
greater social equality and improved welfare services. For the conscripts 
in the armed forces were dangerous enemies to the old social order: jolted 
out of their acceptance of it by communal travel, hardship and danger. 
The rifle aimed at the enemy might be turned on the ruling classes, as it 
was in Russia. 22 
The social solidarity of the war years, it is claimed, led to an enhanced social 
conscience among middle and upper-class citizens towards their poorer countrymen, 
leading to a willingness to accept egalitarian and collectivist policies. These sentiments 
were augmented by illuminating and shocking social findings. Evacuation and the 
bombing of British cities highlighted the substandard condition of a significant 
proportion (around one-third) of the nation's housing, with w'ealthier sections of society 
made aware of the conditions in which many of their fellow citizens lived. The 
evacuation of schoolchildren highlighted levels of poverty. Shortly before the outbreak 
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of war, thousands of (mostly) working-class children were evacuated from the cities to 
new homes in the suburbs or the country. The condition of many of these children, the 
conventional argument contends, shocked and alarmed their largely middle-class hosts: 
stories were rife of verminous, illiterate children who did not know how to use a knife 
and fork, had little idea of personal hygiene and who were content to use the living room 
as a lavatory. 23 The then Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, was shocked by such 
findings. 24 In an argument first put forward by Titmuss in his study of wartime social 
policy, and later supported by Thorpe and Addison, the revelations of evacuation led to 
many in the wealthier classes resolving to tackle the poverty, bad housing and disease 
which blighted working-class life. 25 
Simultaneously, the War changed popular perceptions of what the state was 
capable of by necessitating extensive state control of industry, food, materials and 
manpower, dubbed "war socialism" by Conservatives. Crucially, what the Government 
had maintained was impossible in the inter-war years, state action to eradicate 
unemployment, was now shown to be both practical and achievable. The new emphasis 
on the state represented a change in the political culture that would underpin the post-war 
regime, regardless of the Party in power; 
The British state was, by any reckoning, remarkably successful, both by 
the standards of its own past, and by the standards of the other 
belligerents. It was successful, moreover, not only in raising armies and 
waging war, but in the gentler activities which Keynesians, planners and 
social reformers wanted it to undertake in peace. Ministers and civil 
servants turned out to be surprisingly good at managing the economy. No 
one who looked at the contrast between the fully-employed, highly 
mobilised command economy could deny that, in some circumstances, 
state intervention might be considerably more efficient than the higgle of 
the market. 26 
On the same theme, Harris has claimed; 
Public discussion in the mid 1940s constituted a profound break with 
some of the major conventions of the previous hundred years. Promises, 
programmes and planning had become the norm: those who questioned 
their validity now occupied the eccentric minority position previously 
occupied by programmers and planners. This change in perceptions of 
the mutual relationship between society and state. The older view of 
politics had seen society as essentially 'given', as something which might 
change or evolve with the course of history or according to its own inner 
dynamics but which at any given moment in time was largely outside the 
control of its members. The new view of politics saw society as 
something that could be moulded and modified, made and un-made by 
acts of political Will. 27 
Putting it into the consensus perspective, Addison argues; "Whether ministers were 
Conservative or Labour, they were borne along by a belief in the state as a modernizing 
influence.,, 28 
All these factors combined to sweep along the political parties towards a new, 
progressive consensus and the Coalition began to draw up plans for reconstruction from 
late 1942 onwards. Addison contends that, with leading Conservatives accepting there 
could be no return to the laissez-faire capitalism of the 1930s and with Labour 
maintaining its revisionist beliefs under the firm control of the Right (Attlee, Bevin and 
Morrison), the Coalition converged on the ideas of 'middle-opinion', a grouping first 
identified by Marwick in the 1960s. 29 'Middle-opinion' had developed as a 
consequence of the economic depression that had prevailed in large parts of Britain in the 
1920s and 1930s. Government appeared impotent, with orthodox Treasury doctrine 
failing to provide any effective solution. Consequently a number of groups, such as 
Political and Economic Planning (founded 1931) and The Next Five Years Group 
(founded 1934) and individuals such as the Conservative, Harold Macmillan and the 
economist, J. M. Keynes, advocated a 'middle-way' in economic and social policies that 
would lie between capitalism and state socialism. The 'middle-way' advocated a new 
and greatly increased role for the state and throughout the 1930s papers were published 
advocating universal social security, a National Health Service, a planned economy 
through the public ownership of essential industries, government direction of investment 
and controls over the private sector, and the use of Keynesian techniques of demand 
management to achieve and sustain full employment. 30 In the conventional view of 
wartime consensus these ideas became generally acceptable to the leadership of the major 
parties in the second half of the War. 
This consensus led to the 'White Paper Chase' of 1944, which saw the 
publication of a range of government documents relating to the shape of post-war Britain: 
on employment policy, social security, education, and town and country planning. Thus, 
by 1945, a "massive new middle ground had arisen in politics [with] all three parties 
going to the polls committed to principles of social and economic reconstruction which 
their leaders had endorsed as members of the coalition.,, 31 Addison and other advocates 
of his thesis admit that during the election campaign the rhetorical debate between 
socialism and capitalism was renewed with acrimony but claims that the difference was 
exactly that - rhetorical. He believes; "In practice, the Conservative and Labour leaders 
had by-passed most of it in favour of pragmatic reform in a mixed economy.,, 32 Similar 
conclusions have been reached by Middlemas, Dutton and O'Gorman. 33 
The Revisionist Interpretation of Wartime Politics. 
Among proponents of the consensus thesis the content of the wartime settlement, and its 
origins, have aroused little controversy. There has, however, been a higher degree of 
disagreement surrounding the consequences of the wartime settlement. For most 
supporters of the Addison thesis, the wartime consensus resulted in a more benevolent 
and fairer society, which ensured that there would be no return to the conditions 
experienced by many in the 1930s. The consensus was a "good thing". Addison 
himself stated that the consensus was "positive and purposeftil: the basis of a more 
enlightened and humane society. -34 However, whilst accepting that a consensus did 
exist some historians, and both sides of the political spectrum, have been critical of the 
wartime settlement. Calder sees the consensus as a negative construct. Although it had 
been a "People's War", he interprets the wartime consensus as a victory for the forces of 
privilege and bureaucracy over the 'participatory democracy' of 1940-42. He wrote; 
The war was fought with the willing brains and hearts of the most 
vigorous elements in the community, the educated, the skilled, the active, 
the young who worked more and more consciously towards a transformed 
post-war world. Thanks to their energy, the forces of wealth, bureaucracy 
and privilege survived with little inconvenience, recovered from their 
shock, and began to proceed with their old business of manoeuvre, 
concession and studied betrayal. Indeed, this war, which had set off a 
fennent of participatory democracy was strengthening meanwhile the 
forces of tyranny, pressing Britain forward towards 1984.35 
Pelling has also suggested that the War was not greatly innovatory, having emerged 
victorious the British concluded that their institutions had been vindicated, thereby 
ensuring a post-war settlement that was much less radical than might have been the case; 
"Somehow or other, things in their own country were arranged much better than 
elsewhere in the world - even if, in limited directions only, there might be some room for 
improvement.,, 36 By the late 1960s and 1970s, left-wing writers were strongly critical 
of the Attlee Governments of 1945-51. In their judgement, by implementing the policies 
agreed upon by the wartime Coalition, Labour were merely collaborating with capitalism 
and deliberately ignoring the chance to create a socialist utopia. 37 The New Right, in the 
late 1970s and the 1980s, were also critical. The most notable attack on the wartime 
consensus came from Barnett who attacked the Coalition for its failure to address the 
fundamental problems created by Britain's industrial backwardness and was critical of 
'utopian' reformers such as Beveridge for imposing on the economy the burden of an 
expensive welfare state. 38 In 1985 John Hoskyns, Mrs Thatcher's policy adviser at No. 
10., summarized the New Right thesis; "In 1945 Britain committed itself to full 
employment by demand management and simultaneously embarked upon wholesale 
nationalisation and the creation of the welfare state, before rebuilding its productive base. 
It has not yet recovered - and may never recover - from this strategic error. ', 39 
There has been an increasing tendency to challenge the orthodox view of wartime 
solidarity, and it is no longer regarded as axiomatic that the British people came together 
as never before, with a breaking-down of class barriers. This revisionism was reflected 
in a series of essays in War and Social Change. British Society in the Second World 
Wu (1986) and more recently in Tiratsoo, Fielding and Thompson's England Arise! The 
Labour Party and Popular Politics in 1940s Britain (1997)40 They suggest that the War 
was far less disruptive of social relations than was once imagined. By concentrating on 
the Blitz and evacuation, Tiratsoo, Fielding and Thompson demonstrate that pre-war 
prejudices remained intact throughout the War and that, if anything, wartime experiences 
served to re-affirm these prejudices. In their study of the Blitz they dispute the notion of 
the sharing of shelters and common danger breaking down class barriers and increasing 
'mateyness'. They point out that only a small minority (around 13 per cent) actually 
used the Tube or other public shelters so, for the vast majority, the Blitz was a private, 
familial experience. 41 Citing the example of Stepney in East London, they argue that a 
significant body of evidence suggests that even for the minority who did use public 
shelters, social harmony was fragile. The small West African and West Indian 
community in the area complained about discrimination, particularly from Jews, and of 
inferior air-raid accommodation. East End anti-Semitism also appeared to increase 
during the Blitz. 42 Such evidence has led the authors to conclude; "The experience 
rarely brought people together to the extent that some imagined. As has been shown, 
family or neighbourhood loyalties sometimes remained paramount at moments of great 
danger. The image of a people standing together in communal defiance of the German 
bombs seems to be, in part, a myth., 43 England Arise! also challenges the belief 
that evacuation fostered a new social consciousness among the country's middle and 
upper-classes. Again, evacuation is perceived to have merely re-affirmed existing 
prejudices as the condition and behaviour of many of the children provoked not 
sympathy, but disgust and resentment among their hosts; bed-wetting and headlice were 
evidence of "lax moral standards" or a "needlessly unwholesome life style". As a result, 
as the War progressed, there was an increasing reluctance to accommodate evacuees. 44 
Consequently, "The common danger and anxieties of war had certainly not diminished 
long-standing prejudices about the urban poor ... Many host families continued to believe 
that the condition of the evacuee children reflected incompetence and laziness rather than 
social and economic deprivation. "45 As early as 1974, Marwick cast doubt on the belief 
that evacuation magically dispelled middle-class prejudices about their being a feckless 
and dirty section of the working-clasS. 46 Macnicol suggests that evacuation did help to 
construct an ideological climate favourable to welfarism but that it simultaneously 
boosted a conservative, behaviouristic analysis of poverty that viewed the root cause of 
the children's condition as family failure and poor parenting, suggesting a continuity with 
nineteenth century attitudes. Therefore; "evacuation probably served to reinforce 
existing [unfavourable] analyses of working-class poverty rather than to change them.,, 47 
Morgan has also disputed the notion that the class system underwent drastic 
changes during the War; "It was clear ... that the 
belief that the British class system 
dissolved or was basically modified during the war is a total myth ... In some ways, the 
war hardened rather than dissolved social distinctions"48 This view is supported by 
Cronin, who demonstrates that the 1945,1950 and 1951 elections were the most 
class-dominated elections of the century. This, he points out, is hardly reconcilable with 
a unified civilian population. 49 
Calder's Myth of the Rfitz. (1991) examines the period from the outbreak of war 
to the end of the Blitz, and portrays the 'spirit of 1940' as a constructed myth that has 
become deeply ingrained in British thought. Although he emphasises that 'myth' does 
not necessarily imply untruth, he contends that the stereotyped clichds of the Blitz 
('London can take it') were deliberately exaggerated for propaganda purposes for 
domestic and, more particularly, for American consumption. Far from being a people 
united in their eagerness to defeat Hitler, Calder suggests that in 1940 "latent pacifism 
was widespread" and that Dunkirk and the Battle of Britain did not destroy the mutual 
antipathy of workers and management characteristic of large sections of British 
industry. 50 In the early stages of the War; "What [people] experienced was a perturbing 
sense of anti-climax, during which class divisions in British society were demonstrated 
and exacerbated as at no time since the 1926 General Strike.,, 51 The bravery and 
togetherness of the British people under air assault is portrayed as a myth constructed 
during the London Blitz, partly to impress the Americans (the phrase 'taking it' was 
actually American) and once this basic 'story' was scripted it was simply transposed en 
bloc to any other city that was targeted. Mass Observation reports, Calder suggests, with 
their tales of panic, despair and depression, presented a very different picture from the 
standard view and demonstrated that "morale (however defined) remained potentially 
volatile throughout 1940. ', 52 
Tom Harrisson, the founder of Mass Observation, has suggested that recollections 
about the wartime spirit are nostalgic rather than realistic. In an experiment conducted 
in the 1970s Harrisson asked a number of his 1940 Observers to recall their memories of 
1940 and without exception they told of a united people and the Dunkirk spirit whereas 
their observations made in 1940 itself were shown to flatly contradict their later 
memories. 53 They had, at the time, described a society very similar to that portrayed by 
revisionist historians. 
For a decade after The Road to 1945 Addison's thesis of a wartime 
consensus remained almost totally unchallenged. 54 However, since the mid- I 980s doubt 
has been cast on the existence of consensus in key areas of policy. As Ritschel points 
out; "There is a growing body of revisionist opinion which contends that the belief in 
wartime consensus was little more than a congenial myth, born of the transitory solidarity 
of the Blitz and revived more recently by nostalgia for an idealised past of national unity 
and agreement.,, 55 For this school of thought the election of a Labour Government in 
1945 was crucial to the shape of post-war British social and economic policy. The most 
noted, and persuasive, revisionist rebuttal of Addison has been Jefferys' The Churchill 
Coalition and Wartime Politics 1940-1945.56 In this provocative study, Jefferys disputes 
the idea of the Coalition as a radical, reforming ministry and suggests that the 
maintenance of the agreement between Conservative and Labour leaders was contingent 
on agreeing to disagree. On crucial issues, where controversy threatened to erupt, such 
as over the future of voluntary hospitals or the future ownership of industry, party 
conflict was avoided only by postponing the matter under consideration; differences 
between the parties were not merely rhetorical but real differences of ideology and policy. 
The Coalition programme for reconstruction remained very much at the planning stage. 
For example, despite its popularity, the Beveridge Report was not implemented before 
1945, and apart from the 1944 Education Act and the introduction of family allowances, 
no major piece of social legislation reached the statute books before the end of the War. 
Jefferys claims; "the reason for this was clear cut: it reflected, at base, intractable 
differences between the Coalition partners. The Government, to a large extent, was 
incapable of proceeding beyond promises of reform.,, 57 These 'intractable differences', 
he argues, were reflected in the various coalition White Papers which, far from being an 
agreed basis for a post-war settlement, were compromise documents that were 
sufficiently vague to allow very different interpretations. Furthermore neither Party 
planned to implement their proposals without amendments in the direction of respective 
party policies. Thus; "Britain's welfare state and mixed economy, in other words, were 
not cast in tablets of stone by the end of the war.,, 58 He draws attention to the 1945 
election and the nature of Labour's legislation in the post-war years in support of this 
view. The election, he claims, far from being consensual, was "marked by profound and 
often bitterly expressed disagreements", while the programme of the Labour Government 
was, distinctive from that of the wartime Coalition. " Jefferys does not challenge the 
view that a consensus existed in the 1950s and 1960s, but believes that its origins lay in 
the years after 1945 and selects 1947 as the starting point of consensus. From this time, 
he argues, the Labour Government began to lose its cohesion and radical sense of 
direction after being shaken by a series of economic crises and the Conservatives, after 
being shaken by their humiliating defeat, had rethought their domestic policies leading to 
The Industrial Charter (1947) which, he contends, broadly committed the Party to the 
mixed economy including an attachment to Keynesianism. 
Another critic of the consensus thesis is Pimlott, who discounts the whole notion 
of consensus, even in its supposed heyday of the 1950s and 1960s. In a powerful 
polemic, 'The myth of consensus', he argues; "consensus is a mirage, an illusion that 
rapidly fades the closer one gets to it. -60 He joins with Jefferys in claiming that 1945 
was the most ferocious election campaign in post-war history, while he sees in the Attlee 
Governments deep battles between the parties over a wide range of policies, disputes 
that continued after Labour lost power in 1951; "Sandbagged in the electoral trenches, 
early post-war voters can be seen as the anonymous infantry of two implacably opposed 
armies in an era of adversarial politics, with the middle-way Liberals floundering in no 
man's land.,, 61 
Brooke, in his monograph on the wartime Labour Party, has also argued against a 
wartime consensus, claiming that debates about reconstruction "inevitably fell along 
party lines"' and "in terms of policy, ideologically Labour retained a distinctive 
programme-62 Labour, he argues, were divided from the Conservatives by three key 
principles of social policy. In terms of social security, the Labour Party stood for 
subsistence level benefits, on health Labour envisaged a full-time state salaried staff 
working in health centres under the control of local authorities, which was in opposition 
to the Conservatives' continued preference for the maintenance of private practice and 
voluntary hospitals; and on education Labour favoured multilateral schooling (an 
embryonic form of the comprehensive school) rather than the tripartite system of 
grammar, secondary modem and technical schools. Such distinctions meant; 
"Differences more substantial than mere nuance or rhetoric persisted ... It was obvious that 
Labour would take a more radical course if it took power after the war. -63 Morgan has 
identified a number of policy areas in which the Conservative and Labour parties and 
their supporters were significantly at odds; "On nationalisation, full employment, a 
National Health Service, housing, taxation, and much else in domestic policy, (not to 
mention India, Egypt, and other aspects of external policy) British political opinion was 
clearly polarized in Westminster and throughout the land. "64 Morgan also rejects the 
notion of 1945 being a consensual election and points out the extent of political 
polarization, of barely suppressed anger, was much noted by foreign observers. 65 
Jefferys, Brooke and Morgan have all identified the health services as being an 
area of particular conflict, and indeed party conflict in the origins of the National Health 
Service has also been a significant theme of the health service's official historian, Charles 
Webster. He dismisses the view of the N. H. S. being a product of wartime consensus. 
He has complained that scholarship has hijacked the N. H. S. "to support the consensus as 
the basis for innovation in health policy-66 and claims; "Although a skilful cosmetic 
exercise, the 1944 White Paper signified little progress in resolving acute disagreements 
over the future direction of policy.,, 67 
A recent revisionist assault on the consensus thesis came with the publication in 
1996 of a series of essays in The Myjh of Consensus: New Views on British HistojZý 
1945-64.68 In her study of social policy, Harriet Jones emphasises the continuing 
dominance of liberal ideas in the Conservative Party into the post-war years. 69 She 
argues that in response to the Labour Government's policies of nationalisation, 
universalism in the social services and the suppression of consumer demand through a 
continuing policy of austerity, the Conservatives soon articulated a distinctively 
Conservative alternative based around the values of the free market, low taxation and 
property ownership. Conservatives, she claims, were in no sense reconciled to the 
welfare state in the years following the War. Instead there developed a strong opposition 
to the universalism and redistributive elements of the Labour programme, based upon the 
rejection of the use of the state as a tool to redistribute wealth or to maintain the 
egalitarian trends introduced during the war years. 70 
Ellison, in his study of Labour's approach to social policy, draws a distinction 
between 'procedural' and 'substantive' consensus. 71 He accepts that 'a notable level of 
procedural consensus' (a broad agreement amongst political elites about the basic 
direction of policy making) existed between the parties. However, at a 'substantive' 
level (that is ideological identification about the aims and objectives of specific policies) 
significant differences emerged. Consensus advocates, he claims, have focused too 
heavily on the procedural dimension, obscuring important substantive differences, and he 
examines the notion of equality in intra-party Labour debates in the 1940s and 1950s, 
pointing to competing visions of a socialist society within the Party, all of which were 
incompatible with Conservative objectives. This distinctiveness in Labour policy is also 
addressed by Francis who argues that the policies of the post-war Labour government 
owed less to wartime experience than commitment to its socialist ideology: "Far from 
pursuing the politics of consensus, in the areas of economic planning, public ownership, 
taxation, health, housing and education, the Attlee Government invested its policies with 
a specifically socialist character.,, 72 
Kandiah examines the attitudes of the Conservative leadership and comes down 
firmly against consensus. 73 He points to the virulence of the 1945 General Election, 
claiming; "[The] campaign revealed the cleavages - not consensus or convergence - 
between Conservatives and Labour.,, 74 He argues that the Conservatives' 1945 platform 
was based on anti-socialism, the preservation of capitalism, limited reform, a belief in 
individual freedom, continued emphasis on the private sector, free markets and free 
enterprise - policies that set them well apart from Labour. 75 He rejects Jefferys' 
suggestion that the Conservative Party changed itself in the post-war years, claiming that 
the Party's platform in 1945 established broad parameters in which the Party was to 
operate in subsequent years. Kandiah accepts that there may have been superficial 
I agreement on policy goals', but that underneath this veneer lay profound disagreements 
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between party leaders on policy solutions and over the details of how these solutions 
should be achieved; "The purpose of the 'agreed' goals for each of the parties was 
distinct; and the concept of society to be preserved or created was entirely different.,, 76 
The Swing to the Left and the 1945 General Election. 
While the question of consensus has been the dominant theme of Second World War 
political historiography, a second widely examined theme has been the 'swing to the left' 
that produced Labour's 1945 election victory. That such a swing did occur is 
indisputable. Labour had been heavily defeated in the general election of 1935 and 
by-elections held in the months prior to the War showed no evidence of a significant 
swing to Labour, but in 1945 Labour received 48 per cent of the vote, winning a massive 
majority of over 140 seats, their first Parliamentary majority and their largest until 
1997.77 The orthodox view of this 'swing' (Addison, Marwick, Adelman, Clarke, 
Brooke, and Morgan) contends that the War radicalised popular opinion, pushing the 
public (including, for the first time, substantial sections of the middle-class) in a leftward 
direction and away from the Conservative Party which had governed for virtually all of 
the inter-war period. 
1940 is again identified as the pivotal turning point in mass opinion. The very 
forces which were bringing the parties together were paradoxically turning the electorate 
towards the Labour Party: military humiliation at Dunkirk turned the people against the 
pre-war (Conservative) "Guilty Men... who were responsible for the country's military 
unpreparedness, while the new emphasis on equal shares, equality of sacrifice and the 
concept of "planning" appeared to vindicate much of what Labour had advocated in the 
1930S. 78 This new mood stimulated a massive popular interest in building a 'better 
Britain' where there would be no return to the bad housing, unemployment and 
consequent poverty that blighted so many lives in the inter-war period. This 
determination was fuelled by memories of promises -'homes for heroes' - that had been 
broken following World War One. It has been common for historians to suggest that the 
electorate went to the polls in 1945 with a clear vision of what the future should entail; 
"At the end of the war the majority had a clearer idea than ever before what it was they 
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expected from a modem, civilised society.,, 79 Taylor agreed; "The British people had 
exchanged many of their imperialist values for those associated with the welfare state. "80 
For proponents of the orthodox view of the "swing to the left", the relationship 
between Labour and the new popular mood was essentially unproblematic. Labour's 
election victory of 1945 is portrayed as an enthusiastic endorsement of the Party's 
policies and priorities which, it is claimed, were firmly in line with those of the 
electorate: a N. H. S., full employment and an enhanced welfare state. Addison is typical 
in uncritically accepting the premise that the radical mood of 1940 instigated a tide of 
support for Labour or, as he terms them, 'Labour substitutes' in by-elections, that 
culminated in the Party's massive victory in 1945; "The trend was essentially towards 
left-wing attitudes, with the Labour Party as the natural beneficiary whenever party 
politics revived.,, 81 For Addison, the leftward swing peaked between 194042, 
suggesting that had a general election taken place in this period Labour would have 
received an even greater majority than in 1945.82 Labour built on this leftwards 
sentiment by enthusiastically endorsing measures of reconstruction while the 
Conservatives were seen as, at best, reluctant converts to the new social agenda. So, 
although Addison contends that both parties had accepted the 'post-war settlement', only 
Labour could be trusted to implement it. 
Morgan also has little difficulty in explaining the relationship between popular 
sentiment and the Labour Party; "Labour's victory, in short, can only reasonably be 
projected against the circumstances of the war years ... Labour was uniquely identified 
with a sweeping change of mood during the war years and with the new social agenda 
that emerged. Labour alone seemed to understand and project the new mood.,, 83 The 
belief that Labour was 'uniquely identified' with the new public mood has also been 
evident in the writings of Adelman and Clarke, who again trace Labour's victory back to 
1940; "The year 1940 [saw] the beginnings of the policy of 'blood, toil, tears and sweat' 
- the total mobilisation of the whole nation for the war effort, which implied a new 
emphasis on 'planning' and 'egalitarianism'. These ideas fitted in pre-eminently with 
Labour's ethos.,, 84 Clarke argues; "In the last part of the war the Labour Party gave 
,, 85 institutional form to the radical impulses of 19404 1. 
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The Revisionist View of the Swing to the Left. 
Although Labour's victory at the 1945 election was commonly believed to have 
represented enthusiastic support for Labour policies that dated back to the crisis year of 
1940, this interpretation has come under attack. Fielding and Tiratsoo, for example, 
question the depth of pro-Labour sentiment during the War. In his provocative studies 
of popular opinion in 1942 and the 1945 General Election, Fielding argues that the 
radicalism of the British people, far from moving them towards one particular party, was 
actually moving them away from all parties, and suggests; "It is possible that it was this 
anti-party temper rather than any enthusiasm for any particular political organization, that 
was the most noteworthy characteristic of the radicalism produced by the 'people's 
war ... 86. Although he accepts that populism was mobilised primarily against the 
Conservatives, he contends that this did not automatically lead to support for Labour. 
Instead; "There was widespread uncertainty that any of the parties could be trusted to 
execute such a programme.,, 87 As late as the summer of 1944 a Gallup poll found that 
36 per cent of its civilian sample felt politicians acted on the behalf of the country's 
interests, 35 per cent thought they looked out for themselves and 22 per cent suggested 
they were only concerned with party advantage. 88 To further support his view of the 
unpopularity of all political parties, Fielding points to the success of the (nominally) 
independent, Sir Stafford Cripps, in his attempt to enter the War Cabinet in early 1942 
and the success of independent candidates in by-elections of that year. For Fielding, it 
was Cripps' very independence from political organisations that made him the second 
most popular politician (after Churchill) in the first four months of the year, while the 
success of independents represented more than just frustration at the country's poor 
military performance. During 1942 48 per cent of civilians lacked confidence in all the 
parties, while a poll taken six months later suggested little enthusiasm for a return to 
two-party politics. 89 Fielding eýiphasises that Labour's success in 1945 need not 
necessarily be evidence of the disappearance of anti-party sentiment and his study of the 
1945 election portrays a largely politically apathetic population exhibiting little 
enthusiasm for either Conservative or Labour parties. 90 Many of those who did vote 
Labour, he suggests, did so despite many misgivings and largely because they did not 
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want a Conservative government, rather than because of any great understanding of, or 
support for, Labour's programme. 91 Despite the impression of a massive Labour 
victory, he points out that the Party won only marginally more than 33 per cent of the 
votes of those eligible to exercise the franchise. 92 Fielding is also careful to play down 
the extent to which the middle-class fell to Labour. Although admitting that the Labour 
vote in 1945 was more socially disparate than in pre-war years, he notes that even among 
the sections of the middle-classes in which Labour did best, more than twice as many still 
voted Conservative. 93 This suggests that the scale of any social consensus, as propagated 
by the traditional view of Labour's victory, has been exaggerated. 
Fielding, Tiratsoo and Thompson's England Arise! challenges the belief that the 
British people knew what they wanted in 1945 and in consequence voted Labour. They 
point out that a Ministry of Information survey of 1942 found that between 5-20 Per cent 
of the population had actually been thinking seriously about the country's future, with 
most favouring state-led solutions. However, they argue, the great majority of people 
did not share these interests or sentiments; "Above all else, the war had been extremely 
disruptive and so there was a common desire that it should be followed by a period of 
normalcy. The priority was to restart home and work-life on a civilian basis as quickly 
as possible. Wider questions seemed less pressing.,, 94 Although they accept that 
nobody wanted a return to the conditions of the 1930s, and that many did have 'vague 
and nebulous' ideas about the future, this tended to be the limit of popular thinking about 
political abstractions. 95 As with Fielding's election study, England Arisel suggests that 
many voted Labour for negative purposes, namely "because they actually disliked the 
Conservatives more than Attlee's party. ', 96 
Sibley's study of the swing to Labour casts doubt on the orthodox view of both 
the timing of the swing, and the reasons for the Party's election victory. He disputes 
Addison's thesis that the Conservatives could not have won a general election at any 
point after mid- 1940, claiming; "If there had been a general election in ... 1940 the Labour 
Party would not have won the landslide victory which it did win in 1945, but would 
probably have been quite decisively defeated.,, 97 Sibley argues that the swing to Labour 
was a longer-term movement than the orthodox view would suggest. In the early stages 
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of the War he suggests that the public mood was "massively favourable to the Labour 
Party's programme". However this not been translated into support for the Party itself. 98 
He identifies three phases of public opinion between 1940-45 leading to Labour's 
triumph: a generalised discontent in the very early stages of the War, changing to a 
focusing of this discontent on the Conservatives by 1942, followed by a crystallising of 
opinion in favour of Labour, expressed at by-elections in support for the "Labour 
substitute" candidates. 99 Sibley therefore identifies the real swing to Labour as 
occurring after 1942. 
Sibley also disputes the widely held view that it was Labour's commitment to full 
employment, the welfare state and the N. H. S. that led to their election victory. He 
demonstrates that although a majority during the War held views on specific issues which 
corresponded to Labour's position, polls taken after the election suggests that attitudes 
towards policy were rarely given as reasons for voting Labour and points out that a 
current view held by psephologists about the post-war electorate is that specific policies 
rarely motivated voting behaviour and that negative or vague motives and habit were 
much more common, at least among Labour voters. 100 He submits; "There seems to 
have been a considerable negative and vague element in the motives if those who voted 
Labour. "101 
Jefferys insists that the real swing to Labour did not occur until after 1942. The 
'radical spirit' of 1940 has been overstated as an explanation of Labour's success in 
1945, the emotions of that year were inevitably superseded by other influences and 
experiences, according to how the War unfolded. 102 In 1940-42 the Conservatives 
suffered in the public eye because of the shortcomings of the war effort, but contends that 
the Conservative malaise only became irreversible after 1943 when the Party shunned the 
chance of implementing far-reaching social reform. 103 
Conclusion. 
The last fifteen years have witnessed a fundamental shift in interpretations of wartime 
politics. The earlier, generally accepted truism of the War representing a watershed, 
instigating a bold, new, cross-party consensus on social and economic issues emerging 
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from an unprecedented degree of unification amongst the British people has been 
replaced by an increasingly widespread revisionist view that the War had, in reality, little 
long-term repercussions on the course of British politics. The perception of Britons 'all 
pulling together' are now regarded as mythical and nostalgic, while studies of party 
politics stress the extent of continuing differences between the main political 
protagonists. 
In the same vein, explanations for Labour's historic victory at the 1945 General 
Election have been subject to significant re-interpretations. For some time the result of 
the election was perceived as the consequence of enthusiastic cross-class support for 
Labour policies, which appeared to enmesh with the public mood. Now, however, it is 
more commonly argued that the 1945 election polarised the electorate on class lines, and 
that many of those who voted Labour for the first time did so without enthusiasm, simply 
because Labour was less unpopular than the Conservatives. The dissertation will now 
address Manchester politics and will suggest that the revisionists have put forward a 
more defensible interpretation of wartime British politics. 
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Introd ction. 
This chapter briefly analyses Manchester's socio-economic conditions and political 
trends between 1918-1939, and argues that the period witnessed an increasingly strong 
tendency towards class polarisation. This polarisation, it will be suggested, was 
reflected in the city's transformation from three party politics to two party politics in both 
Parliamentary and municipal elections, as the Liberals faded into near-obscurity. 
However, the process of class polarisation was far from complete by the outbreak of the 
Second World War. 
Socio-Economec Conditions in Intern-War Manchester. 
Manchester, in common with other traditional industrial areas of Britain, knew hard 
times between the Wars. Fortunately Manchester did not rely, contrary to popular 
beliefs, on the cotton industry for employment and the city's complex industrial base 
protected it against the worst effects of the Depression (see Table 2.1): 
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I" Numbers of Insured Workers, aged 16-64, July 1923 & July 1937.1 
Industry 1923 1937 Inerease\Decrease (% 
Transport & Distribution 71240 91 5 10 28+ 
Engineering &Metals 
(including electrical 
engineering) 
69850 _ 80060 15+ 
Clothing 34000 45230 33+ 
Cotton & Textiles 41660 36530 12- 
Building 19080 24090 27+ 
Printing & Publishing 11 15 15 960 9 43+ 
Food & Drink 10 370ý: 66ý9ýO 
ý14 
42+ 
Chemicals 8650 10670 23+ 
- Rubber 11 970 9570 20- 
Hotels etc 7310 8880 21+ 
Coal 7610 650 26- 
Docks 7040 4740 33- 
Laundries 2300 4140 80+ 
All other industries & 
services 
84140 108500 29+ 
Total, all industries and 
services 
386370 460220 19+ 
Manchester was more reliant on heavy engineering and locomotive works, munitions, 
electrical plant, and structural steel, chains and wire were all manufactured on an 
extensive scale. Manchester engineering production far surpassed that of cotton, and 
employed twice as many -people. 
2 The city also had other interests, including banking 
and commerce, chemicals (based at Trafford Park) and foodstuffs (again based at 
Trafford Park and reliant on imports from the Docks). With these diverse interests, 
levels of unemployment were lower in Manchester than the national average and did not 
begin to approach the levels of the worst afflicted areas but the figures were still high 
(see Table 2.2). 
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1927-1936_(y Q). 
3 
YEAR 0% 
1927 7.3 
1928 7.6 
1929 8.4 
1930 17.8 
1931 18.7 
1932 16.3 
1933 15.9 
1934 13.9 
1935 13.4 
1936 11.3 
There were several demonstrations in the city protesting about the level of unemployment 
and ftu-ther bad feeling was created by the terms of unemployment relief, including the 
dreaded 'means test', which was perhaps detested more in Lancashire than in any other 
part of Britain. A cut in benefit rates in 1931 provoked one of the largest demonstrations 
in the city during this period. In early October, a week after agitation in neighbouring 
Salford over such cuts, 5,000 marchers assembled at Ardwick Green with the aim of 
marching to the Town Hall and forcing the City Council to accept a deputation. When 
police informed the marchers that they could not use the planned route they rushed the 
police cordon. Fighting broke out in which stones and hammer-heads were reported to 
have been thrown. Policemen were pulled from their horses and a police baton charge 
was made in which 6 people were hurt and 38 arrested. The following day the police put 
a guard on shops, banks, courts and other public buildings in the city and Special 
Constables were mobilised on a large scale for the first time since the General Strike. 4 
There were parts of the city where unemployment was much higher than those 
listed above, notably in the inner residential ring of Miles Platting, Chorlton-on Medlock, 
Hulme, Ancoats, Angel Meadow and Red Bank. Investigators from Manchester 
University in 1934 found a quarter of all households contacted in Miles Platting had no 
earned income from any family member and among adult males in the sample no less 
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than 42.5 per cent were unemployed at the time of the survey. 5 Not surprisingly, social 
investigations in the city found the worst examples of poverty in these areas. In October 
1932 Alf Purcell, Secretary of the Manchester and Salford Trades Council declared; 
"Winter is upon us. Want and hunger are rife in our midst. Hundreds of thousands of 
men, women and children in Manchester and Salford are going short of many things they 
need; are in desperate want; are going hungry; are suffering numerable privations. ', 6 A 
survey of Miles Platting in 1933 found 18 per cent of the area's population were living in 
primary poverty and a finther 26 per cent living in secondary poverty (defined as a level 
of income between 0-50 per cent above the poverty line). 7 A survey conducted by the 
Manchester University Settlement, carried out in Ancoats in 1937-38, found an even 
worse situation. This survey of 254 households found that 30.7 per cent of the 
population was living in primary poverty and 33 per cent in secondary poverty. The 
survey's authors believed that a level of income 200 per cent above the poverty line was 
necessary to provide a "reasonable margin for holidays, luxuries and saving". 8 The 
survey contained details of a representative weekly budget for a family of five, including 
three children under 14; their total income was 35s per week from the Unemployment 
Assistance Board, which left them 34 per cent below the poverty line. A total of 59 per 
cent of their income was spent on food, with a further 29 per cent spent on rent, which 
left only 14 per cent or under 5s per week to provide clothes, fuel, furnishings and all 
other household expenses before amusement could even be considered. This study 
revealed that even in 1937-38 a trip to the cinema was a luxury beyond the means of most 
people. 9 The consequences of such poverty were to be graphically illustrated in the 
evacuation of schoolchildren from the city in 1939. 
The condition of a substantial proportion of Manchester's housing left a great deal 
to be desired. In 1921 it was estimated that there were 150,000 people living in slum 
properties in the city. 10 In the early 1930s official reports and private studies revealed 
no improvement; in 1933 Manchester's Medical Officer estimated that there were 30,000 
unfit houses in the city, with the worst problem areas being Hulme, Ancoats, St Georges 
and parts of Cheetham. Across the city, 80,000 houses were considered little better. The 
JJ 
average death rate for the city was 14.5 per 1000, but in the slums it rose dramatically: in 
the Medlock Street area of Hulme it was 23.62 whilst off Deansgate it rose to 29 per 
1000.11 Three reports conducted by the Manchester and Salford Better Housing Council 
provided harrowing details of the condition of some of the city's housing. In 1932, a 
survey of 326 houses in Hulme had discovered 165 to be in "indifferent" or "bad" 
condition, and only 66 were regarded as "satisfactory". To give an idea of the standards 
set, one should note that a "satisfactory" house was regarded as one which needed no 
major repairs, had a drip free roof and was only "fairly free" from vermin. Almost 80 per 
cent had to cope without a food store in their homes. 12 
Two further studies found similar problems in other areas. A survey undertaken 
in Chorlton-on-Medlock, (an area now including the B. B. C. and U. M. I. S. T. ) concluded 
that life was; 
A constant fight against vermin firmly entrenched in the old and 
crumbling walls. In the whole district there is hardly a pantry or any 
similar cool, airy place in which the housekeeper could store food. The 
few cupboards... are invariably in a recess at the side of the kitchen fire. 
Of necessity the family fire must bum from about 6arn to I Opm. in many 
homes. Even if the food is not exposed to the attacks of bugs and beetles, 
it cannot withstand the heat of the kitchen fire. Added to this there is the 
weekly discomfort of the family wash which, if the weather is damp, must 
be hung in the only living room. 13 
The investigators pointed out that these were by no means the worst streets they could 
find, and nor were they unique; "There are acres and acres of similar property in the belt 
of slums surrounding the centre of Manchester. "14 An investigation into the slums 
behind London Road (now Piccadilly) Station found families in housing dating back to 
the 1740s. 15 Sir Ernest Simon, a former Liberal M. P. and a dedicated advocate of 
improving urban conditions investigated Angel Meadow for The Rebuilding o 
Manchester (193 5) and found; 
No. 4, F Street. The general appearance and condition of this house are 
very miserable. It is a dark house and plaster on the passage walls, in 
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particular. was in a bad condition. There is no sink or tap in the house: 
they arc in a small yard. consequently in frosty weather the family is 
without water. In this live a man and wife and seven children, ranging 
from 15 to I and a large, ifvarýying, number of rats. 16 
Commenting on tile area as a whole, he wrote; 
Throw, hout tile areas covered by the surveys. dampness, leaking roofs, 
peeling plaster, and general dilapidation were so common as to be almost 
the rule, the same can be said regarding infestation with bugs, which is so 
normal a 1eature of slum houses and which is practically impossible to 
deal with in a house which has been infested for years. 17 
Simon believed; "In Manchester, practically all the houses in the slum belt, numbering 
about 80,000. will have to be demolished and replaced by modem houses or flats, before 
the city's housing can be regarded as satisfactory. " 18 Photographs 2.1 and 2.2 
demonstrate the exterior and interior of a typical Manchester slum: 
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Photograph 2.2: The Int rior of a Manchester Slutn- 
Ofcoursc, attempts were made to improve Manchester's housing in the inter-war period. 
The City Council was one of the first to respond positively to the 1919 1 lousing Act 
(which gave subsidies to local authorities to build houses) and in the next 20 years the 
COLHICII constructed a number ofcorporation estates. Between 1920 and 19318. a total of 
27,447 council houses were erected, with a further 8.315 built by private contractors with 
financial help from the Council. This easily exceeded the 15,845 private houses built 
without subsidy between 1925-39, a ratio of public to private construction well above 
national averages. ") Tlie most notable council effort was the creation of Wythenshawe 
Garden City. -pcrhaps the most ambitious programme of civic restructuring that an), 
British citv has ever Lindertaken. "20 Wvthenshawc, instigated by Ernest and Shcena 
Simon (a Fabian), was planned by the Council following World War One. By 1926 
farmland was purchased on a grand scale eight miles to the south ofthe city and by 1931 
the area had becii incorporated inside the municipal boundary. One of several such 
I garden cities' around the country. Wythenshawe was conceived as. "A satellite garden 
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town-deliberately planned ... to cover a large district 
including not only houses and parks 
but also a factory area [with] the population working partly in the area and partly in the 
mother city.,, 21 It was to have a target population of 100,000, and by 1939 some 40,000 
people inhabited 8,145 homes. 
Despite such innovatory schemes, few of Manchester's slums were demolished. 
Under the Greenwood Act of 1930 councils received a Govenunent grant to develop a 
slum clearance scheme of demolition and rehousing, but by 1939 Manchester Council 
had condemned only 15,000 houses out of a total of 180,000.22 Furthermore, many of 
the people who moved into the new estates were not slum dwellers. As Kidd has 
pointed out; "Of the Manchester Corporation houses built by 1924, over half had gone to 
clerks or others from lower middle-class employment's and by no means all the manual 
workers who occupied the rest had come from the slums.,, 23 Wythenshawe, in the 1930s, 
was a case in point. One resident recalled; "We had to prove we would be good tenants. 
We heard that some people were from the slums but we never met any of them.,, 24 
Political Trends in Inter-War Manchester. 
Regardless of such socio-economic problems, and despite the city's Liberal tradition, the 
Conservatives dominated the political scene in Manchester between 1918 and 1939, with 
the city's Parliamentary election results mirroring national trends. In the 1918 and 1922 
general elections, the Conservatives won 8 and 7 seats (out of 10) respectively, with the 
remainder going to the Labour Party. In 1923, when the first Labour Government came 
to power, the Labour Party added one further success, taking their representation to four. 
The city's middle-class constituencies shunned the Conservatives and instead voted for 
the Liberal Party, who won 5 seats (the Conservatives won just one). The following 
year, 1924, saw yet another general election and the national mood swung against Labour 
with the voters instead preferring Baldwin's Conservatives. Labour was reduced to 4 
seats, while the Liberals lost all their five seats to the Conservatives, who now had 6. 
The 1929 General Election saw another minority Labour Government. The 
Conservatives lost one seat to Labour (Hulme) and two to the Liberals (the last seats won 
by the Liberals in Manchester. ) Labour now had five seats, the Conservatives three and 
the Liberals two. The 1930s proved highly successful for the Conservatives, as was the 
case nationally. In the 1931 election, called after the collapse of the minority Labour 
Government, the Conservatives enjoyed unprecedented success in the city, while 
Labour's disastrous results mirrored their national humiliation which saw the Party 
reduced to a nnnp of just 46 seats across Britain. The Conservatives won all ten of the 
city's seats that year and all by significant majorities. Even in areas previously 
considered relatively safe Labour territory (Ardwick, Clayton, Gorton and Platting) the 
Conservatives were untroubled and in almost every seat they retained, the Conservatives 
received almost, or over, 70 per cent of the vote. Given the scale of their massacre in 
1931, Labour could hardly fail to recover seats in the election in 1935. In line with 
national trends Labour in Manchester rallied, winning back the four seats they had lost 
four years earlier. Across the city, in both Labour and Conservative areas, the 
Conservative vote fell but they were not seriously challenged in any of the seats they 
retained. Nationally, the Conservatives still had a large majority to take back to the 
Commons. Table 2.3 breaks down the representation of the Manchester parties in 
Parliament 
(NO. Of M. pW 25 
Year Conservative Labour Liberal 
1918 8 2 0 
1922 7 3 0 
1923 1 4 5 
1924 6 4 0 
1929 3 5 2 
1931 10 0 o 
1935 1 6 4 1 
In total, out of 74 Parliamentary contests between 1918-37 (including by-elections), the 
Conservatives won 43, Labour 24 and Liberals 7. 
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This does not, however, portray the whole picture of inter-war Manchester 
politics, for election results increasingly pointed to a polarisation of the electorate along 
lines of social class. As the inter-war period developed, the middle-classes increasingly 
rallied behind the Conservative Party while Labour strengthened its hold (except in the 
freakish circumstances of the 1931 General Election) on the working-class vote. This 
can perhaps best be demonstrated by examining the fortunes of the Manchester Liberal 
Party. In the early 1920s the Party was still a force, and won five middle-class seats in 
1923. However, the Party failed to win a seat in 1924 and the two seats gained in 1929 
were the last hurrah for the Party. The 1930s was a disastrous period for the Liberals 
nationally, having effectively split in two in 1931 with the Liberal Nationals joining the 
Government. The rest of the Party spent the decade dispirited, largely inconsequential 
and electorally marginalised. In Manchester the Party not only failed to win a seat, but 
in most constituencies they even failed to put forward a candidate in either 1931 or 1935. 
Their only achievement of note was pushing Labour into third place in Blackley in both 
1931 and 1935. In reality, the Liberals were being steadily squeezed out of middle-class 
constituencies by the Conservatives and working-class constituencies by Labour. This is 
made clear by a breakdown of voting patterns in individual constituencies (see Table 
2.4). 
Table 2.4: Pattern of Voting by Constituency 1918-1935. 
Division 1918 1922 1923 1924 1929 1931 1935 
ýArdwick Con Lab Lab Lab Lab Con Lab 
, Blackley Con Con Lib I Con Lib Con Con 
: Clayton Con Con Lab I Lab Lab Con Lab 
, Exqýe Con Con Lib Con Con Con Con 
: Gorton Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Con Lab 
! Huhne Con Con Con Con Lab Con Con 
! Moss Side Con Con Lib Con on Con Con 
, Platting Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab C on Lab 
Con I Con Lib Con Con Con Con 
'Withing-to Con Con i Lib- 
1 --- 
Con Lib Con Con 
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The Conservatives increasingly dominated Manchester's middle-class constituencies - 
Blackley, Exchange (the central business constituency), Moss Side, Rusholme and 
Withington - and out of 35 general election contests in these seats between 1918-1939 
the Conservatives won 28. The strength of the Labour Party, on the other hand, lay in 
the solid working-class constituencies of Ardwick, Clayton, Gorton and Platting. 
Between 1918-1939, Labour won 21 out of the 28 contests in these constituencies. 
Table 2.5 shows the 1935 General Election result, which highlighted the grip of the 
Conservative and Labour parties on their respective strongholds. 
Table 2.5a The 1935 General Election by Constituency (% of vole). 
Constituency Conservative Labour Liberal Independent 
ýArdwick 47.1 52.9 
, Blackley 44.3 27.1 28.6 
. Clayton 46.3 53.7 'Exchange 54.1 28.2 17.7 
iGorton 44.1 55.9 
iHulme 60.3 39.7 
Moss S*d 58.7 41.3 
Battin 
! ýý L 
48.1 51.9 
'Rusholme 62.6 29.4 8 
iWithington 62.3 21.4 
_I 
3.2 
A similar picture of electoral polarisation developed at municipal level. In 1919, 
Manchester City Council was still very much a three party body, but this had changed 
dramatically twenty years later. On the Council the Conservatives were the largest 
single party throughout the inter-war period. Although only in brief periods, 1921-23 
and 1932-1933 did they have an absolute majority over all other parties, and although 
they endured 'peaks and troughs' there was usually a comfortable margin between 
themselves and the second largest party. For the Labour Party, the inter-war period 
could be split into three phases: a gradual increase in their representation on the Council 
up to 1929, a significant fall in the next three years, and a recovery to their previous 
position. Up to 1925, Labour were the third party of local government in Manchester 
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behind the Conservatives and Liberals. However, in the early 1920s they engaged in a 
brief "progressive" coalition with the Liberals that controlled the Council. Over the 
next few years support grew steadily and in 1929 Labour held 49 council seats out of 140 
(in 1922 it was 26) with the Conservatives having only 6' more. The Labour 
Government's loss of popular support, however, resulted*in lost council seats and by 
1932 Labour were reduced to 38, mirroring the disastrous performance in the 1931 
General Election. For the remainder of the 1930s Labour gradually recovered to their 
1929 position and, following the final pre-war municipal elections in 1938, held 51 out 
of 144 seats. For the Liberal Party, their decline at Parliamentary level was matched by a 
similar, if not quite as dramatic, fall in representation on the Council. In 1919 and 1920 
the Liberals held 40 seats out of 140, the second largest party, and in co-operation with 
Labour controlled the Council. In 1921, their numbers dropped to 33, and for the next 
seven years their numbers stayed within the 30-36 band but in 1925 the Liberals were 
reduced to the third party of local government, never to recover. By 193 1, their 
representation had slipped to 29 out of 143 and following the pattern of many 
municipalities, the Manchester Conservative and Liberal parties entered into an informal 
I anti-socialist pact' (a complete 'about-face' for the Liberals from their earlier alliance 
with Labour) in which the two parties agreed to put up only one candidate in each ward 
to avoid splitting the anti-Labour vote. This was a sign of defeat for the Liberals. The 
ploy failed to destroy Labour and, if anything, it was the Liberals that suffered. From 
1934 onwards, the Liberal representation declined steadily from 30 councillors in 1934 to 
just 19 out of 144 in 1938. 
The exact political make-up of the Council was difficult to establish, even for 
contemporaries, given the tendency of some councillors to refuse to declare their party 
and the fact that others 'crossed the floor' without declaring it. As accurately as 
possible, Table 2.6 reflects the respective party strength on Manchester City Council 
between 1919-1938: 
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Table 2.6* Party Composition of Manchester City Council 1919_1938. 
Year No. of seats Conservative Lab/Co-Op Liberal lnoýpendent 
1919 140 65 33 __ 40 - 2 
1920 140 67 31 40 2 
1921 140 72 30 33- 5 
1922 140 76 26 33 5 
1923 140 74 28 33 5 
1924 67 32 3 5 
1925 140 69 34 33 4 
1926 140 63 41 32 4 
1927 140 60 45 30 5 
1928 140 57 46 32 5 
1929 140 55 49 32 5 
1930 143 _ __ 29 5 
1931 143 70 42 28 3 
1932 143 74 38 28 3 
1933 144 74 40 27 3 
1934 144 63 47 30 4 
1935 144 62 52 27 3 
1936 144 64 52 25 3 
1937 144 64 52 22 6 
1938 144 67 51 19 7 
The process of polarisation was, therefore, by no means complete by 1939. The 
Conservative Party still retained the loyalty of a considerable percentage of the 
working-class vote in Manchester: in the 1935 General Election they had received 47 per 
cent of the vote in Ardwick, 46 per cent in Clayton, 44 per cent in Gorton and 48 per cent 
in Platting. Furthermore, the Conservatives continued to enjoy electoral success in 
Hulme, one of the poorest areas of the city. Only once (in 1929) did the constituency fail 
to return the long-serving Conservative candidate, Sir Joseph Nall, throughout the 
inter-war period. Working-class Conservatism was thus still a major force in 
Manchester on the outbreak of war. 
Given the success of the Conservative Party in Manchester between the First and 
Second World Wars, it is perhaps surprising that the balance of the Manchester press was 
hostile to the Party. The city then had four newspapers: the Manchester Guardian 
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(hereafter the Guardian) was the most successful provincial newspaper of its day 
achieving a national readership, the Manchester Evening News (hereafter the Evening 
Nmys), the Manchester Evening Chronicle (hereafter the Evening Chronicle) and the 
weekly Manchester City News (hereafter the City-h1mys). Manchester's Liberal tradition 
was represented by the Guardian and its sister paper the Evening News, both of which 
were established supporters of progressive Liberalism. Throughout the 1930s, these 
papers were critical of the policies of the Conservative-dominated National Government 
(the Guardian particularly so). The Evening Chronicle (a stablemate of The Timcý , 
meanwhile, was a staunch supporter of the Conservative Party. The City News prided 
itself on having no political bias, supporting instead 'Christian policies and beliefs'. 
Conclusion. 
By the outbreak of the Second World War, two party politics were firmly established in 
Manchester. The Liberal Party had been steadily squeezed out, in both Parliamentary 
and municipal elections, as the classes began to polarise behind the Conservative and 
Labour parties. By 1939, the city's middle-class seats were very secure Conservative 
strongholds, whilst Labour could safely count on Ardwick, Clayton, Gorton and Platting 
to return four M. P. s for the Party. However, although polarisation had undoubtedly 
taken place between the Wars, it was by no means complete by 1939. The 
Conservatives continued to hold Hulme and polled well in other working-class areas, 
demonstrating that Conservatism was still attractive to many working-class people. 
This, as we shall now see, was to be changed dramatically by the Second World War. 
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Introduction. 
Chapter Three analyses the period from the outbreak of the Second World War up to, but 
not including, the publication of the Beveridge Report in December 1942. The 
disruptive effects of the early years of the War, including the Manchester Blitz, had two 
critical political repercussions. First, the War, under a surface of unity, increased class 
antagonism; and second fostered a widespread popular interest in social and economic 
reconstruction. Although these two factors would, in the long-term, prove decisive in 
Labour's 1945 election victory, there was no leftward swing in the electorate during this 
period with the overwhelming public mood towards politics being one of apathy and 
disinterest. It therefore dismisses Addison's thesis that Labour's triumph was inevitable 
from mid-1940 onwards. Inter-party relations and party policies in Manchester show 
that the War, and the existence of a coalition govenunent, did not lessen inter-party 
conflicts and tensions, and did not prompt a rethinking of policy in any party. 
Consequently, the degree of cross-party consensus extended no further than a shared 
desire for a successful prosecution of the War. 
The Manchester Blitz and the " Wartime Spirit". 
The foundations of the political transformation from the position of 1939 to the Labour 
landslide of 1945 are commonly held to have been laid in the early years of the War. 
The most enduring images of these early years are those of a hard-pressed community 
working together in a spirit of self-sacrifice, but it is argued that this period of the War 
transformed popular expectations and demands, producing an unstoppable tide leading to 
a Labour victory. The British people endured a great deal in these years, and the War 
had a massive impact on all aspects of civilian life: conscription and re-direction of the 
labour force, long working hours (55-60 hour weeks were the norm), and, of course, 
rationing. Most importantly, civilians now experienced war at first hand through 
bombing. Throughout the inter-war period, through the theories of the Italian General, 
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Guilo Douhet, and numerous apocolyptical novels and films such as H. G. Wells' Ik 
Shape of Things to Come (1936), the devastating potential of aerial bombardment was 
well documented. Stanley Baldwin believed that 'the bomber will always get through' 
and the Spanish Civil War, particularly the bombing of Guernica, appeared to justify such 
prophecies. The Government predicted hundreds of thousands of deaths, with the 
survivors reduced to nervous wrecks. They were consequently extremely reluctant to 
provide deep shelters, or open the tube stations, fearing that once people had found safe 
refuge, they would become a race of troglodytes. In Manchester, preparations for the 
inevitable attack had begun before war was declared and, within a week, the Council had 
blacked out every building, lamp and vehicle, converted 140 buses into ambulances, 
transferred 700 patients from city centre hospitals and evacuated thousands of children. 
Naturally, attention is most often focused on the London Blitz but Manchester 
and other provincial cities endured their own Blitz. Eleven months into the War, on 8 
August 1940, Manchester suffered its first air-raid. Several high explosive and 
incendiary bombs were dropped, along with a bundle of leaflets titled 'Hitler's last appeal 
to reason' and for the next three months there were regular, but relatively light attacks. 
In total there were 23 air raids between 28 August and 16 December. As one of the 
country's most important industrial cities, Manchester could not expect to escape a major 
assault much longer, and the worst was feared after Liverpool was heavily bombed on 20 
and 21 December 1940. Manchester was now the last major industrial centre awaiting a 
Blitz, and for the next two nights the Luftwaffe targeted the city with heavy, concentrated 
attacks. 2 On the first night, 22 December, a minimum of 270 German bombers dropped 
at least 233 high explosive bombs, 32 huge parachute mines and thousands of 
incendiaries. On the second night thousands of incendiaries were dropped, together with 
a minimum of 55 high explosive bombs. Two eye-witnesses recorded their experiences 
on those two terrible nights. On 22 December a serviceman on leave, Les Sutton, 
headed by train towards Manchester; 
Our chatter was of Manchester pubs and other places of interest. After a 
very slowjourney the train stopped outside Warrington. We stumbled 
through the dark to the station platform and were told that no more trains 
would be going to Manchester as there was a raid on, so we hitched. A 
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lorry picked us up, and perched atop the load we hung on to the lashings, 
the icy wind whipping our faces, each of us thinking Manchester might be 
no more by the time we got there. As we neared the burning city the 
frightening glow reached high into the heavens and lit up the countryside. 
We could hear the dull impact of bombs and the barrage sent up by the big 
guns. Passing through Irlam we could plainly see the fires of Salford and 
in the open fields on both sides of the road scores of incendiaries were 
burning away. Reaching Victoria bridge, at Wooley's the lorry had to 
turn back because of the mass of fire hoses covering the road like giant 
spaghetti. The fire-fighters, though busy and intent on their job, had a 
curious air of detachment and unconcern, and from them we learned of the 
city's ordeal. 
We dispersed anxious and apprehensive. I took the shortest route 
to Ardwick, pausing only to look down Oldham Street at the conflagration 
that was Piccadilly. Our street was deserted and a Warden directed me to 
St Silas church shelter where I found Mum and Dad with neighbours, all 
looking rather the worse for wear. 3 
Patricia Sample was returning home from evacuation; 
The sirens went about 7: 30. We didn't take too much notice at first and 
then the bombing became really heavy. We all went down to the 
underground canal that runs beneath Deansgate. It was full of beds as far 
as I could see. The men, including my father, were asked to volunteer, 
putting out fires from incendiary bombs. My mother and I thought we 
would never see him again. The noise and the thuds were terrifying - 
women were fainting. The Red Cross were working non-stop and we 
were told that the whole of Deansgate above us was on fire and Victoria 
Station had gone. Most of the exits were blocked and people were trying 
not to panic, but many were suffering from claustrophobia and were 
rushing from exit to exit only to find them blocked by falling buildings. 4 
The effect of the bombing was severe. In two nights, 200 business houses, 165 
warehouses, almost 150 offices and 5 banks were totally destroyed or severely damaged; 
a ftirther 500 business houses, 20 banks, 300 warehouses, and 220 offices suffered lesser 
damage. Effectively, within a mile radius of Albert Square, 31.3 acres had been laid in 
ruins. Scores of famous buildings, including the Cathedral, had either been totally 
destroyed or were little more than shells; 159 schools were damaged, some so severely 
that repair was impossible; 86 churches were damaged; several cinemas along with over 
180 public houses and breweries were destroyed or damaged and most of Manchester's 
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hospitals sustained damage and many were unable to admit fin-ther patients. The city's 
industrial areas were a target, but they escaped heavy damage. 
Many buildings had been gutted by fire rather than demolished by high 
explosives. Over a two day period there were six officially designated "conflagrations", 
20 major fires, and 600 (acknowledged by authorities to be a modest estimate) serious, 
medium and small fires. On the night of 23 December a massive fire around Piccadilly 
engulfed nine and a half acres, described shortly afterwards as the biggest fire in Britain 
since 1666. It was not until the afternoon of Christmas Day that the fire situation 
throughout the area was under control. By 2 January 1941 the number of dead in 
Manchester numbered 363, with 455 seriously injured hospital cases and 728 less serious 
wounds. 5 Over 30,000 homes had been destroyed or damaged and several scores of 
thousands of people had been rendered homeless. In eight days, 72,000 meals were 
served at rest centres and in just one day the city's mobile canteens fed 10,000 people. 
In some respects, Manchester's preparations were woefully inadequate. Mass 
Observation reported; 
One of the most important factors of all in Manchester is the bad 
organisation for dealing with the results of a raid, especially with the 
homeless ... The Rest Centres in Manchester were almost as unsatisfactory 
and unprepared, in some cases, as those in the East End three and a half 
months before. They would have been much worse had it not been for a 
determined attack by the Local Council on the constitution of the 
Emergency Committee of three, which led to the Chairman resigning, to 
the Committee being extended to six, and consequently to an Air Raid 
Welfare Officer and a whole new department to take over responsibility 
for Rest Centres etc. This occurred only a few weeks before the blitz, and 
the new department, while it had done much, had obviously not been able 
to do everything. 6 
Mass Observation noted that a typical rest centre still had only one blanket per bed. 
Camp beds in three others were due to be returned to the manufacturers because they 
were falling to pieces. 7 No centre had an adequate first aid chest. The founder of Mass 
Observation, Tom Harrisson, wondered; "But what, one arnazedly asked, of the lessons 
of London, of Coventry and all the rest? Why had this great city not learned before? -8 
A final significant attack came on 9 January 1941. The three large scale attacks on the 
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city put Manchester eleventh on a rough 'Blitz league table'. 9 Photographs 3). 1 to 3.8 
provide graphic images of the Manchester Blitz: 
Photograph 3.1: Pic - dill), Before the Blitz 
PhotW-apb 3.2; Piccadilly After the Blitz. 
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'holograph 14- Damage-to the Canon itrect Area 
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Photograph 3.3: Back Piccadilly Ablaze 
Ph -35ý Hitting Back: Manchester's 
Air-Defences in Action wt=apk - 
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Photogri")h 3,8; Thv--KjjWand Q-uccn Tour Manckatvr. Februan, ll-%41- 
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It has become fashionable to denigrate the eýistence of the 'wartime spirit' that is 
said to have flourished under such hardship. It is portrayed as mythical and nostalgic 
rather than realistic. The Manchester evidence suggests a highly complex reality, with a 
mass of contradictory evidence. There were the inevitable complaints concerning 
rationing and the shortage of many goods, ranging from the lack of oranges and eggs to 
the unavailability of shovels and hair rollers, but this can be ascribed to the natural 
human reaction of expressing dissatisfaction rather than any great expression of selfish 
sentiment. 10 For the majority of the local population, the early years of the War did 
promote a spirit of self sacrifice and a willingness on the behalf of individuals to "do 
their bit". For example, public opinion was prepared to accept an extension of rationing, 
if it was considered necessary. In 1942 the Manchester Information Committee (M. I. C. ), 
a branch of the Ministry of Information, noted that "there was strong support for some 
system of rationing of fuel" and in reaction to the Parliamentary debate on coal rationing 
there had been "very little support for the attitude of critical M. P. s. " II Even 
restrictions on personal recreations provoked little disquiet. In April 1942 the "budget 
was quite well received, with most men interpreting it as a 'request' to give up smoking. 
Many men seemed to be making a really serious effort to curtail smoking, [and even] 
beer tax does not seem to cause much concem. "12 
There were reports of a renewed feeling of community or neighbourliness, whilst 
there was also evidence of a determined public resolve, which was never more evident 
than in periods in which the war news was particularly bleak. In February 1942 the 
M. I. C. reported; "It is remarkable that in a period of bad news, which included the loss of 
Singapore and the escape of the German battleships, so few negative reports were 
received. "13 A few months later, the Committee's Secretary noted; "I have the 
impression that Libya has considerably shaken public confidence yet the odd thing is that 
there is so much difference between what people say and their general demeanour ... [even 
when] they think we are doing badly they aren't bothering overmuch and seem 
remarkably carefree"'. 14 Although some local trade union leaders, mostly Communists 
following the Moscow line, opposed the War until mid 1941 and condemned the conflict 
as "purely an Imperial War [which] does not concern the working class"15, must 
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ordinary workers threw themselves into war work as a patriotic duty. As part of a 
Ministry of Information survey, a number of factory owners were asked; "How are the 
new women recruits working? ** and "Are you suffering from absenteeism? ** The 
answers were the same; "The new recruits are working excellently and absenteeism is 
practically non-existent, certainly under 0.5%. Even in the case of the dockers of 
Manchester voluntary absenteeism is a very small element. "16 There were numerous 
examples of extreme hard work and total commitment on the part of workers. An 
excellent example came at the Metropolitan Vickers (MetroVicks) factory at Trafford 
Park. Following the fall of France in 1940, with an invasion expected at any moment, all 
the workmen and supervisors involved in radar production at the factory worked for 48 
hours without a break to dispatch eight special transmitters to the South Coast. The 
historian of MetroVick's war effort wrote; "Men and women sacrificed hours, leisure, 
health, everything to radar. At the time of Dunkirk men whose sons were known to be 
involved in that dark episode, worked for four days and nights without ever going home, 
so that urgently needed sets could be sent out. 9,17 
Other evidence, however, suggests that this 'rosy' view of wartime life is too 
simplistic. Mass Observation found; "Manchester was such an uncoordinated, 
overlapping, jumbled up place, that even at the best of times 'Manchester feeling' and a 
positive Manchester outlook were liable to be lacking. " 18 This was the case following 
the bombing of the city in late 1940. Mass Observation found little evidence of the 
cheery, but resolute determination that is supposed to have characterised the British 
people at such times. Tom Harrisson, observed; "Mancunians got very upset, at a time 
when Liverpudlians were still pretty confident. "19 In early January 1941, Mass 
Observation reported; "Going from Liverpool to Manchester was like going from an 
atmosphere of reasonable cheerfulness into an atmosphere of barely restrained 
depression.,, 20 There was "obsessive bomb-damage talk", while one worker visited 
three of Manchester's rest centres and found "the misery and despair" of the people 
therein to be "past description. " 
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Not all factories or workers were as dedicated as those at MetroVicks. Wright 
Robinson, a prominent member of the local Labour Party (and shortly to be Lord Mayor) 
wrote in his diary; 
I was shocked when [an employer] said that wholesale slacking was taking 
place, but did not blame the higher trade union officials for that. He told 
of one craft union which was one of the closest corporations in 
engineering, which had a stringent policy against a high production rate. 
I was not shocked that men tried to spin employment out and protect their 
livelihood by any device they could. What did shock me was that there 
should be any workers, any employer, who did not realise that we are 
fighting for our lives and for the life of democracy. Doing less than our 
best to make up for the lowering of output is treason to mankind as I see 
it. 22 
Indeed, at times the M. I. C. found that the public did not see themselves as part of the 
overall war effort, noting as late as June 1942; "Common people have little idea still of 
the nature of this war, and are far from identifying themselves with it.,, 23 
Trades Unions came in for heavy criticism, even amongst their political allies. 
After a proposed strike in November 1940, which caused much ill-feeling among the 
general public, amongst the Manchester tram and 'bus drivers (who refused to work after 
7: 30prn if there was an air-raid alert) even Wright Robinson commented that their action 
was "difficult to understand in these times,,. 24 Anti-union sentiment was a regular 
feature of public opinion reports throughout this period and there was a lack of support 
amongst the people of Manchester for the actions of certain trade unions, particularly the 
miners. 25 A number of reports suggested a growing feeling that strikes should be 
banned. 26 
Public Attitudes 1940-1942. 
The cumulative effect of the War's disruption of everyday life in this period had two 
critical political consequences, which would ultimately shape the outcome of the 1945 
General Election. Firstly, under the veneer of social unity, the early years of the War 
intensified class antagonisms, leading eventually to the class polarisation cvident in it 9' T5. 
Secondly, it prompted a v4d=--nd I ct . 11. interest in the soc-M. 1 ---. -, 4 -,. --onstrL, - ion of 
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Britain which, in the long-term, benefited Labour. However, in the short-term, popular 
interest in reconstruction had no effect on political attitudes in Manchester in the period 
1940-42. 
Although much was made, in print and in films, of the essential unity of the 
British people, the War undoubtedly heightened social and, more particularly, class 
tensions. With the press keen to maintain the pretence of unity, evidence portraying a 
different reality is scanty, but a few examples can be taken as indicative of a more general 
trend. Amongst the working-classes existed a popular perception that the burdens of 
war, and the greatest sacrifices, were falling disproportionately on their shoulders, whilst 
higher up the social scale people continued to live much as they had in peacetime. This 
was reflected in public opinion questionnaires completed in August 1942, which asked 
whether there were "any local matters attracting much public notice? " The responses to 
this question led the M. I. C. to conclude that there was; 
A popular feeling that such matters only ever seem to be intended for the 
lower ... classes - that folk in better positions arc not setting an example in 
this direction. Again, it seems to be a general opinion that Government 
and municipal workers are enjoying two and three weeks holiday while 
essential workers in factories are only allowed one week. In this and 
other matters there are still gave doubts as to whether anything like 
equality of sacrifice has yet or ever will be recordcd. 27 
There had been similar complaints earlier that year following news that interest was 
being paid to share-holders of the Skoda works. The M. I. C. noted that there had been 
"considerable feeling shown on this subject" with many people commenting that "we 
thought this sort of thing wasn't going to happen in this war". 28 Such perceived 
inequality was clearly causing resentment amongst the working-classes. 
In Manchester's wealthier middle-class suburbs, on the other hand, perceptions of 
their poorer fellow citizens were being shaped by the startling revelations following the 
evacuation of schoolchildren from the city in 1939. Evacuation provided shocking 
evidence of poverty in Manchester (and in all other major cities). Many of the children 
came from the poorer areas of the city and the condition of a large minority of them 
surprised and horrified their largely middle-class hosts in the reception areas (rural 
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Lancashire and Derbyshire). In November 1939 the Manchester Education Department 
published an Interim Report on the evacuation, which stated; 
Much has been written about the dirty condition of the children, and it is a 
fact that the physical condition of a minority was not what it should have 
been, and there were children with vermin, impetigo and eczema. 
Clothing in some instances was dirty and it is not surprising that in such 
cases householders resented the introduction of such children who, owing 
to lack of home training or some physical cause, were obviously 
undesirable guests. There were also many diff iculties created by parents 
who visited householders and altogether failed to appreciate their points of 
view. Often there was dissatisfaction on both sides, resulting in 
acrimonious arguments, in appeals to the tribunals and in withdrawals. 29 
Other reports confirmed the poor condition of many Manchester evacuees. A Women's 
Institute report noted; "Some children [from Manchester] had never slept in beds ... few 
children would eat food that demanded the use of teeth - [they] could only cat with a 
teaspoon"30 In Derbyshire, local residents were driven to revolt by their newcomers 
from Manchester. A regional welfare officer reported; 
They were really difficult and rough. I don't mean that they were 
unpleasant, they were enchanting, but their habits were appalling. The 
people of Derbyshire experienced childrenjust doing theirjobbies on the 
floor of sitting rooms. The women approached the Dowager Duchess of 
Derbyshire who told the Ministry of Health, on behalf of the people, that 
they refused to have the children in their homes. 31 
For the first time, Manchester's middle-classes had been exposed to the poverty in their 
midst, in areas of the city they probably never visited, and some were undoubtedly roused 
to support measures to eradicate it. Following such revelations, the Guardian stated; 
More than anything else evacuation must have brought home to people 
how far from perfect our democracy is. 'The poorest he that is in 
England hath a life to live as the richest he', but those who have seen 
some of the poorer children arrive from the cities will realise more than 
they did before how different the two lives are. If this memory can stay in 
the country's mind it may be that in an expedient of war will have been 
found the seeds of a great peace-time reform. 32 
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Similarly, Rostrom Duckworth, the Conservative M. P. for Moss Side discussed the 
evacuees with the Evening Chronicle, which reported; 
It was borne on his mind most appallingly, he said, that our system of 
education had not brought about the result which its great expense ought 
to have achieved. It was heartbreaking to see a number of children who 
looked as though they had never had a bath since they were born. And 
some of the women had not brought a rag of clothing for the children, he 
added. He thought we should have to teach these children self-pride and 
overhaul many of the hygiene services of the country. 33 
Such sympathy and determination was, however, rare. The work of Marwick and 
Tiratsoo, Fielding and Thompson suggests that a keenness to improve working-class 
conditions was not widespread amongst the suburban classes. Instead, such revelations 
merely confirmed, and strengthened, their existing pre-war prejudices about the 
"undeserving poor". So Manchester's evacuation served only to drive a ftirther wedge 
between the classes, rather than acting as a uniting force. The political ramifications of 
such class antagonisms would not be felt until full-scale electoral politics resumed. The 
political polarisation of the classes, evident in the inter-war period, was intensified by the 
unique circumstances of the early years of the War, and was already reflected, as we shall 
see, in the social make-up of the membership of the Manchester Labour Party. 
Given the seriousness of the military situation throughout this period, Mancunians 
were, unsurprisingly, obsessed with war news. Following the Phoney War, interest in 
the War surged with the German invasion of the Low Countries and France in the 
summer of 1940, and with the evacuation from Dunkirk the possibility of invasion was 
clearly uppermost in people's minds. 34 The dominance of war news in everyday life 
remained unchallenged until the close of 1942 and war news, even bad news, was 
eagerly discussed and analysed. People had a realistic appreciation of the War situation 
and the M. I. C. received numerous reports from observers who noted that there was much 
criticism of the Government and the B. B. C. for presenting an overly optimistic view of 
events, particularly the tendency to exaggerate the casualties inflicted upon the enemy 
forces while playing down the extent of British losses. Indeed, any kind of official news 
was greeted with considerable cynicism. In July 1942 the M. I. C. noted; "Disbelief of the 
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truth of published photographs of damage done to enemy factories i. e. Renault works. 
Opinion expressed that 'these are probably our own factories. ", 35 
However, whilst public interest was predominantly focused on the War, 
the early years of the conflict also provoked considerable interest amongst Mancunians 
on the question of social and economic reconstruction and the shape of post-war Britain. 
Throughout Britain, the desperation of the early years combined with the hardships 
endured by the civil population "gave rise to heightened expectations about the securing 
of a better world when arms were finally laid down.,, 36 This was despite the fact that 
throughout 1940-42 Britain looked more likely to lose the War than emerge as victor. 
Pressure towards the idea of "equality of sacrifice" became intense and there was 
widespread reaction against the "old gang". 37 Popular discussion on the subject of 
social reconstruction was, in turn, both stimulated and fed by the progressive 
intelligensia. From 1940 onwards, J. B. Priestley's popular series of 'Postscripts' on the 
B. B. C., in which he urged his listeners to turn their minds to the creation of a better, new 
world, was only the most controversial of several examples. Priestley's talks were 
extremely popular in Manchester, with the City News describing him as "a man who, 
next to the Prime Minister, has done more than any speaker or writer to sustain and 
inspire the mass of the people ... The solid heart of Britain 
is behind him ... He 
is saying 
things we shall remember.,, 38 A series of Penguin Specials examining the prospects and 
possibilities of post-war Britain were published and were widely available, and many of 
the national daily newspapers became more receptive to progressive ideas. The Times 
became an advocate of social reconstruction and one of the most popular and successful 
of the wartime newspapers was The Daily Mirror, whose populist style was based on 
attacks against Colonel Blimp and the Old School Tie network. 
From 1940 onwards came demands for there to be a 'better Britain' after the War. 
By the end of 1940, Mass Observation had found evidence of a radical new spirit and a 
"questioning of the status quo.,, 39 Manchester was no exception. In November 1940 
the Guardian commented; "All serious thinkers are agreed that if democracy is to justify 
itself we must make a different sort of Britain after the war and put an end to a number of 
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injustices that disfigure our life today. "40 In his 'Weekly Column' in the non-political 
Cjjy-N=, Sidney Wicks believed; 
This new vision of a land precious enough to be died for must surely give 
a new meaning to social and political life when peace allows us to turn to 
the trowel and the plough. Will this new emotion be transmitted into 
constructive social effort, the dream expressed in practical rebuilding of 
the whole structure of the national life? I think it will. Wherever men 
meet, in orderly room, in observation post, sitting after tactical exercises 
on the hillside, they talk of reproaches, of evils, of reforms greatly to be 
desired. They talk like men who are acquiring the right to rebuild Britain. 
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Later in the War Labour's Northern Voice newspaper, the mouthpiece of the Manchester 
and Salford Labour parties, retrospectively commented that in 1940; 
One man's war became everyman's war and in their camps and their 
shelters, on fire watch and on guard, men began to ask themselves: What 
on earth have we been doing all these years? Why these recurring wars, 
these economic collapses, these hideous towns, this overwhelming moral 
and spiritual bankruptcy? Why, why, why? Disgust, shame, anger - all 
these played a part and it became clear that there had arisen a grim 
determination to accept democratic responsibility and rise above the moral 
and social standards of the past? 42 
Throughout 1941 popular interest in reconstruction continued unabated and it was a 
major feature of the local press. In January the Guardian observed; 
There have been great movements of population; town and country have 
been thrown into close and unexpected relations; death, danger and 
destruction have thrown their shadows everywhere; thousands spend their 
nights often or always in shelters, where a new kind of communal life has 
sprung up. From these conditions two consequences may be expected. 
There will be a warmer sympathy bred by common hardship, and there 
will be a revolutionary spirit bred by the more vivid realisation and the 
sharper resentment of the gross inequalities that still disfigure our social 
life. 43 
Later in the same month the same paper claimed; 
The war will leave behind it not only a great deal of dangerous confusion 
but a great deal of dangerous impatience. If the Parliamentary system 
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cannot adapt itself to these conditions, if politicians resist reform for the 
sake of resistance, they will find the nation is not in a temper to watch 
these dilatory proceedings with indulgence ... 
We all know what are the 
four or five great spheres of action in which large advance is essential: 
education, nutrition, agriculture, regional and town planning and all those 
questions of economic re-organisation that are involved in the effective 
treatment of unemployment. 44 
The Evening News believed; "There is throughout the country a popular feeling, perhaps 
more intense than ever in history that this time things should be better ordered. ', 45 In 
August the Evening News ran a series of articles concerning post-war Britain, with 
contributions from such notables as H. G. Wells, Julian Huxley and the Dean of St. Paul's, 
dealing with the issues of social equality, education, economic planning, industrial 
democracy and political devolution. 
By early 1942 popular discussion in Manchester on the question of reconstruction 
was such that the M. I. C. asked for specific reports on public feeling concerning the issue. 
Over the following months the M. I. C. received reports and public opinion questionnaires 
highlighting the depth of public interest; "there is much enthusiasm over post-war 
reconstruction"; "post-war being widely talked about"; "a considerable amount of 
discussion of the kind of peace we shall make after victory" and "much talk of post-war 
education and town planning". 46 Perhaps the most illuminating evidence of public 
interest in post-war matters came not through the M. I. C. but via a question and answer 
session between the Lord Mayor, Wright Robinson, and a group of one hundred children 
of school leaving age in mid-October 1942. This was the bleakest phase of the War 
since Dunkirk. Rommel had pushed the Allies back in North Africa; British and Empire 
troops had just completed a further withdrawal in the Far East, while the Germans had 
progressed deeper into the Soviet Union and were encircling Stalingrad. Despite the 
seriousness of the situation, at least one third of the questions were directed at post-war 
matters, with the remainder enquiring about the Mayor's official duties. Some of the 
questions warrant reproducing, for they provide a guide to the conversations children 
were hearing around them, and the priorities being ascribed to particular aspects of 
reconstruction: "What is Manchester planning for the improvement of the slums now 
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and after the war? "; "Are there going to be more or less hospitals after the war? "; "After 
this war, will the ordinary man's son have as much chance of going to college as the rich 
man's son? "; "Do you know whether there will be any unemployment after the war? "; 
"In post-war housing, will there be much communal housing as there is in Russia? "; 
"Should flats be built after the war? "; "Will there be a big slump after this war as there 
was after the last? "; "Has Manchester City Council taken any steps to prevent 
unemployment after the war? "; "Has, or are there, any plans being made for equality of 
opportunity as far as education is concemed?,, 47 
In mid-1942 the M. I. C., hitherto a centralised. body, was divided into five 
divisions with each responsible for a separate area in order to make their information 
gathering more effective. 48 This change revealed that interest in reconstruction was not 
confined to specific social groupings but to society as a whole. Reports from the 
Northern Division, which consisted of traditionally strong Labour areas (notably Ardwick 
and Clayton) and those of the Southern Division, which represented staunch 
Conservative areas (Moss Side, Rusholme and Withington) revealed little or no 
difference in popular views. Reconstruction was being widely discussed across the 
whole spectrum of the electorate. 49 Similarly, the priority being given to particular 
aspects of reconstruction was the same throughout the city. In line with the children's' 
questions listed above, the work of the M. I. C. suggested that housing, employment and 
education were considered the most important priorities, with more modest numbers 
referring to pensions and family allowances. 50 Housing became an even greater priority 
in the public mind following a survey of the city's housing stock in 1942, in which 
Manchester's Medical Officer of Health confirmed that there had been very little, if any, 
improvement on the findings of the 1930s. The survey revealed that Manchester still 
had 69,000 unfit properties and that over one-third of all houses remained below 
("reasonable" standards of sanitation. 51 Wright Robinson noted that the Officer had 
found, in his district, that of the 1,848 houses inspected, over 1,800 had perished 
brickwork, 1,512 had bulged brickwork, 1,500 were verminous and 1,315 were bug 
infested. 52 The Officer stated that throughout Manchester; "The unsatisfactory nature of 
such a large proportion of the dwelling houses must be causing incalculable, but 
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nevertheless great, damage to the health of the occupants and the bad effect on the 
welfare of children, in particular, can scarcely be exaggerated.,, 53 At this time, there was 
much interest in building flats after the War, but the Medical Officer made clear his 
preference for houses; 
Flats are not suitable for families with small children and for young 
married people. Though the amenities of blocks of flats, now universally 
proposed, mitigate to some extent the inherent disadvantages of flats, such 
amenities fall far short of replacing the advantages of maximum light, 
ventilation, privacy, safety, ease of access and garden space of cottage 
dwellings, all of which are so essential to the health and welfare of 
children. 54 
The report surprised many in the city although the Labour leader on the Council, Bill 
Johnston, had earlier admitted; "Every time distinguished visitors come to Manchester I 
feel ashamed of the narrow streets and poor and sometimes verminous houses, revealing 
a low standard of living. -55 The findings strengthened the determination to improve the 
situation. The City News said; 
To be told that we have in Manchester no less than 68,837 houses which 
are unfit for people to live in them cannot indeed do any other than 
depress us. Yet to give the fullest publicity to these figures at this time 
when rebuilding is a subject much in the public mind, is itself a hopeful 
sign. For it is only if we grasp the magnitude of the task ahead that there 
is real promise of wiping out this blot on our civic record. We have not 
merely to make Manchester a better looking city. We must undertake the 
more fundamental and urgent task of seeing that all its citizens are 
decently housed. 56 
At the heart of the popular interest in reconstruction was a general belief that the 
state would play a more significant role in the nation's social and economic affairs in the 
post-war years. Although the state's activities had increased gradually in the inter-war 
years, in 1939 Britain's economic life was still overwhelmingly in the hands of private 
enterprise. War mobilisation increased the state's power massively and soon it 
controlled virtually every aspect of the war effort and civilian life. The belief that such 
involvement would continue after the War, at the expense of private enterprise, which 
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was increasingly seen as being responsible for the unemployment and squalid living 
conditions of much of Britain between the Wars, was evident as early as 1940 and, 
following the Blitz, was particularly focused on the issues of housing and town planning. 
The Guardian observed; 
One effect of the daily destruction from the air has been to turn men's 
minds to the possibility of planning towns and buildings on more pleasing 
and intelligent lines ... the rebuilding must be rational and in accordance 
with social need ... it is essential to have firm direction from the top to 
overcome anarchic interests. 57 
Two months later the same paper returned to the subject; 
We remember the housing problem at the end of the last war and how 
private enterprise was allowed to run out from our towns unsightly streaks 
of little houses both tasteless and badly built. Suburbs were wasted with 
ugliness and in the cities great blocks of flats rose up chokingly were 
never flats should be. The Nazi bombs will leave a building problem at 
the end of the war. Will the State leave those unfettered private hands 
already disgraced to solve it? 58 
Such criticism of the failings of private enterprise was adopted by the Evening Ne3u. A 
mid-1941 editorial hoped that post-war Britain would see no return to the "opportunity 
which a laissez-faire age gave to the shrewd and unscrupulous to make money out of 
their neighbours...,, 59 Shortly afterwards the same paper came out firmly in support of 
the nationalisation of Britain's transport facilities; 
The only way of getting the best value out of our transport facilities is for 
the Government to take them over - rail, road and canal. Industry and the 
general public would benefit not only during the war but after it as well if 
all our transport services were run for public service rather than private 
prof1t. 60 
Demands for nationalisation or an increased role for the state were not new. The Labour 
Party had advocated such policies since 1918 (although they had done little about them in 
their brief periods in Government), while pressure groups such as The Next Five Years 
and Political And Economic Planning, together with individuals such as Harold 
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Macmillan, the Conservative M. P., had advocated planned capitalism throughout the 
1930s. What was significant in the early years of the War was that such ideas gained a 
more general acceptance. 'Plain Citizen', writing in his regular column in the City 
N-ews, observed; "The demand of the common people that, having once more gone 
through the anguish of war, they shall this time get a better world will be heard 
everywhere ... There is a general assumption that the changes to come will be 
in the 
direction of more state regulation.,, 61 
It was not only Manchester's civil population that showed great interest in 
reconstruction for her servicemen, drawn almost entirely from the younger generation, 
showed perhaps even greater enthusiasm. From 1942 the Army Bureau of Current 
Affairs (A. B. C. A. ) and the Army Education Corps led weekly classes and discussion 
groups where the problems of contemporary Britain found expression. An informed 
account of A. B. C. A. published in The Times in September 1942 revealed; 
Of the dozens of topics so far promoted for discussion in the Army, a few 
stand out in popularity. Reconstruction themes are well up. Although 
they develop plenty of debate about such bread and butter matters as 
post-war security, they also reach broader issues like 'What's wrong with 
democracy? ', 'Do we deserve our Empire? ', 'Town Planning' and 'How 
should our schools be run?, 62 
Although the effects of A. B. C. A. 's work has been called into question, the evidence in 
Manchester suggests that it raised awareness. 63 In August 1942 the M. I. C. noted; "great 
interest, especially amongst the lads home on leave from the Forces, about a new social 
order. "64 A short time later it was again reported that there were "many servicemen 
calling in the Bureau complaining that their dependants are not receiving a fair deal from 
the Government and mutter dark threats about a 'New Social Order' after the war". 65 
The civilian and service interest in reconstruction was accompanied by a 
considerable cynicism. Many recalled that the First World War had witnessed similar 
hopes and aspirations, fed by the promise of 'Homes fit for Heroes'. Such promises had 
led to little in the way of progressive change and there were many who believed that the 
aftermath of this war would be little different. Early in 1941, the City News observed; 
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"Many people when they hear the promises and aspirations that come so freely from all 
quarters today remember painfully the social aspirations of the last war and shortly after, 
and the sad contrast of the realities. ', 66 Deep cynicism was still evident in the summer of 
1942. The M. I. C. received reports noting a mood of "dissatisfaction with the rosy 
picture painted by leaders about life at the end of the war - 'experience of the last war 
should produce caution.,, '67 Many dismissed high-level talk of reform as a carrot with 
which the Government sought to encourage people to work harder and sacrifice more, 
talk which would be forgotten after the War. In August 1942 public opinion 
questionnaires revealed that people were asking whether "something [is] really going to 
happen, or is it just blutP,, 68 
A Swing to the Left? 
The widespread interest in post-war reconstruction has been held, by historians such as 
Addison, to indicate a major swing to the Left in public opinion in the period 194042. 
Indeed, Addison suggests; "Opinion may have been further to the Left in 1942 than it was 
to be in 1945. ', 69 Labour's 1945 triumph was, he contends, inevitable from the summer 
of 1940 onwards. Superficially, the evidence appears to support Addison's argument. 
The reaction against the "Guilty Men", the slogan of "equality of sacrifice" on the home 
front; the prestige enjoyed by figures such as J. B. Priestley and the widespread interest in 
social reconstruction can all be put forward as evidence of a distinct leftward trend in 
popular attitudeS. 70 Perhaps most revealing was the massive popular interest in the 
Soviet Union from the moment the U. S. S. R. entered the War in June 1941. Thedepthof 
interest in the Soviet's military performance and her way of life was a major feature of 
this period of the War, a point that has not gone unnoticed by those attempting to 
discover popular political sympathies. Throughout 1942, public opinion reports revealed 
that war news from the Eastern Front was almost as widely discussed as news of British 
forces. 71 Furthermore, with the continuing German advance into Russia came 
widespread calls for the Allies to open a Second Front in Europe to relieve the Soviet 
burden. In Manchester, as elsewhere, the major force behind this push was the 
Communist Party and in September 1942 the Lord Mayor received a deputation of 
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seventy men, all Communists representing a number of workshops, to press this 
demand. 72 Two large public meetings in support of a Second Front, again initiated by 
local Communists, were held at Belle Vue and in Piccadilly, drawing large tumouts. 73 
The Soviet Union was clearly hugely popular in Manchester. One local Communist 
recalls; 
When a Russian trade union leader visited Metro Vickers the support he 
got was enthusiastic beyond imagination. He was even invited to come 
downstairs to the directors dining-room but he wanted to go to the 
workers canteen instead and he was very warmly cheered. No doubt 
about that. 74 
The M. I. C. noted that "you frequently hear the jest that we had better borrow some 
Russian generals.,, 75 The local press also extolled the virtues of Britain's Soviet allies, 
with the Evening Neya typical in asserting; "We were told that Communism was a 
ghastly failure. Now we learn that the release of science for the aid of industry and 
agriculture has worked miracles and is one of the secrets of Russia's amazing 
resistance.,, 76 
This tremendous pro-Soviet feeling can be contrasted with the indifferent, and 
occasionally hostile, attitude taken to the entry of the United States into the War. In the 
early years of the War, American non-involvement had undoubtedly been resented. One 
Mancunian, now residing across the Atlantic, wrote to the City News in 1940 and -asked; 
"What do you expect of this motley crowd of blacks, yellows and throw-outs? "; Another 
remarked; "[Arnerican] boys are cowardly ... Many of the boys now coming of age were 
I weather strips', conceived to keep their fathers out of the draft [in 1917]. Therefore, 
they inherit cowardice.,, 77 America's declaration of war following the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbour (December 1941) provoked no great relief and the M. I. C. received a 
number of reports suggesting a popular feeling that "the Americans have come in late 
again and will take all the credit like they did last time.,, 78 Throughout 1942, thq 
American war effort came in for heavy criticism. After the capitulation of the "fortress" 
of Singapore in February 1942, the M. I. C. recorded; "[The] tendency now is to say 'well, 
we can't hold on to everywhere'. I'd like to know what the Yanks have done so far. ", 79 
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Similarly, in April it was noted; "People want to know what the U. S. Navy is doing and 
whether America is doing anything at all except talking big figures. People are 
beginning to feel very bitter about the failure of the U. S. to help in the Far East. "80 The 
political significance of the widespread interest in Russia is impossible to quantify, but 
the evidence suggests that it had no political ramifications. A pertinent analogy would, 
perhaps, be to compare the role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War with that 
of Belgium in the First, that of a gallant ally fiercely resisting a strong enemy. 
The evidence from Manchester suggests that there was no leftward swing in 
popular opinion between 1939-1942. The period was, instead, characterised by a general 
disinterest in party politics in any form. Furthermore, as we shall now see, popular 
interest in reconstruction was subordinated to a general willingness to win the War first. 
Consequently, although not the case in later years, reconstruction did not yet have a 
political edge, and no political party was linked with reconstruction in the public mind. 
Given the cynicism about the prospects of reform, one might have expected there 
to have been considerable local pressure on the Government to initiate some tangible 
measure of reconstruction to prove that their tfflk of change was genuine. Indeed, both 
the Guardian and Evening Soya regularly pressed for such evidence. In October 1940 
the Guardian claimed; "Among the things required now is an assurance that some 
Cabinet Committee is working unremittingly on a design for twentieth-century living in 
the sphere of .. reconstruction at home.,, 
81 However, such statements were 
unrepresentative of the public mood, for one of the most notable features of these early 
years, even as late as the summer of 1942, was the complete lack of such pressure from 
the general public in Manchester. This is an important point which has been either 
widely dismissed or ignored by many historians who have seemingly coriftised 
widespread interest in reform for a demand for work to begin immediately. In fairness 
many contemporaries, including Deputy Prime Minister Clement Attlee, also believed 
that the public mood required the Government to give the people something positive to 
fight for (i. e. the promise of change) rather than the essentially negative aim of defending 
(and therefore maintaining) the status quo. Most political studies of the War have 
argued that such attitudes demonstrated that the Labour Party were in touch with the 
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mood of the people. Conversely, Winston Churchill is portrayed as reactionary, a man 
out of touch with public feeling on the issue and an obstacle standing in the way of 
change. It is true, of course, that for more than two years after he came to power in May 
1940 Churchill's energies were directed almost totally to matters of military strategy and, 
on the occasions he turned his attention to the Home Front, production. In these years 
Churchill, who, in Hugh Dalton's words, was "allergic to post-war policy", avoided 
reconstruction matters realising that they would threaten coalition unity and therefore his 
own position. 82 For Churchill, reconstruction would have to wait until the War was 
won. The evidence of Manchester suggests that as late as August and September 1942 
Churchill's attitude, far from being diametrically opposed to that of his people, was 
merely echoing their own private thoughts. Questionnaires taken in the city during 
August revealed that high-level talk of reform was unpopular with many Mancunians, 
who felt politicians should concentrate exclusively on the war effort: "I am continually 
hearing complaints of public speakers talking of what is going to be done after the war, 
when we have not yet won it. "; "Too much talk on post-war problems whilst still 
fighting for our existence. "; "There is too much talk of post-war. "; "General attitude is 
I get the war over'. "; "General opinion is 'first catch your hare. "'; "General feeling is to 
get the war won and then to talk of reconstruction. If we don't win we needn't bother 
talking about reconstruction - Hitler will see to that for us.,, 83 Not one questionnaire 
(out of over sixty) revealed dissatisfaction with the lack of progress in social reform 
being made. So throughout the early part of the War, Labour were not riding on the crest 
of public opinion but were actually in advance of it. While the Labour Party and much 
of the local press was pushing for change, most people supported Churchill's approach. 
The lack of public pressure for immediate reforms was reflective of a general 
disinterest in politics. M. I. C. reports during these years reveal that political apathy was a 
characteristic of the city. On the occasions that public interest in politics was recorded 
by an observer, it took the form of a common desire for all politicians to present a united 
front. This was also admitted by the Clayton Labour Party which, in December 1940 
found that "there is no demand for a general election.,, 84 Again, in a M. I. C. Public 
Opinion survey of August 1942 it was noted; "A General Election was not wanted. ', 85 
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This was a national trend, with Mcallurn and Readman pointing out; "It is certain that 
nothing was further from the minds of the general mass of the electorate in 1942 than the 
idea of holding a general election.,, 86 The one contested by-election in Manchester in 
this period highlighted a general disinterest in political conflict. The turn-out for the 
by-election in the Labour-held seat of Clayton (October 1942) was only slightly over 20 
per cent, as against the 1935 general election turnout of 77 per cent. 87 Although the 
by-election figure was measured against an electoral register that was now three years out 
of date, it should be noted that a by-election in Rusholme two years later attracted a 
tum-out of nearly 35 per cent against an even older register. Amongst those who did 
vote, the majority evidently did so only to show their support for the Government, rather 
than through any great interest in policies. One voter said: "I would [like] to give my 
vote for the Government ... I think everyone who can should go to show our confidence in 
those who are running the country today.,, 88 It was generally agreed that the campaign 
of the Independent, Hammond Foot, had attracted very little interest, despite the election 
coming after months of military setbacks. The Guardian remarked; 
The mood of the electors has been pretty clear for some time. Alderman 
Harry Tbomeycroft, the Labour candidate is sure of election, what remains 
in doubt is whether Major Hammond Foot, the Independent, will save his 
deposit. Major Foot's candidature has lighted no fire in the division. 
The electors have, on the whole, treated him with indifference and have 
largely ignored his meetings. 89 
This was in part due to the nature of Foot's candidature, with Foot himself dismissed by 
the Labour Lord Mayor, Wright Robinson, as an "elderly, tall and bemused Major. "90 
He was a consulting engineer and was described as an authority on tank attacks and was 
actively engaged in an advisory capacity to the Government. 91 His policies included 
opposition to the "centralisation of commodities which are destroying individual 
enterprise and the small shopkeeper", opposition to women fire watchers (women were 
deemed "too precious to be unnecessarily imperilled") and, obscurely, a "courageous 
balancing of a terribly menacing unbalanced town and rural planning by the building up 
of a new yeoman community and ideal modem homesteads. -92 Such policies were not 
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likely to attract much support and Foot was heavily defeated, receiving little more than 
600 votes, as against almost 9,000 for his Labour opponent. 
Throughout this period, political conflict or a party seeking to use war-time issues 
for its own ends caused considerable public resentment. Interestingly, local criticism 
was directed solely at the Labour Party. In late May 1942, following the Labour Party 
Conference, which endorsed the continuation of the electoral truce by a majority of only 
1,275,000 to 1,209,000, the M. I. C. recorded that there was "much disgust at the strength 
of the vote against the electoral truce', 93 Two months later, public opinion 
questionnaires revealed the existence of "strong criticism of the Minister of Labour's 
[Ernest Bevin] tendency to indulge in party propaganda on every possible occasion. -94 
The perceived Labour bias of the B. B. C. caused much disquiet with one observer 
reporting "violent criticism of the left tendency of B. B. C. speakers and the broadcasting 
of the Socialist Party Conference as blatant party propaganda.,, 95 As the Conservatives 
were largely dormant, no similar criticism could be made of the Conservative Party. 
There is no evidence to suggest that widespread interest in reconstruction boosted 
support for Labour. There was, again, considerable feeling against parties using 
reconstruction to advance their own cause. In the summer of 1942, public opinion 
reports revealed that on the issue of social reform there was disquiet at the way 
"politicians give the impression they are playing for position.,, 96 Others reported that; 
"There seems to be some disquiet re talk of post-war. Whilst all feel that changes are 
necessary, there seems in many quarters a real fear lest they are being used by 
sentimentalists to foster their own social or political fads.,, 97 Once more, public 
criticism was reserved for the Labour Party. In reaction to the 1942 Party Conference, 
where there had been talk of using the Party's influence to introduce reconstruction 
measures as soon as possible, the M. I. C. noted that they had "heard much disgust 
expressed with the blah-blah talked at the Conference. "98 Rather than helping to present 
a united front, non-Labour supporters felt that Labour was undermining the war effort by 
failing to cease their party political activity and attempts to make political capital out of 
war-time issues were, therefore, the antithesis of the popular mood. For this reason, 
widespread public interest in reconstruction had no positive effect on Labour's 
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popularity. Labour's push for reconstruction was seen as blatant party political 
propaganda at a time when the majority of the local population believed the war effort 
should be receiving sole attention. Jefferys argues that throughout the early years it 
"remained to be seen whether [Labour] would benefit from new public concern about 
social progress. "99 The evidence of Manchester supports his argument. 
There was no swing to Labour in Manchester in the period 1940-1942 and there 
was nothing to suggest that Labour was gaining support from middle-class Conservative 
voters. Indeed, the opposite appeared to be true, a point reflected in the Manchester 
Labour Party membership figures. Membership of the city's constituency Labour parties 
fell from 8,069 in 1940 to 4,719 in 1942.100 This in itself is not significant: throughout 
the country factors such as service call-ups led to a considerable decrease in party 
membership. It was, however, significant that the fall was much greater in the city's 
Conservative held constituencies than in Labour strongholds. In 1940, the four 
Labour-held constituencies (Ardwick, Clayton, Gorton and Platting) provided 4,098 
members; by 1942 this had decreased by 1,200 to 2,829 -a fall of 29 per cent. In the 
Conservative areas membership had dropped from 3,971 to 1,890, a decrease of over 
2,000 or a massive 52 per cent. 101 Proportionately, in 1940 the four Labour 
constituencies provided 50.78 per cent of the Party's membership, while the six 
Conservative constituencies provided 49.21 per cent, virtual parity. By 1942, the 
proportions had changed to 60 per cent and 40 per cent respectively. Evidently, while 
some of those leaving the Party in Labour strongholds were being replaced by new 
members, the same was not happening in Conservative-voting constituencies. The 
intensification of class antagonisms was perhaps leading many of Manchester's 
middle-class citizens to identify even more closely with the Conservative Party, their 
natural political defenders. In consequence, Labour was making no inroads into the 
Conservatives core middle-class support. Indeed, in early 1942 some Conservative 
Ward parties reported an increase in their membership, particularly among women. 102 
The period 1939-42 nevertheless saw the beginnings of wartime class polarisation 
but the overwhelming mood of the Manchester electorate was one of disinterest in 
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politics. In 1941, Home Intelligence had found that there was "an absence of thought 
along traditional party lines and as yet few settled opinions about the expected 
complexion of Britain's first post-war Government. "103 The evidence of Manchester 
would justify the same conclusion being reached in the autumn of 1942. 
Coalition versus Party Loyalties. 
If the early years of the conflict had significant, if long-term, effects on public attitudes, 
they had no impact on party politics. Despite the exigencies of total war and the 
existence from May 1940 onwards of an all-party government, continuity, rather than 
change, characterised Manchester (and Westminster) politics between 1939-42. Political 
relationships remained fraught as the main parties continued to play the party political 
game, while none of the parties felt the need to amend their core policy beliefs. 
Shortly after the outbreak of war the three major parties, at national level, agreed 
"not to nominate candidates for Parliamentary vacancies that now exist, or may occur, 
against the candidate nominated by the Party holding the seat at the time of the vacancy 
occurring. "104 This electoral truce was extended into formal coalition in May 1940 
following the collapse of the Chamberlain Government, with Labour and the Liberals 
serving with the Conservatives under the premiership of Winston Churchill. Even in the 
first few perilous months, coalition relations were tense and strained and the Coalition 
can best be described as an uneasy alliance rather than a solid team. Several issues 
provoked party political feelings in Westminster, most notably the production crisis 
(which engendered much debate throughout 1940 and 1941) and the fuel rationing 
scheme (spring-early summer 1942). Throughout the 'Phoney-War' the economy 
remained only partially mobilised; munitions production and the mobilisation of 
manpower proceeded at a leisurely pace and little was done to interrupt the production of 
many non-essential items. Over one million people remained unemployed. Even in 
mid- 1941 ministerss were admitting that "output is not what is should be, and nothing to 
boast about. " 105 Production deficiencies throughout 1941 revived party tension at 
Westminster with Conservative and Labour M. P. s, anxious not to yield any advantage, 
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soon lining up behind the respective interests of capital and labour. John Colville, 
Churchill's Private Secretary, noted in June of that year; 
[The] first signs of a new class feeling between the two sides of the 
House. The Tories, conscious of the great sacrifice they are making 
financially and of the exceedingly high wages being paid to war workers, 
are cantankerous about the many reports of slackness, absenteeism etc. in 
the factories. The Labour Party resent this criticism and blame the 
managers and employers for any shortcomings. 106 
On 3 December 1941, over thirty left-wing Labour M. P. s pressed an amendment calling 
for the immediate public ownership and control of all industries vital to the war effort. 
Despite Attlee's threatened resignation, over 40 M. P. s voted for the unofficial 
amendment. 107 This was by far the most serious anti-government vote since May 1940, 
and many Conservatives saw the issue as an attempt to exploit the War for socialist 
purposes. 
The coal rationing issue of spring 1942 saw a similar political confrontation, 
provoking a Conservative rebellion. Hugh Dalton (Labour) as President of the Board of 
Trade argued that rationing provided the only feasible solution to the shortage of coal, 
and made a provisional announcement to this effect in March 1942. Before the 
Government could finalise its plans, a powerful body of resistance had built up among 
both coal-owners and Conservative M. P. s. The Vice-Chairman of the 1922 Committee 
put forward an alternative policy to increase coal production and warned Dalton that at 
least fifty Conservative M. P. s would enter the opposition lobby if the Government 
pressed ahead with its plan unamended. 108 There could be no doubting the political 
feeling behind the storm which engendered by these proposals or of the part the 
Conservative 1922 Committee played in defeating them. As one Conservative told 
Dalton; "They acted as they did because they felt that the Labour Party in the 
Government was getting too much of its own way. " 109 Rationing, when advocated bya 
Labour Minister, was seen as the first step to nationalisation of the mines and Dalton was 
forced to shelve rationing to concentrate instead on the idea of government control aimed 
at increasing production, with the state assuming responsibility for mining operations 
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while owners retained control of all financial matters. This compromise, whilst 
acceptable to Conservatives, was poorly received by miners' officials and Labour opinion 
ingeneral. 110 As with the production issue; "Behind the arguments about the merits or 
defects of the scheme, the debate turned into an unacknowledged trial of strength 
between the parties. "I II Party political feeling was constantly simmering beneath the 
veneer of coalition unity, rearing its head whenever any ideological controversy arose. 
It is frequently argued that the Conservative and Labour parties held divergent 
views of the nature of party politics during the War. Ramsden, referring to the electoral 
truce, states the common argument that "Tories interpreted it as an electoral and political 
truce, Labour only as an electoral truce", whilst Addison argues that "the Right was 
politically quiescent while the Left kept up a barrage of activity and propaganda.,, ] 12 
This view of the Conservative Party, concentrating their energies on the war effort while 
Labour was busily laying the foundations for its victory in the next General Election, is a 
prominent feature of the historiography of wartime politics. Much is often made of the 
suspension of the Conservative Party's annual conference in the early years of the War. 
Last held in 1937, the Party did not arrange another conference until 1943 and party 
organisation was similarly affected, with a number of key staff at Central Office leaving 
to take up work of national importance. The ma ority of full-time agents and Area 
Officers were conscripted, while the Party's youth organisation (The Junior Imperial 
League) was disbanded following the outbreak of war and was only reformed in late 
1944. At a local level many Conservative Associations simply closed down until further 
notice while several of the Party's regional and district associations never met at all 
between 1940-1945.113 In comparison, attention is drawn to the fact that Labour 
continued to hold its annual conference (normally in London and lasting for less than the 
normal week) and although local Labour associations were also affected by the War, 
especially in areas where organisation had been relatively weak (such as Scotland), in 
many inner-cities (London, Birmingham and Bristol are all good examples) Labour's 
reliance on trade unionists working in reserved occupations permitted a much higher 
level of activity. 114 Conservatives complained that compared with their own restraint, 
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Labour activists missed no opportunity to proclaim their party's socialist message, and 
would later present this as a major factor in their 1945 defeat. 
In Manchester, a similar pattern was repeated. All but one Conservative agent 
left their posts and the Party ceased to hold regular meetings. E. A. Radford M. P. 
(Rusholme) was typical when telling the City News in late 1940; "1 am not having any 
political meetings nor taking part in any form of political party activity.,, l 15 
Meanwhile, the Labour Party continued to hold regular meetings and lost only one of 
their party agents. However, the evidence of Manchester suggests the view of a 
one-sided truce is misleading, for local Conservatives engaged in party politics to a level 
at least equal to, if not greater than their Labour rivals, but Conservative activity took a 
different form. 
Superficially, inter-party unity was solid with all three parties respecting the terms 
of the electoral truce. Up to the end of 1942, there were three by-elections in the city: in 
September 1940 the Conservative candidate, Harry Hewlett was elected unopposed in the 
Exchange constituency following the death of Peter Eckersley M. P.; in March 1942 
Labour's Bill Oldfield was elected unopposed for Gorton when the incumbent M. P. 
William Wedgewood-Benn was elevated to the peerage. 116 Only one seat was 
challenged, resulting in the by-election in Clayton in October 1942. The ensuing contest 
was seemingly a model of wartime political co-operation. The Manchester 
Conservatives asked all voters, including supporters of their own party, to vote for Harry 
Thorneycroft (Labour), the Government candidate, and Harry Hewlett M. P. 
(Conservative, Exchange) supported Thorneycroft at several election meetings. 
The electoral truce presented a calm surface in Manchester politics, but 
underneath this veneer existed a very different reality. Party rivalry continued to such a 
degree that a local Labour leader lamented after a stormy City Council meeting of 
November 1940 that "there might have been no war on [at all]. "I 17 Throughout the 
early years of the War, the Conservative Party's actions on Manchester City Council 
displayed a remarkable degree of partisanship, producing considerable resentment from 
their Labour counterparts. In late October 1940 a major party conflict developed over 
the issue of expanding the council's Emergency Committee. This Committee initially 
-83 
constituted three members, including the leader of the Conservative group on the 
Council, Sir Norton Barclay, as Chairman. However, the Committee's work was widely 
considered unsatisfactory and was criticised by Mass-Observation. Similarly the City 
&wa observed; 
Whatever may have been its success in details of organisation, 
Manchester's Emergency Committee cannot be said to have shown any 
conspicuous grasp of any issues that have been a matter of public 
discussion. It has 'dithered' continually from one policy to another. It 
has shown itself unaware of public needs and feelings and haughty and 
aloof towards endeavours to educate it. 118 
The Council expanded the Committee from three to six members, a decision opposed by 
the Conservatives. Barclay called for a meeting of the Council's 
Conservative-dominated General and Parliamentary Committee, which decided to ask the 
Council to reverse its previous decision. This led to "heated discussions between Labour 
and Conservative Groups". 119 One Labour leader, Wright Robinson, bemoaned; I 
strongly object to the Tory Party trying to over-ride a decision of the Council. "] 20 
The following month, despite the fact that invasion remained a possibility, the 
Conservatives attempted to gain a party advantage in the running of the city. In mid - 
November 1940, the City Council met to select the Chairmen and Deputy-Chairmen for 
its various committees. Throughout the meeting, the Conservatives continuously used 
their superior numbers to ensure that they were greatly over represented in these 
positions. There were twenty statutory committees up for election, and following this 
Council session fifteen Chairmanships and eleven Deputy-Chairs were held by the 
Conservatives. Three Chairs and two Deputies were held by the Liberals and only two 
Chairs and three Deputies by Labour. Taking both Chairs and Deputies together, the 
Conservatives held 43, Labour 16 and the Liberals 9. As Labour had 51 councillors out 
of a total of 144 (the Conservatives had only 16 more), they were significantly 
under-represented. An exceptionally stormy council meeting ensued with Labour 
councillors enraged by the Conservatives' actions, and the City News observer reported; 
"[There were] severe attacks on Alderman S. Woolam, Secretary of the Conservative 
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group (and known as the Grand Old Man of the Tories], alleging that his colleagues were 
using their great majority to secure the 'plum' positions on committees.,, 121 Wright 
Robinson told the meeting that he wished to protest against the unfairness of the 'other' 
party; 
There is supposed to be a united front to win the war. What has happened 
is that under the guidance of those of the other side we are receiving less 
and less a proportion of responsible positions. Take Education, 
Electricity, Highways, Markets, Public Assistance, Rivers, Town Hall, 
Town Planning, Airport, Local Pensions and Wythenshawe. On all these 
there are Conservative chairmen and deputy chairmen, although we on our 
side have men who have served longer. Their members of three years 
service are getting offices against seasoned veterans. The other side have 
quite definitely taken advantage of this truce and there is therefore no 
unity between us. We want proportional representation. Here is no truce 
to win the war. It is sharp shooting for they have obtained a stranglehold 
on this corpomtion. 122 
Another Labour member, Alderman Hart, told Woollam; 
The Conservatives have done everything to get hold of all the important 
committees leaving the rest for the pickings ... You are Public Enemy 
number one ... You would lose the British Empire before you would give in 
on a political issue... We are asked to sit down quietly and take what the 
other party is going to give us. They take all the best positions and then 
say we will now talk things over to show you how fair we are. 123 
One such example came on the General and Parliamentary Committee. Woollarn defied 
the Labour Party over an allegation that he had broken an agreement by replacing two 
deceased Conservatives with other Conservatives. Wright Robinson alleged that the 
agreement was for proportional representation on major committees, and that Labour 
were entitled to both seats. Robinson said; "We have found Alderman Woollarn 
unbending. There is no fairer man on ordinary topics, but when he gets his party 
spectacles on his sense of fairness disappears. " Woollarn replied; "As party secretary I 
am here to defend the interests of my party and to see that it gets fair play. ', 124 
Following the meeting, a furious Robinson wrote; 
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I was very annoyed to find how the Tories had done it on us over 
Chairmanships and Deputy Chairmanships. We are living in a time of 
party truce, an altogether partnership to win the war [but] when we come 
to the election of Chairmen and Deputies the Tories throw their party 
weight around. 125 
Robinson noted that one Labour stalwart with thirty years of Council service, George 
Titt, was nominated by the Party for the Deputy-Chairmanship of the Highways 
Committee but was rejected by the Council in favour of a "negative Tory" with just three 
years membership of the Council. 126 Tom Regan, a leading Labour figure and a staunch 
left winger with the longest membership of anybody on the Committee, "Was rejected in 
favour of the same negative Tory", because it was "[Regan's] socialism that the Tories 
objected to. ', 127 Robinson noted that he was "very annoyed at this patent political 
packing by the Tory Party"and claimed; " there will be no unity on these terms. "128 
Twelve months later, the same situation occurred. Robinson noted; "We had the 
old row about Regan [this time] as Deputy Chairman for electricity. " 129 Once again the 
Conservatives refused to appoint him, but so as not to alienate Labour completely they 
elected another Labour member, whom they believed to be more moderate, in his place. 
This infiniated Labour with Robinson remarking; "Now was the fat in the fire. What 
right had the Tories to select our nominees for us and turn down the official one? "130 
The 'moderate' appointee was ordered to resign by his Labour colleagues and promptly 
did so. 
It was not only the Labour Party with whom the Conservative tactics caused 
friction. The Manchester Liberal Federation was infuriated following an incident in 
December 1940. An Aldermanic vacancy had arisen in the Rusholme Ward and both the 
Liberals and Labour had agreed that in such circumstances the senior Councillor would 
be elevated to the Alderman's bench without an election. However, the Conservatives 
refused to agree to this position and nominated a candidate for the seat, who was 
defeated. 131 This demonstrated the extent to which the Conservative Party sought to 
secure the utmost advantage for themselves, regardless of the military situation. The 
Secretary of the Liberal group on the Council, Hugh Lee, believed that the War had 
actually exacerbated party tensions; 
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For some time in the council chamber there has been a marked tendency to 
move in the direction of party politics rather than in a direction which 
makes for wise and efficient local Government administration. The 
opposition to the elevation of Alderman Edwards is the most recent 
example of these tactics. 132 
This was also the view of neutral observers, with the City News bemoaning; "The lack of 
leadership which many think they have discerned during the war, and the petty squabbles 
over mean points which mar our council's dignity and influence. " 133 
The Conservatives revealed little spirit of co-operation even when non-party, 
war-related, issues were discussed. On many local Councils, party stalwarts worked 
together in order to frustrate the common enemy. In Birmingham, where the 
Conservative majority had bitterly resented the way in which Labour had supported a 
Communist-led rent strike in 1939, an agreement was reached giving Labour 
representation on the Council's Emergency Committee. Thereafter, inter-party 
agreement on matters of civil defence was complete. 134 This was patently not the case 
in Manchester, where the Conservatives had strongly opposed any extension of the city's 
Emergency Committee and this position was taken further in October 1942 when the 
Party decided to oppose an important report on War Damage and Condition of 
Rebuilding. Only the revolt of several Conservatives ensured that "instead of blocking 
the very first step in reconstruction, the Report was carried. " 135 
Although the Manchester Conservatives ceased holding regular party meetings 
they did hold a special conference in the city in late 1941. The main topics of discussion 
were support for the Government, wartime 'slacking', youth education, the plight of 
small shopkeepers, family allowances, and post-war industry. 136 It was the overall 
mood of the conference that was of most significance; the City News stated; "Tbe 
conference did not smack of propaganda; rather a rallying of determination that when the 
war ends Conservatives, far from lulled into security by successes in war-time 
by-elections, will be not unprepared to face the inevitable conflict of political ideals. "137 
The Conservatives clearly believed that the Coalition was only a short-term measure and 
the next general election was very much on their minds. 
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It was not only Conservatives who failed to put party interest aside; the same was 
true of Labour and the Liberals. Most of the subsidiary branches of the Manchester 
Labour Party ceased to function shortly after the outbreak of war and did not resume 
activity until later in the conflict. For example, the Women's Section of the Gorton 
Constituency Labour Party closed down in the summer of 1939 and did not hold its next 
meeting until May 1943, but the main Labour organisations, the Manchester City Labour 
Party, and the Manchester Labour Women's Advisory Council continued to meet 
regularly. Labour was determined to maintain its separate presence as a political force in 
the city. One day after the outbreak of war, the President of the Women's Advisory 
Council "spoke of the need to maintain contact and preserve the organisation during the 
warperiod. "138 A short time later the Council heard that "a lead should be given by the 
Advisory Council as to what could be done to keep the sections together. "139 
Admittedly, this was partly due to a keenness to play their part in the war effort and in 
September 1939 the Council launched a group to look for profiteering, take evacuee's 
reports and to form a working committee to make bandages and other such supplies. 140 
However, this desire to 'do their bit' came second to their sense of party loyalty. Just as 
the Manchester Conservatives continued to play party politics, so did the Labour women. 
The thought of co-operating with Conservatives, even in wartime, proved impossible for 
many to swallow and an indication of this came early in the War. For almost a year from 
December 1939, the Labour Women's Council minutes recorded numerous debates and 
resolutions concerning the recently created Maternal Mortality and Welfare Committee. 
In December 1939 the Women's Council withdrew its support from this committee due 
to the fact that it contained Conservative women and other non-Labour members. In 
April 1940, the Council unanimously passed a resolution "re-affirm[ing] our previous 
decision to disaffiliate and [we] ask all Labour councillors and Women's Sections to 
withdraw the support. "141 The Women's Council had the full support of the City 
Labour Party whose Secretary "expressed his opinion that he thought the decision [to 
withdraw] was a wise one and that maternal and welfare questions were the normal work 
of our Party and should be done by us as a Party, and not in conjunction with an ad hoc 
committee. "142 The issue rumbled on throughout the summer of 1940 and an example 
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of the pettiness it aroused was revealed with the Women's Council noting with glee; 
"Mrs Holmshaw of Maternal Mortality stated that if they had to choose between the 
support of the Labour women and that of the Tories they would drop the Conservatives as 
they did not give active support, nor were they prepared to go all the way with the 
Maternal Mortality Committee. "143 For Labour women, any civic/community work 
should only be undertaken if they alone were responsible for carrying it out. This was 
further emphasised in October 1940. The Women's Council received a letter from the 
National Group for the Defence of Women and Children asking the Council to affiliate 
and appealing for donations. Again the Advisory Council refused, resolving that "the 
work being done by it is work that should be undertaken by the Labour Party. " 144 Even 
sharing a public platform with a Conservative provoked howls of protest from Labour 
women. In late 1942, the Council was informed that Dr Edith Sumerskill (a prominent 
Labour M. P. ) would address a meeting whose Chairman would be Alderman Miss 
Kingsmill-Jones, a veteran Manchester Conservative. In response, the Advisory Council 
resolved; "We strongly protest against Labour women M. P. s associating with and taking 
part in public meetings with organisations not affiliated with the Labour party.,, 145 
Surprisingly, given the Conservative Party's actions, the Labour group on the City 
Council did attempt to show a spirit of party co-operation. However, this led only to 
intra-party conflict with councillors enduring heavy criticism from other sections of the 
Party. In early 1940 the City Council Labour group, nominated Conservative women 
councillors for positions on various committees and was instantaneously condemned by 
the Women's Advisory Council. Bill Oldfield, the leader of the Labour group, addressed 
the Advisory Council and put forward their explanation, but the Labour women 
"Expressed their opinion [that] whilst accepting Councillor Oldfield's explanation, they 
protested against the practice of Labour men Councillors giving preference to Tory 
women when Labour women are available. "146 This suggests that Labour men were 
perhaps more willing to co-operate than were their female colleagues. Two years later, 
in January 1942, the Labour group supported an increase in salary for the Chief Engineer 
and Manager of the Manchester Transport Department. Again the councillors were 
fiercely criticised with the Labour women resolving; "This Council deplores the attitude 
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of the Labour Group. "147 Evidently, as was the case with the Conservatives, much of 
the local Labour Party found it extremely difficult to put party politics to one side. 
As with the Conservative Party, the Manchester Labour Party regarded the 
wartime Coalition as a strictly limited measure. Normal local party machinery and 
activity continued to as great an extent as possible, and the war effort and the existence of 
a coalition did not prevent Labour from continuing its propaganda. In December 1939, 
the Women's Council agreed to purchase copies of 'Labour Women' for the rest of the 
War, which it intended to put on open sale to attract new members. Similarly, in March 
1941 the Party produced a pamphlet entitled 'The Threat To Wailes , again intended to be 
widely available. Labour was keen to see prominent Labour members of the 
Government visiting the city to both boost their own electoral prospects and to spread the 
Labour message. Concerning the visit of Herbert Morrison to the city in May 1942, 
Wright Robinson wrote; "It was suggested that he was thinking of the textile vote and if 
he was it was a very sound political thing to do. It is not only house sense but a duty on 
the part of a politician to cultivate his electorate. " 148 Robinson here is very revealing, 
suggesting that Morrison's trip was seen as essentially a party rather than a government 
visit. Even at this perilous stage of the War, the Manchester Labour Party was looking 
ahead to the next general election and was keen to ensure they made political capital out 
of their party's participation in government. The wartime Coalition was precisely that, a 
wartime measure that would ultimately end, allowing a return to "normal" electoral 
politics and Manchester Labour Party meant to be ready. 
The third coalition party, the Liberals, largely steered clear of political disputes in 
the city during this period. Apart from the Aldermanic dispute with the Conservatives, 
no other incidents were recorded. However, from the outbreak of war the Liberals were 
active in the city, following the Labour approach that foundations should be laid for the 
next general election. Again, the Coalition was regarded as only a short-term necessity. 
Shortly after the outbreak of war, the Manchester Liberal Federation received 
correspondence from Party Headquarters, informing the local Party that "ordinary 
political activity will naturally cease and that all grants to associations will be 
discontinued. " 149 Despite this news the Federation continued much as before, with 
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meetings at Federation, Executive and constituency level held on a regular basis. The 
Federation's view of the need to retain a coherent, working organisation was made clear a 
few weeks after the outbreak of war; 
This Committee is of the view that it is vitally necessary to keep the 
organisation of the Party in being as this means not only can the 
Federation play its part more effectively in the national effort but when the 
time for contesting the election which is likely to come shortly after the 
war. the Liberal organisation in Manchester must exert its efforts as never 
before to lay the foundations for a just and lasting peace. 150 
The need for organisational strength was a recurrent issue. In February 1940 the 
Executive Committee received "reports from the various districts which showed that a 
determined effort was being made to keep organisations alive despite the difficulty of 
holding regular political meetings. "151 In November Mr Robert Davies of the Liberal 
Party Organisation "urged that meetings be held wherever possible even if of an informal 
nature in someone's private house. " 152 The Liberal strategy was taken a stage further in 
late 1942, when the Executive Committee advised; "Divisional and Central Associations 
should carry out a programme of activities with the definite object of strengthening their 
position. "153 For the Liberals, in common with the other two parties, party politics was 
not to be put on hold even in a time of national emergency. 
The study of Manchester highlights the fact that disputes, particularly those 
between the Labour and Conservative parties, in Parliament were mirrored even more 
strenuously at a local level. Any issue, whether controversial or relatively trivial, was 
likely to lead to the parties entrenching themselves in their party positions. Despite the 
graveness of the war situation and the existence of a coalition, all three parties had one 
eye on the next general election. Old habits refused to die. 
An Emerging Consensus? 
Continuing party politics in Manchester were accompanied by the lack of any emerging 
consensus between the two major parties on Britain's social and economic ftiture. At 
Westminster, the gravity of the military situation ensured that reconstruction planning did 
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not proceed far before the end of 1942. Indeed the appointment, in January 1941, of the 
Labour veteran Arthur Greenwood to the post of Minister without Portfolio charged with 
responsibility for reconstruction questions was a reflection of the low priority accorded 
to post-war matters in these years. All three major parties created their own 
reconstruction policy groups, but policy discussions in all parties had limited bearing on 
Government planning. 154 However, as Jefferys has argued; "the importance of such 
discussions lay rather in highlighting the very different perceptions of the future that lay 
concealed beneath the mask of coalition unity. "155, While the lack of major policy 
initiatives in the early years of the Coalition can be attributed to the war situation, it also 
reflected the mood of the Conservative majority in Parliament. Many Conservative 
back-benchers resented what they saw as the socialistic trend of wartime controls 6ver 
the economy and were determined to limit, whenever possible, the influence of Labour 
ministers and Dalton had discovered how uncompromising Conservatives could be when 
he produced plans to re-organise coal. In contrast, from mid- 1942 onwards in particular, 
the Labour Party were determined to urge its ministers in government to secure tangible 
gains in social policy. Hence, in July 1942, more than fifty Labour M. P. s voted to 
condemn the latest changes in the pensions system, the largest anti-government vote 
since the outbreak of war. 156 
711ie differing views of the parties in Westminster on the shape of future policy 
were also evident in Manchester. The early years of the War did appear to lead to a 
greater interest in the welfare of the working-classes for some local Conservatives. 
Evacuation findings surprised local Conservatives, as it did others. This was made clear 
in a letter from Harry Hewlett M. P. (Conservative, Exchange) to a Labour colleague in 
November 1941. Hewlett wrote; 
I have been distressed to find, when our children from Manchester were 
evacuated, to ascertain the large numbers of children who were what I 
might describe as being dirty. This came as a great shock to me ... I want to live to see the day when there is a total abolition of slums ... I would love to talk to you at length, and listen to you at length, on these post-war 
problems, particularly those problems that effect what we might call the 
working classes. 157 
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Superficially, this may suggest the beginnings of a shift in the traditional Conservative 
position towards the adoption of a degree of collectivism, and certainly it would appear 
to support the views of historians (such as Addison) who have argued that the early years 
of the War witnessed the origins of a cross-party consensus on social and economic 
affitirs. In reality, the increased awareness of working-class life and conditions had little 
or no effect on the attitudes of local Conservatives who remained wedded to their pre-war 
values of self-help and the minimalist state, values which continued to dominate their 
policy agenda. The views of the Manchester Conservatives were firmly on the 
neo-liberal Right of the Party. This was demonstrated by Hewlett who, in the same 
letter, wrote; 
I am a great believer in the fact that if the state cannot find a man work, 
then the state is responsible for the help of that man, his wife and his 
children, but here I feel there is an anomaly, and that is during past years 
on occasions I have ascertained that an unskilled labouring man with 
reasonably sized family could draw more from the dole than he will be 
paid if he was working a full working week. I am sure that you will agree 
with me that this is wrong in principle and that amendments to our laws 
will have to be brought into operation to rectify this anomaly. 15 8 
Here is the traditional Conservative position on welfare provision, and demonstrates that 
any attempt to improve the welfare of the poor would only be undertaken within strict 
boundaries and without changing the fundamental Conservative philosophy of minimalist 
state intervention. 
Local Conservatives continued to consider sacrosanct their preference for private 
over public enterprise, with one Labour councillor being asked by a Conservative 
colleague; "Did I not agree that corporation employees were slackers and less efficient 
than private employees? "159 For Conservatives, state control over industry was a 
necessary short term measure, which would give way once the War was won, allowing a 
return to the dominance of private enterprise. Any significant extension of the 
peace-time role of the state in welfare, industry, or the economy in general, such as that 
undertaken by Labour after 1945, was unthinkable and there was no recognition from 
Labour members that the Conservatives were beginning to transform themselves. After 
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one City Council meeting in 1941 Wright Robinson lamented how two Conservative 
councillors; 
Talked about the poor unemployed and how they doled out relief at the 
Guardians, bringing to my mind all the insolent arrogance of the rich 
philanthropist who used to be 'kind to the poor'... Humiliated I sat, feeling 
that the unemployed were being insulted and cheapened and their 
humanity exploited. 160 
This prompted Robinson and other Labour councillors to accuse local Conservatives of 
being "selfish, self-satisfied, with no real conscience, charmingly unaware of any social 
obligation, doing what public work they do in order to satisfy their desire for public 
approbation. " 161 Even allowing for the natural Labour suspicion of the Conservatives, 
these examples demonstrate that they did not believe the Conservatives were changing 
their ways. It would, however, have been very surprising had the Conservatives started 
to amend their core beliefs. The 1930s had been a highly successful decade for the 
Party, and the unique circumstances of 193942 were unlikely to persuade the Party to 
change a 'winning formula'. 
Manchester Labour also remained staunchly supportive of core party beliefs. In 
reality the Party had very little room to manoeuvre, even had it wished to do so, for 
Labour's decision to participate in the Coalition sparked unrest among some sections of 
the Labour movement. This placed the Party in the difficult position of managing a 
balancing act between co-operation with the other parties in the Coalition and 
maintaining a degree of independence in order to placate its own members. Once in the 
Coalition, the Parliamentary Labour Party came under pressure from local organisations 
who held unrealistic expectations of what Labour in government could achieve. 
Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, the Manchester District 
Council Branch of the N. U. R. recorded; 
We hold that the declaration of policy made by the Prime Minister and 
Foreign Secretary with reference to assistance to the U. S. S. R can only be 
implemented by a Government from which members who approved of 
Munich and laissez-faire capitalism have been exorcised and we call upon 
the N. E. C. of the Labour Party to insist upon the passing from 
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Government of those friends of Fascism who have helped materially to 
bring the nation into peril. 162 
Although such demands were totally unrealistic they, combined with the strong feelings 
expressed by groups such as the Women's Advisory Council, emphasise the fact that the 
P. L. P. had to appear distinctive from the Conservatives to mollify its rank-and-file This 
was a crucial necessity. The Labour Party leadership were aware that their participation 
in the Coalition, and the attendant co-operation with the Conservatives, risked alienating 
some traditional supporters and driving them into the grateful hands of the resurgent 
Communist Party. Popular interest in the Soviet Union had led to a substantial growth 
of the British Communist Party, which achieved a peak of membership of around 65,000 
in September 1942 compared to the highest pre-war figure of 18,000 achieved in the first 
half of 1938. Although with hindsight it is easy to dismiss the growth of the Communist 
Party as a strictly short-term phenomenon, this was not obvious at the time, and Labour 
were concerned that they may be outflanked on the Left. This concern manifested itself 
at both national and local levels. National Labour leaders, were highly critical of the 
Communists, and refused to accept their affiliation to the Labour Party, while locally, in 
diaries and minute-books there are concerned references to the relative success of the 
Communist Party and its propaganda. Throughout the country, the Communist Party 
sought to exploit popular fears on the subject of air-raid shelters and in September 1941, 
Wright Robinson (then Lord Mayor) wrote; "Alderman Hall, Councillors Ben Ainley and 
John Owen had called a public meeting, ostensibly to rouse people to their danger, r=4 
to ca= on the good work of Communist propaganda., 163 Labour were greatly 
concerned about Communist infiltration into the local trades union movement. 
Throughout 1940 a struggle waged on the Manchester and Salford Trades Council 
between moderates and Communists, who were officially banned from trades councils, 
and who, it was claimed, were engaging in disruptive activities. The Trades Council 
refused to affiliate to the Labour Party and was "restrained by the knowledge that some of 
its Union members would withdraw if it did. "164 The Guardian noted; "the extremists 
[are] apparently getting the better of it", and consequently the Trades Council received 
word that the T. U. C. had struck it off the list of recognised trades councils until it had 
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been satisfactorily reorganised. 165 Such concern did not simply die away, and over a 
year later, Robinson noted anxiously; "Communists are out to capture the Works 
Committee at Metro Vics. ', 166 So concerned were the Party about the threat of losing 
support to the Communists that party members were banned from taking part in any 
activity organised by the Communist Party. One Labour councillor, Dr Emrys Davies, 
who disobeyed this instruction by presiding at a meeting commemorating the Communist 
Tom Mann, was excluded from the Labour Party and subsequently said that it was 
regrettable that the Labour Party "should have sunk so low as to act in so dictatorial a 
manner. "167 Labour also resented the Communists subversive efforts on the various 
Anglo-Russian associations. Wright Robinson, referring to the Anglo-Russian 
Friendship Committee, claimed; "[It] should have been one of the greatest joys of my life 
but was thwarted by the continuous attempts of the Communist Party to go beyond the 
terms of reference and to use one and the Committee for political as against educational 
appeal on Russia. "168 Such was Robinson's feeling against the Communists that he 
described them as "the least pleasant feature of my year of office [as Lord Mayor].,, 169 
However, not all Labour members opposed the Communists and the attitude of 
the Labour leadership did provoke some internal arguments with the Labour Left, 
particularly at constituency level. Manchester provided one such example. At the 1942 
Labour Party Conference the Rusholme Labour Party, who were regarded as being the 
most left-wing of the Manchester Labour Constituency parties, moved a resolution in 
support of Communist affiliation; 
This Annual Conference of the Labour Party and Affiliated Organisations, 
believing that working-class unity is essential to secure the full 
prosecution of the war and vitally necessary in the post-war world, 
instructs the N. E. C. to remove the ban on members of the Labour Party 
co-operating with members of the Communist Party on specific issues. 
With undivided forces the working-class can go forward to victory in the 
war and victory in the peace. We are of the opinion that the Labour 
Movement should unite all sections of the working-class so that the fight 
would find the working-class in full strength. My party are convinced 
that the pressure of events will undoubtedly bring this about and say any 
such unity will not hinder the full prosecution of the war. 170 
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This resolution was overwhelmingly defeated and the views of the Rusholme Labour 
Party were unrepresentative of the Manchester Labour Party as a whole, the great 
majority of which remained steadfastly hostile to the Communists. 
Labour was not alone in fearing the rise of the Communists. The British 
Establishment were greatly disturbed about the possible political ramifications of the 
tremendous pro-Soviet feeling in the country. In an attempt to prevent the Communist 
Party from benefiting from this overwhelming popular sentiment, the regional 
information officers of the Ministry of Information were quietly encouraged to take over 
local campaigns begun by the Communists. Manchester provided a classic example. 
The local Communists organised an Anglo-Soviet Committee to raise funds for Russia 
but, prompted by the North-West region office, the Lord Mayor gave the Committee his 
blessing but persuaded it to disband so that he could form one of his own with Ministry 
representation. 171 
With the Labour Party needing to maintain its independence, it was inevitable that 
the language and policy preferences of the local Labour Party during these years were 
very different from those of the Conservatives. The existing economic system was 
continually attacked and, it was argued, could only be replaced by a system which 
involved a greatly increased role for the state. As early as August 1940,, Wright 
Robinson referred to a decision taken by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (now B. P. ) 
which was reported to have sold one million barrels of oil to Japan. Robinson 
bemoaned; "This is disturbing and is part of the whole mad policy of capitalism. To win 
this war we must have unity [but] there will be hell let loose afterwards. " 172 For 
Labour, profits and self-satisfaction should be put aside in favour of the common good, 
with Robinson saying in a speech of late 1941; 
I do not suggest that either here or in America equality has ever been 
accepted in practice. The nearest approach to equality is not to be found 
in the larger but in the smaller democracies - Denmark, Sweden and 
Norway where the gap between the highest and lowest incomes was much 
narrower than in Great Britain or America, [and we must] praise Denmark 
for setting up a co-operative dairy system to overcome major economic 
difficulties. 173 
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In total contrast to the Conservatives, the local Labour Party foresaw the future in terms 
of state "control of industry and equality of economic opportunity. - 174 Labour were 
adamant that there must be no return to the mass unemployment of the 1930s, which was 
described as "the best recruiting sergeant for Hitler [and] the greatest soul destroying 
thing in our civilisation. "175 The Manchester Labour Party thus urged the need for 
national planning, involving the creation of a Regional Industrial Committee, to begin 
work as soon as possible to prevent mass post-war unemployment. 176 
Further evidence of the major differences between the two major parties was 
provided by Labour's support for the nationalisation of land. In early 1941 Sir Ernest 
Simon (at this time an Independent but with links to Labour, becoming a Labour Peer 
after the war) spoke for many fully-fledged Labour members when advocating national, 
regional and local planning to determine the general location of properties and industry. 
In a paper entitled 'Urban Land Ownership and Management after the War' Simon stated 
how impressed he had been at the contrast between the planning of Moscow and 
Manchester. Simon argued; 
Individual ownership of the land must be abolished. Under unified 
ownership central open spaces can be provided with no cost to anybody. 
Only when there is common ownership of the land will it be possible to 
plan and rebuild our cities with a single eye to the advantage of the people 
as a whole. The authorities must have a free hand to plan for convenience 
and amenity without certainty of obstruction through damage to the value 
of property or individuals. 177 
He concluded; "Firstly, separate ownership of urban land must at all costs be abolished 
[and that] secondly, all land should be nationalised at the earliest possible moment. "178 
Simon presciently acknowledged that there was "a very strong prejudice against 
nationalisation from the political Right, and there would be a terrific fight to settle the 
basis of compensation. " 179 
While the Conservatives remained wedded to their pre-war views of the social 
services, the local Labour Party continued with their campaign to further their provisions. 
In July 1941 the Labour Women's Advisory Council resolved that it should "take steps to 
forward to the N. E. C. a resolution that sick benefit should be paid to pregnant women 
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two months before and after the birth. If necessary supplementary benefit should be 
provided. "180 Also in July 1941, in response to the Government's recently introduced 
scheme of Day Nurseries, the Advisory Council proposed that the P. L. P. should push for 
the following policies to augment the proposals; 
(1) Residential Day and Night Nurseries for children up to 2 
years old. 
(2) Nursery schools from ages 2-5 with meals provided. 
(3) Equipment of nursery classes on nursery school lines. 
(4) Provision to be made for children after school hours from 
age of 5 
to school leaving age. ] 81 
Amongst the Women's Council, any sign of vested interest or private profits 
coming before what they perceived as the public good was roundly condemned. In 
January 1942 the Council resolved; "[We] strongly protest against the statements made 
by Lord Woolton and the Catering Trades [which were the subject of fierce disagreement 
between the parties in early 1943] that (a) the British Restaurants would not be continued 
after the war and (b) that the Catering Trade would be considered before a British 
restaurant is opened in any area. " 182 Similarly, the following month it was resolved that 
"This Council is of the opinion that the recent legislation granting an allowance for 
travelling expenses to a section of the community [such as the upper reaches of the local 
Council] is unjust and demands that the allowance should be available to all workers. - 183 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of policy formulation amongst local parties 
concerned the Liberals. There is clear evidence to suggest that there were marked 
differences between the Parliamentary Liberal Party and the Manchester Liberal 
Federation over the Party's future direction. During this period, the Liberals at 
Westminster were moving closer to the Labour Partý position on many issues, accepting 
that the state would continue to play a major role in society after the War. Indeed, the 
Party was in favour of adopting a peacetime planned economy. However, while the 
Liberals in Parliament were moving in a progressive direction, this was evidently causing 
considerable friction in the provinces and Manchester Liberals, on many issues, were 
closer to the Conservatives in their views. For them, increased state action and 
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regulation was purely a war-time phenomenon to be dismantled as quickly as possible 
after the War, a view shared by Liberal associations in other parts of the country. In late 
1942, the Manchester Liberal Federation received a letter from the East Grinstead Liberal 
Association asking for the Federation's support in their protest against the Liberal Party's 
Organisation's suggested adoption of the planned economy. 184 In response, the 
Federation decided to await a report from the Party Headquarters, but hinted that it had 
considerable sympathy with the East Grinstead Association's views. 
The Manchester Liberals views on the shape of post-war Britain were clearly 
expressed in an address made by their President, Philip Oliver, in April 1942. This 
makes interesting reading for much of it could quite easily have come from a 
Conservative: 
After the victory there will be an appalling amount of work to be done and 
an appalling number of beaurocrats [sic] who will be perfectly willing to 
do it. The beaurocrat (sic] will be ready to give us security at the expense 
of freedom. It is for Liberals to see that in the giving of security, freedom 
is preserved, not at the expense of security but as its complement ... We demand the widest possible extension of free trade ... In the domestic 
sphere our task will be to re-establish the freedom which we have 
voluntarily surrendered for the purposes of war. The new 'Declaration of 
Rights' recently published in the U. S. speaks of the " right to live in a 
system of free enterprise, free from compulsory labour, irresponsible 
private power, arbitrary public authorities and unregulated monopolies. " 
Not for ever can we be obedient and regimented children of the state, the 
pertinent victims of monopoly. The interim period will no doubt be full 
of difficulties. In restoring freedom we must not destroy security. The 
restoration of some [economic] controls will be necessary while we 
change from a war economy to a peace economy. But there must be no 
uncertainty as to the direction in which we tread. The goal must be 
freedom - the restoration of the old freedom which is security from the 
arbitrary authority of the state. 185 
The emphasis here on free trade, the relaxing of economic controls and curbing the 
powers of the state demonstrate that the Liberals in Parliament were at odds with the 
views of their colleagues in the country. The evidence of the Manchester Liberals, 
together with the correspondence from the East Grinstead Association suggests that 
provincial Liberal opinion remained essentially conservative. 
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Conclusion. 
The evidence of Manchester suggests that the disruptive effects of the period from the 
outbreak of the War up to the publication of the Beveridge Report in late 1942 impacted 
on the electorate in two significant ways. Firstly, although one can easily find examples 
of bravery and a willingness to make sacrifices which conform to the 'myth of the Blitz', 
one must conclude that to speak of a homogenous, united civilian population is highly 
misleading. Attitudes towards the War itself were at times nebulous, whilst the Blitz 
shook civilian morale far more than was, and is, recognised. Crucially, class antagonism 
intensified. There existed a widely held working-class perception that they were 
shouldering a disproportionate amount of the burdens and sacrifices inherent in total war, 
while the experience, and horrifying stories, of evacuation served only to strengthen 
existing middle-class prejudices about their poorer neighbours. Secondly, the very 
desperation and hardships of the early war years generated a massive popular interest in 
social reform, and public enthusiasm, perhaps strongest among the young, for the notion 
of a 'better Britain' was a notable characteristic of these years. In this period, however, 
such thinking tended to take the rather vague form of 'something must be done', although 
reports suggested that certain policy areas (notably housing and education) were seen as 
priorities and there was increasing support for the state to play a greater role in post-war 
Britain. Between 1940-1942 the population is awaiting a lead, some great initiative 
behind which they could throw their support. 
However, although in the longer-term the combination of these two factors 
shaped the outcome of the 1945 General Election, their short-term political effects were 
negligible. There was, throughout this period, an absence of thought along party political 
lines. Newspaper comments, M. I. C. reports and the evidence of the Clayton by-election 
all suggest that, even by late 1942, party politics held very little interest for Mancunians, 
who met any attempt to score party political points with resentment and criticism. 
Importantly, reconstruction did not yet have a political edge; although there was 
considerable cynicism about the prospects of much-vaunted social reforms ever being 
introduced, public opinion reports demonstrate a general acceptance of Churchill's 
approach of 'winning the War first'. Such evidence clearly suggests that Addison is 
101 
wrong in his assertion that Labour's 1945 victory was determined as early as mid-1940. 
On the contrary, the evidence of Manchester supports the Jefferys/Sibley thesis that, even 
by late 1942, the likely outcome of the next general election was impossible to predict 
with any degree of confidence. 
Throughout the period covered by this chapter Britain remained in a perilous 
military position but despite this, and the creation of an all-party coalition Government in 
1940, the early years of the War had no effect on the nature of party politics or on policy 
thinking. Underneath the veneer of unity presented by the electoral truce, all three major 
Manchester parties saw the Coalition as a strictly war-time phenomenon which would 
give way to a return to 'normal' politics. Consequently, the parties remained determined 
to protect their separate identities and party interests. Party rivalries and conflicts 
therefore remained fraught, as could be seen in on a number of occasions. With the very 
nature of party politics unaffected by the War, it is little surprise that there was no 
evidence of a cross-party consensus emerging between the parties. For their own 
reasons, both the Conservatives and Labour held rigidly to their pre-war beliefs. The 
1930s had been a highly successful decade for the Manchester Conservatives, who were 
therefore unlikely to feel the necessity for a major re-thinking of the Party's social and 
economic policies in the uncertain and perilous early years of the War. Consequently, 
although the revelations surrounding evacuation appear to have shaken some 
Conservatives, the Party remained wedded to their neo-liberal tenets of minimalist state 
intervention in social policies and the superiority of private over public enterprise. 
With the Conservatives remaining loyal to their pre-war dogma, a consensus 
could only emerge if Labour moved to the Right. However, for internal party political 
reasons, Labour had very little room for manoeuvre. Labour had to continue to appear 
distinctive from the Conservatives to both mollify their own rank-and-file and to check 
the possibility of being outflanked on the Left by the resurgent Communist Party. This, 
judging by the nervous reaction of the Labour Party, was a real fear in 1941-42 and 
Labour was therefore strongly resistant to any notion of compromise of party policies. 
'I'liere was therefore no consensus, or emerging consensus, between the two major 
parties by the end of this period. For one to develop in the later years of the War was by 
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no means impossible, but it would require a significant change in attitudes from one of 
the two main parties. 
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The Tide Turns ... Hooray for Beveridge'. 
Introdueflon. 
The year from the end of 1942 to the end of 1943 represented the decisive turning point 
in public attitudes towards reconstruction and popular perceptions of the political parties. 
The publication of the Beveridge Report, coinciding with the turning of the military tide, 
transformed thp public mood into one of widespread dissatisfaction with the 
Government's approach to reconstruction. In consequence, reconstruction acquired a 
sharp political edge, previously lacking, which began to benefit the Labour Party. 
However, Labour's increasing support was confined to specific social groupings and 
owed more to the unpopularity of the Conservatives than to any great enthusiasm for 
their own party. By focusing on the crucial policy areas of Beveridge, land-ownership 
and the retention of economic controls, this chapter demonstrates that in Manchester 
there was no evidence of an emerging cross-party consensus. Indeed, the divide between 
the Manchester Conservative and Labour parties was greater than that which existed 
between the respective national leaderships; the Conservatives strongly opposed any 
notion of change whilst the Labour Party, through a continuing fear of being outflanked 
by the Communist Party, resisted any compromising of established party policy. With 
Britain no longer facing imminent defeat, party conflicts intensified, further reducing the 
likelihood of establishing a common ground and the improving military situation served 
to intensify and extend social divisions in the city. 
The Intensification of Social Divisions. 
Late 1942 saw the military tide turn in the Allies' favour; in North Africa, Russia and 
the Pacific, the Allies enjoyed decisive successes. On 4 November a B. B. C. announcer 
interrupted normal programming to advise listeners that the best news for years would be 
given at midnight. General Alexander's communiqud from Cairo revealed that British 
forces had won a complete victory at El Alamein and the church bells rang out, not to 
announce invasion, but to mark 'Monty's' victory. 1 Shortly afterwards British and 
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American forces landed in French North Africa (Operation Torch) whilst in Russia, the 
German Sixth Army was trapped at Stalingrad, surrendering in late January. In the 
Pacific the Japanese position on Guadalcanal had become hopeless. The war news gave 
a massive boost to public spirits which had endured reports of defeats and retreats since 
the War began. The M. I. C. recorded the mood in Manchester; 
The news from Egypt, Libya and later French North Africa has been so 
heartening during the last few weeks that there is a universal feeling that 
we are now on the right road: that we have found the right men in General 
Alexander and General Montgomery. The feeling of caution felt by 
everybody -a kind of 'too good to be true - or to last' is being replaced by 
confidence in victory in Africa. The landings in Morocco and Algeria, 
and particularly the passage of the huge convoy to Gibraltar received the 
highest praise. The news from the Solomons and New Guinea is regarded 
as very encouraging. 2 
The good news tended to promote over-confidence throughout the country, leading 
Churchill to warri; "This is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is 
perhaps the end of the beginning. -3 The M. I. C. noted that Churchill's broadcast had 
been appreciated as "a welcome and necessary antidote to the excessive optimism which 
recent successes have encouraged. "4 However, the M. I. C. still felt it necessary to wam; 
"There are still people who do not appreciate that we shall sustain very heavy casualties 
when we storin Europe and that very hard fighting lies in front of us in the vital job of 
driving the Axis out of the Occupied Countries. -5 Nevertheless, it was difficult to 
dispute that there was certainly "light visible at the end of the tunnel.,, 6 The Evening 
News espoused this belief in late December; "Now 1943 dawns, its horizons gleaming 
with more hope than since the long distant days of peace. -7 
The improving military position eliminated the external threat (1943 was the 
quietest year of the War for air-raids), provoking a general sense of war-weariness and 
complacency amongst the population. Early in the year a member of the M. I. C. 's 
Central Division, Mr Nathan (also a Liberal councillor), "expressed grave concern at the 
general slackness and lack of drive shown ... at the moment. "8 The Committee were 
clearly in agreement with this assessment; "After a debate, the Honorary Secretary was 
asked if he would send a letter to the Public Opinion Officer at the Ministry of 
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Information expressing the concern of the Committee on this matter. "9 Complacency 
and war weariness were not short-lived responses to the first major Allied victories, but 
trends that continued throughout the year. The public mood was now one of confidence 
with fear of invasion and defeat a distant memory; "our sense of personal danger has 
faded and we have settled down to a humdrum routine of civilians at war, or in 
wartime. "10 By September the M. I. C. was again expressing its concerns, whilst in 
October, the Cily News stated; 
Here in Manchester we are able to see what is taking place day by day. 
There is a slowly accumulating tiredness which is mental as well as 
physical. Tempers are frayed, minor ailments are growing in importance, 
the critical fever is rising. The Government is in danger of becoming a 
focus of discontent. II 
Manchester was not alone in reporting a high degree of complacency. Other Regional 
Committees reported the same observations and in October the Home Intelligence 
Department launched a national investigation into "the question of the feeling of 
slackness thought to be prevalent in the country at the moment. "12 Three months later, 
on Christmas Day, Wright Robinson still believed; "As far as the major issue for us all [is 
concerned], we are in more danger from complacency and tiredness than from enemy 
action. "13 
Attitudes towards the War itself underwent a significant change. In 
mid-February 1943 there was evidence to suggest that war news, hitherto eagerly 
devoured and discussed, was now of diminished importance to Mancunians. The 
M. I. C. 's Eastern Division noted with concern; "[The] Committee is almost unanimous in 
the belief that the public attitude to the military situation is an apathetic one of waiting 
for fresh developments. " 14 Public feeling against enemy powers was diminishing; 
despite the fact that British forces were enjoying little success against the Japanese and 
that stories of Japanese atrocities against Allied prisoners were reported in the press, it 
was still considered necessary to launch an investigation into public attitudes towards the 
Japanese. In February the M. I. C. received a letter from the Ministry of Information 
which stated; 
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It is of importance that people in Britain should realise that, though 
Germany is near to us, Japan is a menace not only to the people of Canada 
and Australia, to our Allies ... but to us in Britain. The Prime Minister 
has 
stated that in the event of the war in Europe being ended before the 
struggle in the Pacific, British forces will be diverted to that theatre until 
Japan is beaten. It would be disastrous ... if we failed to back up our 
servicemen. 15 
The M. I. C. acknowledged the problem and urged the M. O. L. to emphasise; "Before the 
war Japanese competition, particularly in textiles [of major importance in Lancashire of 
course] was severe and it was intensified by unfair and dishonest trading methods, such 
as the imitation of British trade markets. " and that "During the war their war crimes have 
been catalogued often. " 16 People's willingness to "do their bit" was reduced by Allied 
successes. In late July Dr. Stratton reported to the M. I. C. that the number of blood 
donors in the area (obviously of great importance in war-time) had fallen to less than 
7,000; "making it difficult to obtain the requisite number of donors for civilian purposes 
[let] alone ... military requirements. " 
17 For the first time in the War the M. I. C. was forced 
to organise a 'Blood Donor Week' to enable blood to be collected for the services. 
In 1943 the M. I. C. introduced a 'Question and Answer' service in which official 
replies were given to written questions submitted by the general public. A survey of 
these questions emphasises the extent to which complacency and expectation of the 
War's end dominated the public mood. Some of the questions would have been 
unthinkable a year earlier; for example, in late August, one correspondent asked; "What 
are the reasons for maintaining the blockade of the continent? "; in November another 
asked; "Couldn't the Home Guard and fire-watching services be relaxed now? "18 
Concern for servicemen focused entirely on their prospects at the end of the War. By 
July the M. I. C. was receiving numerous questions such as; "Will members of the forces 
who have served overseas for a long time be allowed priority in returning to this 
country? " and "What is being done to solve the many problems concerned with 
demobilisation after the war? "19 Enquiries also revealed a degree of general war 
weariness. Despite the shortage of fuel, one questioner wondered; "What is being done 
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to restore the damage done to the countryside by open-cast mining? " Even troop 
exercises, a novelty in the early years of the War, now became the subject of complaints 
because of the damage they incurred. 20 
The general mood of weariness served to further fracture Manchester society. 
Crime rose dramatically in the city with the total number of indictable offences rising 
from 5,990 in 1942 to 7,217 in 1943, an increase of 21 per cent. Compared to the lowest 
war-time figure, that of 1940 (5,067 indictable offences), crime had increased by 42 per 
cent. 21 Manchester society became introspective and particular social groupings 
attracted widespread criticism. Most notably, despite the fact that Nazi atrocities against 
Jews were well documented in the press, anti-Semitic feeling in the city increased, 
particularly in the first six months of the year. Anti-Semitism had long been a feature of 
Manchester, but it increased markedly with the improving fortunes of the War. In 
January Leonard Behrens, the Head of the M. I. C.; "expressed gave concern at the 
growth of anti-Semitism... and felt that it was helping the enemy to allow this to continue 
uncheeked.,, 22 Anti-Semitism featured heavily in M. I. C. minutes for several months, and 
the Northern Division's Annual Report for 1943 stated that the growth of anti-Semitism 
had been a major feature of that Division, while Councillor Barrat (a Conservative) 
wondered; "If the Jewish members of the meeting really were aware of the growth of 
anti-Semitism because if not he could assure them that it was there.,, 23 The M. I. C. was 
concerned with the increasing hostility towards the Jews and the attention of the 
Committee was drawn to a letter published in a local newspaper from a 'known Fascist' 
(the Committee's description, although it was later withdrawn from further M. I. C. 
correspondence) which conducted 'a violent attack against the Jews'. Instead of 
dismissing this example as a 'one-off, the Committee was acutely worried about the 
effect of such a letter; 
While agreeing that the freedom of the press should in no way be 
curtailed, the Committee was of the opinion that the publication of such a 
letter was regrettable in so far as it was aimed at creating disunity within 
the nation, and while too crude in its statements to convince any informed 
member of the community its sentiments might influence certain sections 
of the people. 24 
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At this time a confidential meeting between the M. I. C. and Jewish representatives took 
place to discuss measures that could be taken to improve matters. 
1943 also saw the questioning of juvenile morality, particularly the perceived 
loosening of moral standards among girls of little more than school age. On 2 July a 
local Juvenile Morality Conference was held, attended by 150 delegates including a U. S. 
Army chaplain, clergymen of several denominations, a female Police Sergeant, 
representatives of the political parties and a British Army Officer. Leonard Behrens, the 
Chairman of the M. I. C., stated; "No one at the meeting ... had the slightest doubt that the 
problem existed in an alarming degree. -25 The problem, the Conference heard, was, 
"ignorance of the serious dangers of moral conduct and widespread indifference to moral 
standards among adolescents and even parents.,, 26 This "had been accentuated by the 
presence of large numbers of men in uniform [particularly Americans]., 27 One female 
probation officer, emphasising the scale of the problem, commented; "Before the war [1] 
had to deal with something like 30 boys under 14 and perhaps 2 girls, now it is 35 girls 
and I boy. -28 Members of the Conference formulated a number of recommendations 
over the next few weeks. 29 The concern about juvenile behaviour was not confined to 
Manchester and the 'Manchester Report' (as it became known) struck a chord throughout 
the nation with enquiries "pouring in about its widespread immorality from the 
authorities in London and many other parts of the country.,, 30 The Report was not the 
end of the matter and in December, Manchester City Council created a Special 
Committee to consider the requirements of young people and youth welfare. 31 At a 
meeting of this Committee a further 42 representatives of social organisations attended, 
emphasising the continuing concern surrounding the issue. It was not only the behaviour 
of young girls that caused concern, as servicemen's wives also came in for criticism. In 
August a letter to the M. I. C. stated; "I am a young married woman of 25 and my husband 
is in the Merchant Navy and I am appalled at the actions of married women whilst their 
husbands are in the Navy. -32 In the same vein, Wright Robinson noted; "complete 
chastity and fidelity is no longer believed in as a sacred obligation. Young women after 
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short honeymoons are finding themselves unable or unwilling to endure indefinite 
celibacy and are taking chances in the husbands absence.,, 33 
With the war situation improving, it may well be that 1943 saw the release of 
anger and tensions that had been building up, during the early years of war. With the 
pressure easing, such emotions were no longer 'bottled up' and a form of 'scapegoating' 
could now take place. The social classes were hardening in their views of each other, a 
point reflected, as we shall see later, in the continuing polarisation of the Labour Party 
membership. 
The Impact of Beveridge. 
1943 saw not only an intensification of class and social divisions, but also a fin-ther 
crucial political development. The widespread support for Churchill's cautious 
approach to reconstruction, so evident in public opinion surveys taken in the city as late 
as August 1942, dissipated and was replaced by widespread demands for the Government 
to provide tangible evidence of its sincerity. This, in turn, gave reconstruction a political 
cutting edge with Labour as the beneficiaries. 
The pivot for this change was in late 1942 with the publication of The Report on 
Social and Allied Servi=, or the Beveridge Report as it was more popularly described, 
on I December 1942. Coinciding with the victory at El Alamein, which had so greatly 
boosted public confidence and morale, the Beveridge Report had an enormous impact on 
both opinion formers and the general public. The Report had initially been 
commissioned by Arthur Greenwood when he was in the War Cabinet, and its purpose 
had been to recommend measures to consolidate existing welfare provisions. Sir 
William Beveridge, the Committee's Chairman, was disliked by many of his colleagues, 
who regarded him as vain, humourless and tactless, and was given his new brief because 
Ernest Bevin, for whom Beveridge worked at the Ministry of Labour, detested him and 
wantedtoberidofhim. In his new job Beveridge went considerably beyond his brief 
and the character of the final report owed a great deal to Beveridge's determination to 
make a crusade out of it for the sake of the achievement of social reform and, according 
to his critics, for the sake of his ego. After sixteen months of consultation with 127 
121 
individuals, pressure groups, and political organisations (but not the Conservative Party, 
which declined to assist) the Beveridge Committee published its recommendations. 
Beveridge's plans for social insurance envisaged a single flaeate contribution which 
would provide a comprehensive system of social insurance, including unemployment 
benefit, sickness benefit, disability benefit, workmen's compensation, old age, widows' 
and orphans' pensions, funeral grants and maternity benefits. A system of National 
Assistance, paid for by the Government, would be provided for those who fell outside 
other benefits. The level of contribution would be fixed at a level within the reach of 
every employed person, with benefits paid at a "national minimum subsistence income", 
with the whole system being co-ordinated by a new Ministry of Social Security. To 
these proposals, Beveridge added three "assumptions" which were necessary to ensure 
the plan's success: the provision of family allowances, national health and rehabilitation 
services, and the maintenance of full employment (i. e. an unemployment rate of not more 
than 3 per cent according to Beveridge, although others claimed that 8 per cent would 
still constitute full employment). In summation of his report, Beveridge stated; 
The Plan for Social Security is put forward as part of a general programme 
of social policy. It is one part only of an attack upon five great evils: 
upon the physical -W-= with which 
it is directly concerned; upon Disease 
which often causes Want and brings many other troubles in its train; upon 
Ignorance which no democracy can afford among its citizens; upon the 
Squalor which arises mainly through haphazard distribution of industry 
and population; upon Idleness which destroys wealth and corrupts men, 
whether they are well fed or not. 34 
The plan involved a large increase in social insurance contributions from individuals, but 
it was calculated that the average household was already paying out so much towards 
private, voluntary schemes and private medical services which the plan would make 
redundant, that no great increase would be involved for those content with the national 
minimum. 
Despite Beveridge's earlier claims that his scheme would take Britain "half-way 
to Moscow", the scheme was evolutionary rather than revolutionary. His proposals were 
based on the time honoured principle of contributions from employer, employee and the 
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state, the preservation of insurance was a throwback to the days of Lloyd-George, while 
the flat rate contributory element applied to all income levels, which was a retrogressive 
arrangement. Beveridge had "finally rejected the socialist doctrine of a social security 
provided by society. "35 Nevertheless, Beveridge encapsulated the hopes and aspirations 
of the British people for a better future; in one 300 page document the population were 
seemingly assured that poverty, financial insecurity and poor health had no place in 
post-war Britain. 
The earlier, vague desire for a 'better world' crystallised into massive public 
acclaim for the Beveridge Plan. 36 Outside His Majesty's Stationery Office, massive 
queues lined up to buy copies of the Report, with at least 635,000 copies eventually sold. 
Within two weeks of publication, Gallup revealed that 19 out of 20 people had heard of 
the Report and 9 out of 10 believed that the proposals should be adopted. 37 Iht 
Spectator observed; "It is rather more than a fortnight since the Beveridge Report was 
published. In that interval the report has almost eclipsed the war itself as a subject of 
discussion in the country.,, 38 The press were similarly enthusiastic, with even 
right-leaning newspapers (except The Daily ldý) supporting the plan; The Times 
pronounced the Report to be a "momentous document which should and must exercise a 
profound and immediate influence on the direction of social change in Britain. ', 39; Jilt 
Yorkshire Post praised Sir William's "pioneering vision" and said that a prompt decision 
to implement its main features "would be a most heartening affirmation of faith in the 
future of Britain.,, 40; The Spectator was more circumspect but still argued that "to 
recognise that everything in the Beveridge Plan is open to discussion and revision does 
not mean that the plan could simply be shelved. "41 
The impact of Beveridge was such that his proposals were widely reported 
abroad. Returning from the United States the Manchester politician, Sir Ernest Simon, 
informed Beveridge; 
For two or three weeks the headlines of the papers, wherever we went, 
was dominated by 'Beveridge'. The publicity there was quite 
astonishing. One small illustration of the popularity of the report will 
amuse you. The Controller of the City of New York gave a copy to his 
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wife for a Christmas present; she also had the same idea and gave him a 
Copy. 42 
The reaction in Manchester reflected the national mood, with the Report being 
greeted with enthusiasm by all the local papers. The Guardian described it as "a big and 
fine thing. ', 43 The Evening News commented; "Its publication has lighted a beacon in 
the minds of a people grown weary of the narrow and muddling content of their affairs 
before the war and it is as certain as anything can be that the nation will never be content 
until that beacon has been reached. "44 The Evening Chronicle was also supportive; 
The conclusion Sir William has drawn is that it is within our power to 
abolish want and to offer a measure of social security to all. That has 
been talked about for years, but this is the first time a comprehensive plan 
for achieving it has been drafted. In this respect it should prove one of 
the most powerful propagapda weapons at the disposal of the United 
Nations ... The great thing is that it gives them [politicians] a fine basis on 
which to work for the abolition of want in a world which cm be made 
better when this war is over. 45 
On 7 December the M. I. C. reported that the Beveridge proposals were "generally 
welcomed as the basis for consideration and discussion, and as a token of Britain's desire 
to translate promises into deeds. -46 This was tame and greatly understates the massive 
public interest in the scheme within the city. The local press more accurately assessed 
the public mood; "Wherever one went today, in the workshops, on the buses, in the 
offices, and in commercial circles, everybody seemed to have digested the many 
newspaper columns devoted to the Beveridge Plan. -47 On 5 December the Guardian 
noted; 
There has been a remarkable demand in Manchester for copies of 
[Beveridge's] report on the social services. The first supplies were sold 
out in a few hours and inquiries have been continuous ever since. The 
local officials of the stationery office are taking special steps to distribute 
the fresh supplies that reach them and ask that the public should be a little 
patient. It has not yet been possible to meet the full daily demand. 48 
Beveridge visited Manchester on II December as part of a promotional tour, addressing 
the Manchester Luncheon Club on "Reconstruction Problems". This provided further 
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evidence of Beveridge's popularity, with his visit "arous[ing] unusual interest. The 
number of people who have indicated their anxiety to hear him is already so large that the 
officers of the club announce that they may be compelled to limit the issue of tickets. ', 49 
Beveridge had caught the imagination of Mancunians. 
Support for the Beveridge Plan transcended traditional socio-economic 
boundaries. There was no doubting its popularity amongst the working-class; in his 
regular Evening News feature, 'Voice of the Workshop', William Pickles (an engineering 
worker) stated; 
There is no doubt the Beveridge Plan has gained the approval of the man 
in the workshop. Particularly this is true of the part which makes 
provision for old age ... The enthusiasm of the man in the workshop for the Beveridge Plan seems likely to continue. Should any Government 
endeavour to prevent the plan being put into operation it will pay a heavy 
penalty for its failure. 50 
The middle-class was also strongly in favour of its implementation. One local civil 
servant said of Beveridge; "It is a big step towards security and it will be welcomed by 
the middle-class particularly; similarly the M. I. C. concluded; 
What might be called the 'middle' or 'professional' classes are 
particularly interested because of the promise it suggests of some form of 
state aid for them ... At present the man earning between LSOO and f 1000 a 
year with children to educate is finding current taxation a heavy 
burden ... Now he is looking forward to the time when he can reap a small dividend from the money paid in taxation, which looks like continuing at a 
high level. This class of citizen will expect some consideration when 
plans for post-war security are considered by the Govemment. 51 
The popularity of the Beveridge Report also cut across traditional political allegiances, a 
point demonstrated by Divisional Committee reports to the M. I. C. In February, shortly 
before Parliament debated the proposals the Eastern Division, a largely Labour area, 
commented; "[The] Committee is almost unanimous in the belief that ... there is a keener 
interest in Home Front events [than the War]"; in the same month the Southern Division 
(strongly Conservative) observed that there was "a sustained interest in the Beveridge 
proposals. -52 'Me Evening News reiterated the overall strength of support for the 
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Report in Manchester; "Its reception and propaganda has been such that it will be very 
difficult for the Government to avoid adopting the major parts of it.,, 53 
Despite the massive acclaim for the Beveridge Report, the Government's 
response was hesitant. At Westminster the reactions of the Labour and Conservative 
parties revealed a significant gulf of opinion; the Beveridge Report had clearly "brought 
to the surface and pinpointed the tension of coalition politics.,, 54 Critically, in the public 
mind, Labour were seen to be strongly in favour of the Report, whilst the Conservatives 
were seen as hostile to its intentions. The vast majority of Labour M. P. s supported its 
immediate implementation for the Report was advocating policies Labour had 
championed since the mid-1930's. Only a few on the left of the Party disagreed. 
Realising that the Plan was hardly revolutionary, one veteran party agent described its 
ecstatic reception as a "deluge of slush.,, 55 Nevertheless the National Council of 
Labour, representing both the Labour Party and the T. U. C., endorsed the Report, the 
Liberal Party also declared their support for immediate implementation but among 
Conservatives, however, there was widespread scepticism with the right-wing of the 
Party, in particular, remaining unimpressed. The National Review observed gloomily; 
"T'he dole is to be increased so greatly that thousands of people will greatly prefer to do 
nothing., '56 The line of more moderate Conservatives, as Harold Nicolson perceptively 
observed it, was to "welcome the Report in principle, and then to whittle away by 
detailed criticism. They will say that it is all very splendid and Utopian, but we can only 
begin to know whether we can afford it once we have some idea what our foreign trade 
will be like after the war.,, 57 Churchill himself regarded the Report as a distraction from 
the serious business of winning the War, and only a small group of younger 
Conservatives (later to be known as the Tory Reform Group, led by men such as Lord 
Hinchinbrooke and Quintin Hogg, later Lord Hailsham), consisting of no more than 50 
M. P. s, championed the Report with Hogg remarking that it was "above all an opportunity 
to re-establish a social conscience in the Tory Party.,, 58 
The split between the two major parties was reflected in the Cabinet. Labour 
ministers pressed for the implementation of Beveridge while Conservatives such as 
Kingsley Wood pointed to the financial difficulties of the Plan. Despite the 
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overwhelming popularity of the Beveridge Report, the widely divergent views of the 
parties meant it could not be implemented without a controversy that would jeopardise 
the Coalition. The inevitable consequence was prevarication. The Cabinet agreed to 
welcome the Report in principle but also to undertake its own detailed investigation. In 
the meantime there could be no legislation: given the uncertainty of the post-war 
situation it was "impossible at this stage to establish any order of priority or to enter into 
definite commitments. "59 
The Government went to extraordinary lengths to stifle all official publicity for 
the Report. A summary, by Sir William himself, was issued as an A. B. C. A.. pamphlet 
on 19 December but was withdrawn by the War Office just two days later. The War 
Minister, Sir James Grigg, explained to indignant M. P. s that he could not permit 
A. B. C. A.. discussion groups to discuss such a controversial subject. The Evening 
Ngm, along with much of the rest of the country, was strongly critical of the decision, 
commenting; 
Among the most ridiculous attempts to turn back the clock has been the 
decision of the War Office to withdraw the A. B. C. A.. bulletin on the 
Beveridge Report. Soldiers are apparently encouraged to discuss 'current 
afTbLirs' but not those things which will intimately affect their future, or not 
until the Government has decided whether the report will be good for 
them or not. 60 
The Government's response to Beveridge provoked massive discontent in 
Manchester. The broken promises of the First World War were recalled and the 
Guardian commented; 
Parliament must never forget the enormous psychological effect the 
Beveridge Plan has produced in the country. There was no parallel to it 
in the last war, even with 'homes for heroes' and if the peoples hopes 
should be dissolved in cynicism the consequences will be revolutionary in 
a very different sense from that of Sir William Beveridge's mild 'British 
Revolution'. 61 
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In the midst of this increasing suspicion and frustration, a Parliamentary debate on the 
Beveridge Report took place between 16-18 February. The local press were in no doubt 
as to the importance of the debate. The Evening News commented; 
The wishy-washy safety-first, all-party motion on the Beveridge Report 
satisfies none of its supporters. If that is as far as the Government is 
preparing to go in the coming debate the cynics and pessimists will feel 
themselves confirmed in their suspicion that the Government does not 
mean business in the matter - that in fact the report is no more than a 
carrot dangled before the nation's nose. Discouragement will be intense. 
It is of the utmost importance for the prosecution of the war that the 
Cabinet spokesmen in the debate should make clear not only that full 
action on the report is intended but also how soon action will be taken. 62 
The Guardian again warned; "As the weeks have gone on it has become more and more 
clear that unless we get the Beveridge Plan, or something at least as comprehensive and 
bold we shall not escape ... without far reaching political reaction at home. -63 
The split in the Cabinet and between the parties ensured that the Government's 
statements during the debate were fudged. It was agreed that the Government should 
announce that the Cabinet was ready to commit itself to a start on preparing legislation, 
but at Churchill's insistence any decision as to whether this legislation should be 
implemented was to be left to a new Government elected after the War. 64 The 
Government arguably had a reasonable case but their main speakers, Sir John Anderson 
(Home Secretary) and Sir Kingsley Wood (Chancellor of the Exchequer) -presented it so 
badly that, in Dalton's words, they "succeeded in creating the impression that they were 
both shifty and hostile. ', 65 Anderson put the Government's position "in a manner which 
made clear that he lacked not only any enthusiasm for the plan, but also any 
understanding of the depth of interest taken in it by the people" whilst Wood "lingered 
with apparent satisfaction over the financial perils of the plan.,, 66 - As Barnett dryly 
observes; "The Government got much the same response as a parent telling a child that 
Father Christmas would have to consider very carefully in the light of this and that, when 
and whether and in what circumstances eventually to bring him his heavily expected 
bicycle.,, 67- After the first day of debate, the Evening News scathingly commented; 
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The Government's explanation of its attitude to the Beveridge Report was 
so provisional, conditional and indecisive that if they do not think again, 
we may soon be in the throes of a political crisis. The very fact that this 
is so shows to what extent public opinion on the question of social 
security has advanced since the war began. The public, growing 
increasingly cynical wanted evidence that plans are to be implemented 
rather than pigeon-holed. The evidence they asked for was an immediate 
start by the setting up of a Ministry of Social Security and a clear 
indication of when other legislation will be introduced. The Government 
not only refused to do that but went out of their way to emphasise that 
their statements of policy commits them to nothing. 68 
The Guardian was initially prepared to give the Government the benefit of the doubt; 
"One's first impression is that the Government has met the Beveridge Report in 
something like the spirit it was written.,, 69 While Labour ministers were constrained by 
loyalty to the Government to support its policy, backbench Labour M. P. s strongly 
criticised the Government's stance. Without exception, Labour speakers called for the 
Beveridge proposals to be implemented immediately. On the Conservative backbenches 
attitudes %yere very different. Most reluctantly accepted the Government's policy of 
welcoming the Report in principle, as they were anxious not to be seen blocking a 
proposal that had widespread public support. The only open criticism came from Sir 
Herbert Williams. However, several others could hardly conceal their animosity towards 
the Report and the manner in which it had been produced, and a group of Conservative 
industrialists put down an amendment calling for the postponement of legislation though 
this was not pressed after the Government's spokesmen hinted that any such eventuality 
was unlikely before the end of the War. 70 
The Government's weak endorsement of Beveridge produced the largest 
backbench revolt of the War. Although all Labour and Liberal ministers voted with the 
Government, 97 Labour members, I Communist, 3 members of the I. L. P.., 9 Liberals and 
11 Independents voted against the Government. Only 2 non-ministerial Labour M. P. 's 
voted with the Government. 
In Manchester, the response was one of both great disappointment and anger. 
The Guardian reversed its earlier support and condemned the Government; 
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The Government's handling of the debate has been most inept. If it had 
had a sense of popular psychology the confusion and recrimination of the 
last three days would not have been allowed to develop. The effect on the 
Government's reputation at home and abroad has been highly damaging. 
Ministers have given the very impression of vacillation and 
half-heartedness that they should most strongly have guarded against. 
The War Cabinet apparently did not realise what the Beveridge Report has 
come to mean in the outside world's picture of Britain or in the minds of 
ordinary people, civilians and servicemen, in this country. 'A bold and 
imaginative plan' Sir John Anderson called it and then proceeded to 
stress all the differences the Government had with it. When he did come 
to say that it was 'accepted in principle' no one could believe him. Sir 
Kingsley Wood deepened the feeling that the Government was really 
committing itself to nothing. He pushed social security a long way back 
in post-war priorities. 71 
The Evening Nem emphasised the disillusionment, and made it clear that it held the 
Conservatives responsible for the Government's stance; 
The Beveridge debate has caused deep disappointment throughout the 
country. Many who hoped the present Government might so respond to 
the temper of the people as to lay the foundations for a happier England 
have now abandoned any such hope because of the evident strength of the 
reactionary forces in the Commons and Cabinet which seems to have 
made courageous decision impossible. 72 
Dissatisfaction with the Government's stance stretched across the Manchester 
political spectrum, and was equally strong among Conservative and Labour supporters. In 
the Wythenshawe division (predominantly Conservative), for example, it was reported; 
"[A] widespread opinion exists that the Beveridge Report, sent out by the Government 
for obvious propaganda purposes, is not being implemented and that it does not appear to 
be intended to put the propaganda into serious practice.,, 73 A second Conservative 
division reported; "There was a general desire that plans be formulated forthwith for 
post-war reconstruction. "74 Responding to the cynicism and disillusionment, Churchill 
broadcast on 21 March 1943, advocating a "Four Year Plan" including a broadening field 
for state ownership and enterprise, a National Health Service and national compulsory 
insurance "for all classes, for all purposes" This speech has been described as "the first 
popular proclamation of the new consensus.,, 75 However, it did little to appease the 
public as he made no direct reference to Beveridge and had warned against "attempts to 
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over-persuade or even to coerce His Majesty's Government to bind themselves or their 
unknown successors ... to impose great new expenditure on the state., '76 
As The 
Guardian observed; "When we look at its details, the 'Four Year Plan' does not amount 
to more than what the Government is already pledged to in the way of reconstruction.,, 77 
Despite continuing public pressure the Government still moved only slowly towards the 
introduction of a reconstruction programme. Again pressure came from Conservative 
areas, with the Southern Divisional Committee, representing areas that habitually gave 
the Conservatives over 60 per cent of the vote, being the most frequent recorder of public 
demands for positive action to be taken. In July the Committee again reported "a 
growing public desire for a Government plan for post-war reconstruction.,, 78 
Throughout the early years of the War servicemen, or in electoral terms, younger 
voters, had been particularly interested in social and economic reconstruction and 
following the fudge over the Beveridge Report the young were felt to be particularly 
impatient with the Government's prevarication. Wright Robinson noted; "It is fairly 
clear that this generation will not be content with the things my generation were content 
to accept. "79 The impatience and frustration of the young was also referred to by Bill 
Oldfield M. P. (Labour, Gorton). Speaking in the Parliamentary debate on the Beveridge 
Report, he declared that "if nothing is done to implement the Report the growing 
cynicism about Parliament, especially among the young people would be increased.,, '80 
This impatience would increasingly lead to younger voters looking elsewhere than the 
Conservative Party to implement the reforms they wanted. 
In Westminster a new Reconstruction Priorities Committee was established to 
consider the Government's reaction to the Beveridge Plan but this proved unwieldy in 
operation, whilst friction in Cabinet continued. In June the three leading Labour 
members of the Government, Attlee, Bevin and Morrison, submitted a paper to the 
Cabinet entitled 'The Need For Decision , arguing that future planning would be fatally 
prejudiced unless the Government made its own detailed financial forecasts, followed by 
firm decisions about which items of policy might be acted upon before the end of the 
War. Churchill replied negatively, and Morrison was left to complain about the lack of 
reconstruction measures and the "slowing down influence of Kingsley Wood and such 
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people.,, 81 There still existed among Conservatives a widespread suspicion that, in R. A. 
Butler's words; "Beveridge is a sinister old man who wishes to give away a great deal of 
other people's money. "82 Not until November did Churchill create a Ministry of 
Reconstruction, and the activities of this new committee were to be circumscribed by the 
need to avoid contentious issues. Only in the field of education, where there was a 
degree of cross-party agreement was any real progress made, and even here with 
considerable difficulties. 
People hoped the King's Speech (in November) would contain promises of 
reforming bills to be introduced shortly. However, on the committee devising the 
Speech, Butler noted that ministers could only come up with variations upon "We have 
an Education Bill. When they came to include something else they couldn't find it. -83 
Not surprisingly, the King's Speech produced only disappointment in Manchester. The 
Guardian wrote despairingly; 
A full employment policy remains only an 'aim'; there is nothing about 
ways of achieving it. The whole group of subjects that come under the 
head of the Beveridge Plan are seen to be pushed well into the fiiture ... It is 
almost a year since the Beveridge Report was published, so it cannot be 
said that the caravan is moving recklessly. 84 
Similarly, the Evening News observed; "[We have] been bitterly disappointed. On all 
the major problems of reconstruction, with the single exception of the Education Bill, 
there are promised only more White Papers, more discussion, more declarations of papers 
and debates.,, 85 In the ensuing Parliamentary debate, JR. Clynes M. P. (Labour, 
Platting) claimed his constituents felt that "many subjects in the King's Speech were 
shrouded in the most uncertain terms and the language and treatment had aroused the fear 
that delay, not drive, was the chosen method of the Govemment.,, 86 
Throughout 1943 there was constant frustration amongst the population of 
Manchester concerning the lack of progress on social reform. The cynicism of the early 
war years intensified and was no longer subjugated by a general willingness to win the 
War first. What were the political repercussions of this new mood? 
132 
A Swing to Labour? 
A number of historians, notably Jefferys and Sibley, have argued that during 1943, the 
public perceived significant differences between the Conservative and Labour parties on 
the issue of reconstruction, and have consequently identified 1943 as the year people 
turned irreversibly to the Labour Party. 87 Rejecting the popular notion that Labour's 
victory was inevitable from 1940-41, they suggest that it was the massive public 
frustration with the slow progress on reconstruction issues throughout the year that led to 
people switching their support from the Conservatives to Labour. Labour, it is argued, 
were widely seen as the progressive party who were committed to the implementation of 
the policies the people were clamouring for, while the Conservatives were widely seen as 
reactionaries. The Beveridge debate is often held to have played a significant role in this 
characterisation, with Labour pledged to implement Beveridge in full, and the 
Conservative Party seemingly hostile to Beveridge and all notions of change. For this 
reason a number of historians, such as Calder, have argued that the debate was a crucial 
factor in Labour's 1945 victory. 88 
A cursory glance at national by-election results and opinion polls suggests the 
Jefferys/Sibley hypothesis is highly plausible. By-elections changed in character in 
1943. Earlier in the War most by-elections were forced by 'freak' candidates exploiting 
discontent over the war effort. Whilst the Conservative vote dropped in most of these, 
the main causes of anti-Conservative feeling had been readily apparent: frustration about 
the War and restrictions on the Home Front. However, in 1943, independents usually 
fought on the issue of reconstruction, with Common Wealth and independent Labour 
candidates (sometimes assisted by members of the local Labour Party, against the terms 
of the electoral truce) standing on electoral tickets such as "a good socialist policy" or 
"Beveridge in full, and now.,, 89 Their Conservative opponents often had little sympathy 
for the idea of wholesale social change, with one calling Beveridge a "poets dream". 90 
In some of these by-elections, such as at Eddisbury, the Conservative candidate was 
defeated (on this occasion by Common Wealth) and the average anti-Conservative swing 
was an average of 8 per cent. Common Wealth was a Christian socialist party, founded 
in 1942 under the leadership of the former Liberal M. P. Sir Richard Acland, advocating 
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policies very similar to Labour, including widespread public ownership. Common 
Wealth had close associations with Manchester, having been formed by a fusion of JR. 
Priestley's 1941 Committee with Acland's Forward March group, the latter having been 
founded in Manchester in early 1941. Common Wealth held its inaugural party 
conference in the city in 1942. It is commonly assumed that Common Wealth were a 
'Labour substitute', whose votes would switch to Labour in a general election. 91 TEs 
was probably true and indeed, in the second half of 1943 the first opinion polls taken 
since the outbreak of war on the question of party support gave an average Labour lead of 
10 per cent. 92 With the War now going very well, these figures could no longer be 
dismissed as a protest vote. 
In Manchester, one must acknowledge the continuing popular interest in the 
Soviet Union whilst being careful not to ascribe it, and continuing resentment towards 
the United States, undue political significance. With the Soviet military position 
improving, demands for a Second Front diminished, but this did not lessen support for, or 
interest in, Russia. On 20-21 February Britain celebrated 'Red Army Day', 
commemorating the 25th anniversary of the creation of the Soviet army and throughout 
Britain public meetings and military parades were held. Large crowds turned out in 
Manchester to celebrate the day and hear Colonel Stanley, the Colonial Secretary, catch 
the public mood with a strongly pro-Russian speech. Throughout 1943 the M. I. C. 
consistently recorded strong support for Russia. In January it reported; "There is a 
tremendous number of people stating that Russia is our salvation, and if they had not 
come in, the war would have been lost by now; that Russia only has been responsible for 
Hitler's discomfiture etc.,, 93 The way of life in Russia continued to create particular 
interest and the 1943 Manchester Review (a library publication) concentrated almost 
exclusively on study of Russian literature, art and music. 94 The Russian people 
themselves were held in extremely high esteem by local citizens with the M. I. C. 
reporting; "People are impressed with the Russians. They are saying 'Of course they are 
quite different from us, much hardier. -95 Wright Robinson, a fierce critic of 
Communism, nevertheless unquestionably spoke for the vast majority of the local 
popuWion in praising; 
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The unsurpassed valour of the Russian people in the field, in the factory, 
in the shattered towns and villages, showing unquestionable heroism not 
blind immolation, but buttressed by consummate planning before and 
during their terrible ordeal. In twenty-five years this new Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics has created a staff of planners, of fighters, of workers, 
of statesmen, of heroes ... 
96 
Such gushing praise was typical of the nation as a whole: polls revealed that nine out of 
ten people were willing to give a favourable opinion of Russia. 97 
The depth of public support for Russia provoked genuine concern amongst the 
M. I. C. that the focus on the Soviet Union was overshadowing Britain's own 
achievements. The Committee wrote to the Ministry of Information and argued; 
[We] feel that a strong effort must be made to stress the vital nature of the 
victory at the Battle of Britain in the air, of the way we stood alone 
triumphant for twelve months against Hitler's concentrated might. We 
should do this without deprecating Russia's effort, but to restore a proper 
perspective 98 
In contrast to the overwhelming support for Russia, the Americans remained 
relatively unpopular. American forces were stationed in large numbers around Britain, 
including Manchester, and throughout 1943 the M. I. C. organised a number of 
Anglo-American Friendship Exercises. Despite such attempts, and America's 
increasingly impressive military performance during 1943, the oft-applied phrase "over 
paid, over sexed and over here" summed up popular feeling. Across Britain, after the 
fall of Mussolini in the summer, Americans were actually less well spoken of than the 
Italians! " Not once did the M. I. C. record widespread public praise for American 
forces despite their victories, and coloured troops were particularly unpopular. Despite 
the evidence of a national poll which showed that an overwhelming majority of people 
were opposed to racial discrimination, racism towards coloured troops in Manchester did 
exist and was not confmed to a tiny percentage of the population. At a March meeting of 
the M. I. C. "a discussion arose as to the association of young girls with coloured ... troops. 
This was ca i__ ýoncern in the district. " 100 Racism reared its head again when, 
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as part of the Anglo-American Friendship Exercises, local people were encouraged to 
engage in personal hospitality. Upon hearing this, the Eastern Division Committee 
complained; "personal hospitality is difficult in the Ardwick area as troops are 
coloured. "101 Indeed, the sight of a black sailor kissing a white girl at a railway station 
set off a series of incidents which led to G. Ps being banned from places of entertainment 
in the city for a fortnight. 102 
Although there were no by-elections in Manchester in 1943 from which to draw 
quantifiable conclusions, the available evidence does suggest that support for the Labour 
Party was increasing in Manchester in 1943. This was certainly the opinion of the 
Evening News which, on the first day of the Labour Party Conference in June, 
commented; 
It says a good deal about the inherent strength of the Labour Party that its 
annual conference, opened in London today, excites as much general 
interest as it does. The vigour comes from below. Much of it comes 
from outside the Party itself, from people who desire a better order of 
things than they have today, and who despairingly but hopefully, cling to 
the Labour Party as the only visible means of getting it. 103 
However, the evidence suggests that this support was drawn almost entirely from specific 
sections, rather than a broad cross-section, of the populace and that the Labour Party was 
still failing to generate widespread enthusiasm. For the first time in the War the 
membership of the Manchester Labour Party increased, from 4,719 in 1942 to 4,823 in 
1943, but a breakdown of party membership reveals that the Party was increasing its 
support amongst manual workers whilst continuing to lose support in middle-class 
constituencies. Membership in Labour-held constituencies increased from 2,829 in 1942 
to 2,968 in 1943, but in the middle-class Conservative strongholds support decreased 
again (although only slightly) from 1,890 to 1,855. The Labour Party were clearly 
failing to attract new support from traditional middle-class Conservative voters. Ibis had 
the effect of further polarising the class make-up of the overall Labour membership. 
Middle-class constituencies now provided just 38.5 per cent of the total membership, in 
comparison to 49.2 per cent in 1940. This evidence suggests that, despite strong popular 
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support for reconstruction measures existing across the whole spectrum of the electorate, 
its political repercussions were tempered by class considerations. Continuing class 
antagonisms served to intensify support for Labour amongst the working-class, who were 
already beginning to look to the Party as the best means of achieving much-desired 
reforms. For most middle-class citizens, however, class identification prevented them 
from supporting Labour, even if they did appear to be the more progressive Party. 
Furthermore, despite the overall increase in Labour's membership, contemporary 
opinion agreed that the Party was failing to generate much enthusiasm, largely through its 
own shortcomings. The best examples of contemporary criticism came in the aftermath 
of the Labour Party Conference, with both the Evening News and Guardian being 
scathingly critical of the Party. The Evening News condemned the party's "lack of 
crusading spirit"and groaned; 
The Labour Conference has done what it was expected to do. It has been 
cautious, sensible - and uninspired. There was never apparent any 
appreciation of the fact that great changes have taken place since the war 
began, that there is a great body of progressive opinion with ideals in 
many regards similar to those of the Labour movement. [The leadership] 
seem totally unaware of the fact that by the right kind of appeal, with a 
proper broadening of their basis, with a new vigour of enterprise they 
could ensure for this country a generation of progressive Government. 
The tactical difficulties [i. e. Labour's participation in the Coalition] are 
undoubtedly great. They cannot be overcome by men in the mood in 
which the Labour leaders faced this conference. They can be overcome if 
these men will only realise the extent of the opportunity, unparalleled in 
our history, which is presented to them. 104 
Exactly the same criticism was made by the Guardian; 
There is a curious contrast between the mood of the Labour Party 
Conference and the mood of the country. The last six months have seen 
rapidly growing interest everywhere in reconstruction. There is more 
expectancy, more social hope than there has been for years. The Prime 
Minister recognised this and tried to canalise this in his broadcast. One 
might have expected that the largest party of the left would reflect this too, 
that its conference would be an occasion for launching a clear policy for 
progressives, that its speakers would be thinking keenly about how to put 
it through and about the kind of political problems we face. Instead the 
Labour conference has looked back, not forward. It has been readier to 
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recriminate than to gather itself together with confidence ... There are signs 
of a tired, elderly and hidebound party. 105 
Given such views, how can we explain Labour's lead in the polls, the increase in 
Manchester party membership and the relative success of the 'Labour substitute' party, 
Common Wealth? The most plausible explanation is that the Party were benefiting from 
dissatisfaction with the Conservative Party, whose share of the vote in by-elections had 
dropped significantly. The Conservatives were widely perceived to be hostile to the 
enormously popular Beveridge Report and the general notion of reconstruction which, 
although not shaking the allegiances of their traditional middle-class support was perhaps 
weakening their support both amongst their working-class voters and amongst the young 
who, we have seen, were particularly strong advocates of reconstruction. Labour, 
therefore, were perhaps the beneficiaries of negative enthusiasm as the only alternative to 
an increasingly unpopular Conservative Party. 
The first real signs of a shift towards the Labour Party or, perhaps more 
accurately, away from the Conservative Party, were clearly discernible in 1943. It 
would, however, be overstating the case to conclude that the Party's 1945 success was 
inevitable from 1943 onwards. The Guardian commenting after the Labour Conference 
in mid-year, did not believe that any firm conclusions could be drawn from the mood of 
the electorate in 1943, arguing instead that party support was still in the balance. 
Although admitting that some people were indeed looking to the Labour Party, it 
suggested that; "Some join the Communist Party, which is ready to make use of them, or 
fly to the respectable and heady Common Wealth. Others are waiting to see whether the 
Liberals and Conservatives offer better scope and can give an aspiring lead. " 106 
In reality 1943, with its changing public attitudes towards reconstruction, should 
be regarded as the turning point in Labour's fortunes. Although not yet guaranteed 
future electoral success the Party had, crucially, begun to build its support in the two 
constituencies - the manual working-class and younger voters - that were most 
responsible for their 1945 victory. 
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A Clash of Political Beliefso Manchester Politics. 1943. 
With reconstruction now firmly on the political agenda, the Manchester parties began to 
address the issue of social and economic reforms. This process served to highlight the 
continuing lack of consensus between the Manchester Conservative and Labour parties. 
Indeed, it suggested, the divide between the parties at local level surpassed that which 
existed between their national leaderships. Despite public support for the Government's 
proposals, Manchester Conservatives were privately hostile to reconstruction, while the 
Labour Party were severely critical of any compromising of party policies. 
At national level the political reaction to the Beveridge Report highlighted the 
continuing policy differences of the Westminster parties. A second Bill, the Catering 
Wages Act, served to re-emphasise these differences, revealing that the future control of 
industry remained a highly partisan issue. The Bill, produced by Ernest Bevin, proposed 
the creation of a Catering Wages Commission consisting of two employers, two workers 
from the industry and three independent persons. Where collective bargaining already 
existed in the industry, the Commission need not interfere, but where it did not the 
Commission could recommend the Ministry of Labour to appoint a Wages Board with 
statutory power to fix pay, hours and holidays. Although the Bill had Government 
backing, Conservative back-benchers were intensely hostile to the Bill, believing it would 
produce an intolerable level of state interference in privately owned companies. 
Consequently, as the Evening News reported; "The debate was conducted by the 
opposition Conservative group with a sectional bitterness such as has not been known in 
the House since the war began. "107 The Bill produced the largest back-bench revolt of 
the War (to that point) with 118 Conservatives voting against it. 108 The Catering Wages 
Bill demonstrated that party attitudes towards the post-war control of industry were far 
from consensual. 
Importantly, in the light of disputes over Beveridge and Bevin's Bill, local 
commentators rejected any notion of an emerging consensus. The Evening News was 
typical in accepting that; "Some progressive Conservatives, perhaps influenced by the 
knowledge that large numbers of the public will demand far more sweeping changes, are 
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turning in the same direction as Labour men and Liberals"; but it still maintained; 
"Everything suggests that the reactionaries still form a majority of Tory M. P. s and control 
Central Office. "109 The paper cast its attention forward to the first post-war 
Government and "hoped it will be formed from men who differ less than members of the 
present Government on immediate social objectives. " 110 In Manchester a similar pattern 
was emerging. The need to turn minds to the question of post-war reconstruction 
revealed significant differences in the attitudes of the local Conservative and Labour 
parties. The two parties differed markedly in three central policy areas: the Beveridge 
Report, the question of land ownership and the retention of economic controls. 
Following the publication of the Beveridge Report, the local Conservative and 
Labour parties immediately adopted the stance of their respective Parliamentary 
colleagues. The position of the Manchester Labour Party on Beveridge was clarified 
both during the Parliamentary debate itself and shortly afterwards at a Party meeting. In 
Parliament, two of Manchester's four Labour M. P. s, J. R. Clynes (Platting) and Bill 
Oldfield (Gorton), spoke decisively in favour of the immediate implementation of the 
Beveridge proposals, with Clynes deploring the Government's failure to grasp; 
The most amazing chance ever offered a modem Ministry of building up a 
great social edifice for the future well being of the masses. The workers 
themselves are quite ready to pay their contributions. [He urged] that the 
main body of the proposals should be implemented. Parliament could 
with little difficulty and certainly within this session take the necessary 
steps to give legislative form to the main proposals. III 
Bill Oldficld "appealed to the Government not to tinker with small reforms but to see 
that the magnificent Beveridge Report was fully implemented. " 112 Tbc Manchester 
Labour Party's position as a whole was made clear in mid-March when it passed a 
resolution demanding "a clear and unequivocal acceptance by the Government of the 
Beveridge Report. "113 However, not all local political figures sympathetic to Labour 
supported Beveridge. The post-war Labour peer, Sir Ernest Simon was strongly opposed 
to his proposals. When he received a letter from Kingsley Martin, co-owner of the N-cH 
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Statesman and Nation asking him to sign a letter to The Times demanding more support 
for Beveridge, Simon's reply was unequivocal; 
Nothing would induce me to sign a letter to The Times demanding more 
support for Beveridge, nor to join any organisation for that purpose. Ifit 
was a letter about education, housing or health, that would be quite a 
different matter, but I think the passion for Beveridge is a real danger; if 
all the money goes there, much more important things will be neglected. 
So I hope you will do what you can to smash the Times letter! 114 
Serious opposition in the Labour ranks came from the left of the Party. It was noted that 
"There is a tendency for certain people, influential ones, to propagate the idea that 
[Beveridge] is a 'Banker's Ramp'. This idea is anomalously enough being promoted by 
Socialists. " 115 The left in Manchester, as elsewhere, believed that Beveridge was 
merely a measure of social amelioration designed to sustain the capitalist system, and 
were consequently opposed to its introduction. Such opponents were, however, a very 
small minority and the vast majority of the Manchester Labour Party were strongly 
pro-Beveridge. 
The Manchester Conservative Association did not issue a statement on their 
position, and none of their M. P. s spoke during the Parliamentary debate. However, none 
of their M. P. s were members of the pro-Beveridge faction of the Party and local 
Conservatives catastrophically underestimated the popularity of Beveridge; George 
Beattie, the Chief Agent of the Association, argued that "public opinion was being 
manufactured by the press. "I 16 Meanwhile, Harry Hewlett M. P. was accused of being 
outrightly hostile to Beveridge, a position he refuted, declaring that he was "perfectly 
happy with the Government's position. " 117 Eventually, in October, the leader of the 
Conservative Group on the Council, C. B. Walker, declared that his party was in 
"complete accordance with the Government's plan on the Beveridge Report. " I Is The 
local Labour and Conservative parties had aligned themselves with their national parties. 
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The Manchester Liberals were again at odds with national party policy. Whilst 
the national Party was strongly pro-Beveridge, the Manchester Liberal Federation was 
more reticent, perhaps surprisingly given that Beveridge himself was a Liberal, and was 
to stand as a Liberal candidate in the 1945 General Election. - Despite the fact that the 
Withington Division Liberal Association had sent a letter to the Liberal leader, Sir 
Archibald Sinclair, suggesting that he should make a speech on post-war reconstruction, 
the local Party's attitude towards the Beveridge Report was underwhelming. When it 
came to arranging the Federation's annual meeting the Executive Committee noted; 
"Resolutions on-the Beveridge Report had been suggested but in view of the shortage of 
time at the meeting and the fact that Sir Percy Harris [the speaker] must leave at 4: 45pm 
it was agreed to leave the agenda arrangements with the officers. " 119 One resolution 
asked the Federation to approve the Beveridge Report, but in response the Federation 
promised only to give "careful consideration to this suggestion. " 120 These were hardly 
the statements of Beveridge enthusiasts, emphasising the continuing differences between 
the national Liberal Party and the Manchester Liberal Federation. 
The impressions of strong and lukewarm support for Beveridge given by the 
Labour and Conservative parties respectively, were reinforced later in the year in a 
stormy council debate. In September, members of the Labour group gave notice of a 
motion on the Beveridge issue which read; "This Council believes that the adoption of 
the Beveridge proposals will lead to the unification of the social services in Manchester, 
and urges His Majesty's Government to introduce the necessary legislation as early as 
possible. "121 Bill Johnston, leader of the Labour group, said; 
By means of this notice of motion we hope to bring before the council the 
importance with which we view the Beveridge Plan for Social Security. 
We feel we are not alone in believing that this important scheme should be 
adopted by the Government, and we expect to find our fellow councillors 
ready to voice this opinion and support the motion ... We are afraid that if 
public opinion is not centred on the Beveridge Plan it will be allowed to 
recede into the political background. Among the Forces there are many 
who view the 'side-stepping' of this great social scheme with 
disappointment so we, as members of an influential municipal corporation 
intend to bring it prominently before the public mind. 122 
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When the motion was debated the two parties stuck to their positions and the debate fell 
into bitter party acrimony. 123 Councillor Tom Nally (Labour), proposing the resolution, 
said it was "the duty of local authorities to act as the spearhead in great reforms" and 
asked "what is going to be done to keep the promises made? " Councillor Walker 
(Conservative leader) explained that his party was in complete accordance with the 
Government's position. The debate degenerated with Walker suggesting that the 
resolution was an attempt by Labour to "steal a march for propaganda purposes". In 
these circumstances, he said, he had asked his party to refrain from voting. The debate 
continued; 
Mr George Hall (Lab): You dare not. 
Mr Nally (Lab): When the Beveridge Report came out the public reception was 
such as to fill the hearts of men and women with splendid determination. But no 
one would deny that there is now a degree of sulleness: a resignation period when 
men and women were starting to ask themselves 'Do they mean anything? Is it 
the same old, old story, and are we to see again the conditions of 193 1? 
A Conservative: You don't trust the Government. 
From the Labour benches: Wedonot. 124 
After the debate the Conservative group issued a statement on the decision not to vote, in 
which they deplored "this attempt to embarrass the Government at a time of grave 
national crisis. "125 The Manchester Conservatives had appeared only half-hearted 
supporters of Beveridge, and this was reinforced after the meeting when Councillor R. S. 
Harper told the City News; "Let us try not to make promises which we are likely to be 
broken, but to move steadily forward improving every phase of local and national 
life. "126 The evidence suggests that the Manchester Conservatives were instinctively 
hostile to Beveridge, but could not publicly be seen to oppose it, hence their stance in the 
Council. Indeed, Wright Robinson told the next meeting of the City Labour Party; "The 
opposition almost pleaded with [us] to be tender-hearted and spare them a division. " 127 
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The Beveridge Report created as much partisan feeling in Manchester as at 
Westminster, but this was not the only issue on which there was a notable lack of 
consensus. One widely advocated policy was the nationalisation of land, which was the 
subject of an official study (the Uthwatt Report). The Uthwatt Committee was created to 
advise on the steps needed to prevent the work of physical reconstruction in bombed 
areas from being prejudiced by the high price of land. Its Report recommended that the 
development rights in land outside built-up areas should be vested in the state and that in 
urban areas, local authorities should have wider powers to purchase areas as a whole, at 
prices not exceeding the land's 1939 valuation. This Report created enormous partisan 
disagreement at Westminster with the majority of Conservatives opposed to the idea in 
principle, and to the compensation clauses in particular, as a serious infringement of 
property rights. In Manchester also, the question of land ownership brought out very 
different responses from Conservative and Labour representatives. Sir Ernest Simon had 
argued for the nationalisation of land in the early years of the War and in 1943, the City 
Labour Party unanimously adopted a resolution supporting the public ownership of 
land. 128 This was anathema to local Conservatives, with one "plead[ing] for the 
retention of private ownership. "129 At the end of the year, the Council created a special 
committee to look at the question of land ownership. 
A ftirther difference occurred over the continuation of economic controls in 
post-war years. The Labour Party supported the idea of the continuation of such controls 
after the War, becoming a permanent feature of the peace-time economy. The 
Conservative Party, however, envisioned such controls playing only a short-term 
transitional role; "MUle control of business was a necessary expedient, it was hoped that 
this could be withdrawn as soon as possible.,, 130 These widely divergent views are 
indicative of the parties' wider approach to post-war industry with the Conservatives 
clearly still thinking of a return to private enterprise, and Labour still favouring a more 
active role for the state. 
Beveridge, land-ownership and economic controls demonstrate that the core 
political beliefs of the two main parties remained unaffected by the War. This point was 
acknowledged by the Labour veteran, Leonard Cox, in his inaugural speech as Lord 
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Mayor, when he admitted that between the parties there existed "real political differences 
amongst us.,, 131 The Manchester Conservative Party remained staunchly neo-liberal in 
its approach to policy; their attitude towards the role of the state in 1943 was identical to 
that of pre-war years. The mouthpiece of Manchester Conservatism, the Evening 
Chmnide, spoke of "the mentality of the servile state" and warned; "this is the danger 
always latent in the aggrandisement of the power of the state, now envisaged in some 
quarters as a desirable and unmitigated blessing. "132 Despite increasing public pressure 
for social reform, Manchester Conservatives saw no reason to change the policies that 
had brought them success before the War, and they were strongly opposed to major, or 
even perhaps any, changes in social and economic policy. The Manchester Conservative 
Party was to the right of the national leadership. Although they were publicly supportive 
of Government policy on, for example, the Beveridge Report, the evidence suggests that 
they were privately hostile to any notion of change. Firstly, it is significant that none of 
the city's six Conservative M. P. s were members of the Tory Reform Group, which 
sought to push the Party in a progressive direction. A second, and most telling, 
development occurred at the very end of 1943 which served to highlight the local Party's 
reactionary nature. James Mcgrath, the Conservative Councillor for the Ardwick Ward 
since 1933, resigned from the Conservative Party and applied for membership of the 
Labour Party (which was accepted in early 1944). He told the local press that "he had 
resigned from the Conservative Party because he had come to realise that it was not 
progressive enough and he thought he would find a more advanced policy within the 
Labour Party. "133 Coming from a long-standing member of the Party, this can be taken 
as strong evidence of the Manchester Conservatives' hostility to a progressive agenda. 
With the Conservatives sticking doggedly to their pre-war mantras, a social and 
economic consensus could only emerge if the Manchester Labour Party shifted to the 
right. This was always highly improbable for, as we saw in the earlier years of the War, 
the threat of being outflanked by the Communist Party prevented Labour from appearing 
too close to their coalition partners. In 1943, the Communists continued to cause 
concern. Manchester Communists were accused of exploiting common grievances for 
their own political ends; for example, the Wythenshawe Division of M. I. C. noted; "A 
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campaign for better allowances for wives and dependants of serving soldiers has been 
instituted in Wythenshawe and elsewhere. It was originated by the Communist 
Party. " 134 This caused concern among the representatives for, a month later, it was 
recommended; "Since there is a constant and growing agitation in certain districts, used 
politically by the Communist Party, it seems essential that some general enquiry be 
instituted. " 135 However, in pure party political terms, it was the Labour Party who 
continued to fear the Communists most. Labour's national leadership again rejected the 
Communist application, with the National Executive stating that although Harry Pollitt 
(the Communist leader, and a Manchester man) declared his party to be "fully prepared to 
accept all obligations of affiliation and carry out loyally all decisions reached at the 
Labour Party's annual conference" they considered that the Communist Party was in no 
position to implement this undertaking, as its primary loyalty was to the Comintem. 136 
The National Executive declared; 
Communist activities in Britain between September 1939 and June 1941 
were characterised by political somersaulting of the most contemptible 
kind [and that] at the most crucial moment in British history when this 
country was, in the eyes of the civilised world, the only resisting bastion 
of democracy the Communist Party seized every opportunity of creating 
disaffection and defeatism. 137 
Wright Robinson's diary provides an excellent insight into Manchester Labour feelings 
against the Communists. At the end of 1942, Robinson received three members of the 
Communist Party who came to press for a 'Second Front. ' Robinson noted derogatorily; 
The interview lasted over two hours and I began by telling them that every 
employer was troubled about the disruptive tension of members of the 
Communist Party in the workshop. My visitors expressed surprise at this 
because the Communist Party were all out for production. John Owen 
told me that he had increased production and that complaints were just 
prejudice. As one of the best employers and best fellows I know told me 
how glad he was to be rid of Owen, I was not impressed by this ... Relations 
are good except for a few carping Communists. 13 8 
In April Robinson, referring to his role on the Anglo-Russian Alliance Committee, asked; 
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Why should I find myself in league and concert with Tom Brown, Pat 
Devine, Communists and their stool-pigeons against the Town Hall? The 
Communists never play fair by our standards. The only use they have for 
me, the Town Hall or our Committee is as a stalking horse for Communist 
Party propaganda. 13 9 
In November; 
Communist cells cannot run on democratic lines. Theydonotjoinor 
initiate to compromise but to proselise [sic]. What they hope to gain in 
the long run by founding 'Russia To-Day Societies' and attracting people 
genuinely interested in Anglo-Russian understanding, who will go so far 
and no fin-ther I do not understand. People refuse to be deluded into 
becoming Communists and resign when 
, 
they find out that their liability is 
being expanded to cover the whole field of Communist propaganda. 140 
Here, Robinson cites the war-time Labour Party position of being pro-Russian but 
anti-Communist. Robinson's hostility to the Communists was representative of 
Manchester Labour as a whole. In March, the Manchester Council of Labour refused to 
allow the Communist Party to assist in the organisation of the annual May Day 
parade. 141 Indeed, it was the Manchester Labour Party that sent the main 
anti-Communist resolution to the national Labour Party for the debate on Communist 
Party affiliation at their June conference. The resolution read; 
This Conference approves the decision of the National Executive 
Committee in refusing affiliation to the Communist Party of Great Britain, 
believing that the interests of the workers are best served by a combination 
of democratic organisations and individuals united in their determination 
to work loyally together for the immediate establishment of a Socialist 
state and that if the Communist Party is affiliated, the declared policy of 
disruption exercised inside that Party will destroy the unity, power and 
influence of Labour in the country. The Communists represent an 
ideology which is entirely foreign to the average Britisher. They dare not 
put across to the British public their views as to a constitution. They do 
not accept Parliamentary representation; they do not believe in popular 
elections. 142 
There was some opposition amongst the local Party to sending this resolution but a 
proposal to send it back to the Executive Committee was defeated by a large majority. 143 
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The fear of the future electoral threat from the Communists, and from the 
emerging Common Wealth, resolved the Manchester Labour Party to maintain its 
position as the main party of the Left. In consequence, they were firmly opposed to any 
compromise of party policy by the national leadership. This was perfectly illustrated by 
the local Party's approach to the proposals of the education White Paper (later to become 
Butler's Education Act). Education was the one area of reform in which progress had 
been possible in 1943, but this had only been achieved by all-party compromise. The 
educational content of the White Paper (which included a raising of the school leaving 
age) created little real dispute between, or within, the parties and the one sticking point 
concerned the future of church schools. Since 1902, the cost of maintaining church 
school had fallen on local government rates, but in the White Paper the Government 
argued that this was unfair and gave church schools a choice between two alternatives. 
If the managers or governors of a denominational school were able and willing to provide 
50 per cent of the cost of required improvements to school buildings then they could 
apply for 'aided status' and carry on as normal. If, however, that 50 per cent 
contribution was considered too great a strain then the school could opt to become 
I controlled' (taken over by the local education authority). The option of *aided status' 
was largely a sop to Catholic schools who wanted to retain control of their educational 
syllabus. In a letter to the Manchester Labour Party, the Labour leadership explained 
that party policy had been to end this 'dual control' by taking all schools under local 
authority control, but in an effort to compromise (to ensure that some reform measure 
was passed) the Party had agreed that "on this difficult matter the White Paper's 
compromise was acceptable to the party. "144 This arbitrary amendment of established 
party policy was condemned by the Manchester Labour Party, with Wright Robinson, 
whose passion was education, complaining to the Guardian that "instead of stating clearly 
its policy the Labour Party wrote a miserable letter about compromise. No Labour 
candidate would know for the life of him what the party line was. -)1145 Privately, 
Robinson was even more scathing. He wrote; 
[The Labour leadership] declared the issue to be a difficult one and that 
compromise was inevitable. That was asking the Government to 
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compromise still further on a white paper based on a compromise, a white 
paper which was itself an essay in compromise. The Labour Party offered 
no separate manifesto. Its whole attitude cannot be explained or 
reconciled with some of its previous declarations and it has hitherto 
consistently advocated educational advancement. Its attitude on this 
historic step on education can only be explained as a cowardly surrender 
to the R. C. vote. 146 
The Manchester Labour Party subsequently passed a resolution "expressing regret" at the 
attitude of the national Party. 147 This was not, however, the end of the matter for the 
issue provoked intra-party dissension. The St. Michael's Ward Labour Party defended 
the national Party and held a meeting of protest against the action of the City Labour 
Party. It passed a resolution "disassociating themselves from the decision taken by the 
City Labour Party" and expressing the opinion that the "decision was the result of the 
intolerance of certain of the individuals comprising that meeting and was not 
representative of the national party outlook on this subject. "148 
The education issue highlighted the difficulties the Labour leadership faced in 
achieving social and economic reform. The differences between the parties meant they 
could not expect to achieve reform without making compromises on party policy, but 
when such compromises were made, the Labour grass-roots condemned the Party's 
actions. This no-win situation was probably the biggest problem Labour faced as a 
result of their participation in the Churchill administration. 
With both the Manchester Conservative and Labour parties, for their own reasons, 
holding rigidly to their pre-war policies, there was no scope for a consensus to emerge. 
Neither party showed the slightest inclination of changing their approach. The divide 
between the parties at national level was very significant, but at local level was even 
greater. 
PaM Rancour in Manchester. 
The scope for policy agreement was fin-ther limited by continuing rancour and bad feeling 
between the Manchester parties. Despite the existence of a coalition, party rivalry had 
been a constant feature of the early war years and, if anything, this was intensified in 
1943 as the military situation steadily improved. The acrimonious council debate on the 
149 
Beveridge Report was just one such example, but there were several others during the 
course of the year. Two further incidents on the Council during the late summer were 
brought to public attention. The first concerned the post-war reconstruction and 
re-development of Manchester; the Labour group supported the Town Planning 
Committee's recommendation that a deputy city surveyor should be appointed, a proposal 
opposed by the Conservatives who suggested that the appointment should not be made 
while men with the necessary qualifications were in the forces. Bill Johnston, the 
Labour leader (and also Chairman of the Council's Post-War Reconstruction Committee) 
said; "It was not right that the work should be held up because of this" and that members 
of his Committee had a "feeling of frustration. " He condemned the Conservatives, 
claiming that "Manchester is wilfully behind" in its re-development. 149 
A different issue saw the tables turned, with Conservatives pointing an accusing 
finger at Labour. In August the Council's Conservative-dominated Waterwork's 
Committee decided to terminate the services of three qualified engineers on work at an 
aqueduct at Haweswater (the men had originally been engaged as temporary staff but had 
then been offered the jobs permanently). The Labour group opposed the decision, and 
their tactics were bitterly resented by their Conservative counterparts. The leader of the 
Conservative group, Alderman Walker, finiously attacked the Labour Party, claiming that 
"the strongest form of political pressure has been brought to bear to force the Council to 
alter the decision. "150 Walker told the Evening News that Labour's approach had been 
"nauseating. " 151 
Two other incidents occurred before this which, although not publicly aired, again 
demonstrated that party hostility was flourishing, and could be found in equal measure in 
the two major parties. In May, the Manchester Labour Party sent an invitation to the 
leading Labour figure, Sir Stafford Cripps (who had been Ambassador to Moscow and, in 
the opinion of some, had been a political. threat to Churchill), to attend an Anglo-Russian 
Alliance celebration. In the words of Wright Robinson; "[The] first, second and last 
object [of this meeting] is to do all we know how to promote a wrought iron friendship 
between this land and people of ours and Russian and her great people, something deeper 
than just sentiment and shock-proof against post-war stress. "152 However, many 
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Conservatives hated Cripps and the Conservative Lord Mayor, J. S. Hill, a leading figure 
on the Anglo-Russian Committee, strongly opposed the invitation. Upon Cripps' 
acceptance, Hill said he would take no part in the meeting and severed his connection 
with the Committee. Following this decision, Wright Robinson noted; "Alderman 
Jackson and I saw the Lord Mayor and said all we could against this drastic 
decision ... Nothing doing. No matter how unpopular it was, whatever political upset it 
would cause for him or anybody else, he meant what he said and would not go back upon 
it. 9,153 
A short time later a similar incident occurred, with. the party positions reversed. 
At a special council meeting in July it was decided to confer the Freedom of the City on 
Winston Churchill, and one would perhaps not have expected the issue to have aroused 
party feelings. On the surface it did not; the Council passed the resolution without 
opposition, and Wright Robinson's speech (he had been asked to second the resolution 
and had regarded it as a personal honour) was a model in non-partisanship; 
Mr Churchill stands out as a man of matchless courage. No leader in 
history ever offered his people so nearly a crown of thorns as when the 
Premier offered 'Blood, Sweat and Tears' and it was on that note that he 
united his people and weaned us from our period of appeasement and 
abasement before the enemies of freedom and right. It is to his honour 
that he has so completely and successfully subordinated his views to the 
one supreme object of uniting the Allies to win the war. 154 
Although Labour's response appeared admirably non-political, this was really an exercise 
in political expediency rather an expression of gratitude to the Prime Minister. With the 
War now going well, the local Labour Party could not afford to be seen offending the war 
leader, whose personal popularity ratings had never dropped much below 80 per cent. 
Behind the scenes it was a different matter for Labour were far from happy with the 
award. Robinson noted that the idea of rewarding Churchill had first been suggested in 
late 1942 and he had approached Bill Johnston, the Labour leader, and told him he would 
like to second the resolution: 
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I shall oppose it, the group will oppose it if you do" Johnson said surlily. 
I just don't understand" I told him. 
"Wait until he has done something" he said dourly. 155 
Such disputes demonstrate that party political feelings were running high in 1943. This 
could only further lessen the possibility of the parties coming to a shared view of 
post-war Britain. 
Conclusion 
Between the end of 1942 and the end of 1943 there were significant changes in public 
attitudes, but no change in party outlooks. Crucially, public attitudes towards social 
reform underwent a major transformation with the publication of the Beveridge Report 
which crystallised the vague early hopes for a better post-war Britain and which was met 
with massive popular acclaim in Manchester. T'his, coinciding with a marked upturn in 
Allied fortunes, produced an impatience with the pace (or lack of it) of social reform that 
had not been evident in the early war years. No longer were people prepared to win the 
War first: they demanded immediate action. This impatience gave reconstruction, for 
the first time, a political edge, from which Labour began to feel the benefit in 1943. 
From June onwards opinion polls gave Labour a 10 per cent lead over the Conservatives 
and in Manchester party membership increased for the first time in the War. However, 
despite the fact that public pressure for the implementation of reconstruction measures 
came from the whole spectrum of the population, the evidence suggests that Labour was 
increasing its support in specific areas of the electorate, rather than across a broad 
cross-section. Support for Labour was growing amongst the manual working-class and 
most likely amongst the young, but was continuing to drop in middle-class Conservative 
heartlands. The political repercussions of popular interest in reconstruction were 
tempered by class considerations, undoubtedly heightened by continuing class 
antagonism in the city, and Labour's increasing support was largely the result of the 
unpopularity of the Conservatives rather than any great enthusiasm for their own party. 
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Nevertheless, 1943 should be seen as the turning point for Labour; the elements which 
would provide their 1945 success began to come together in this year. 
In Manchester politics there was no evidence of an emerging local consensus. 
The reactions to the Beveridge Report revealed a major gulf of opinion between the 
Manchester Conservative and Labour parties, replicating the conflict witnessed at 
national level. Further policy disputes, in the fields of land ownership and the retention 
of economic controls, similarly highlighted the continuing differences between the major 
parties. The Conservative and Labour parties were entrenched in their pre-war positions 
with the divide between the local parties actually surpassing the considerable differences 
between the national Icaderships. Manchester Conservatism was strongly hostile to the 
notion of reconstruction and although they were publicly supportive of the Government's 
position on the Beveridge Report, this did not reflect their private views. It is significant 
that none of the city's Conservative M. P. s joined the fledgling Tory Reform Group, and 
even more significant that the Party suffered the defection of a Councillor to Labour 
citing the Conservatives' reactionary attitudes as the explanation. These two pointers are 
more indicative of the real mood of the local Party than their public utterances. They, in 
fairness, probably saw no need to change the policies that had brought them previous 
electoral success. 
Manchester Labour remained firmly opposed to compromise. With the Soviet 
Union continuing in popularity, it is understandable that Labour continued to fear the 
Communist threat, and the Party had now also to be aware of Common Wealth, which 
replicated many Labour policies. In their determination to remain as the Party of the 
Left Manchester Labour did not wish to see the national leadership compromising party 
policies, identifying them more closely to the Conservatives. This was clearly evident 
over the education issue. 
With the two main parties entrenched in these positions, it is almost impossible to 
see how a consensus could emerge. Continuing party rancour reduced the possibility 
even ftulher. Acrimony over the Beveridge debate and the Cripps and Churchill issues 
demonstrate a continuation, even an intensification, of the frosty relationship between 
Manchester parties witnessed between 1939-42. There was no consensus between the 
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Conservative and Labour parties by the end of 1943 and, in reality, it appeared highly 
implausible that one could develop. 
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Chapter Five 
Introducteon 
Chapter Five analyses the political scene in 1944 and argues that, by the end of the year, a 
number of conclusions could be drawn in relation to the next general election and the 
question of consensus. The chapter suggests that the year witnessed an intensification of 
the anfi-Conservaiiit mood to such an extent that, by the end of the year, the Party's 
defeat in the next general election appeared inevitable. It will be argued that the catalyst 
for ttdc, intensificatiGn was the publication of a number of White Papers dealing with 
post-war problems which were regarded as unsatisfactory compromise documents that did 
nothing to placate popular demands for reform. As in 1943, the Conservative Party was 
held responsible for the Government's prevarication and Labour, despite many popular 
misgivings and the continuing inability to attract traditional middle-class Conservative 
voters, gained a virtually insurmountable lead in opinion polls. The chapter then 
examines party political attitudes and argues that 1944 saw a hardening of partisan 
political sentiments, particularly within the Labour Party, that eliminated any possibility of 
a cross-party consensus emerging. The two main parties remained entrenched in their 
respective positions and, by the end of the year, it was inevitable that the Conservative 
and Labour parties would enter the next election offering very different visions of the 
future. The chapter culminates with a detailed analysis of the Rusholme by-election of 
July 1944, suggesting that the election served to highlight the reactionary tendencies of 
the Manchester Conservatives, the hostile attitude of Manchester Labour and the 
anti-Conservative swing amongst working-class and young voters. 
The Continuation of Social Divisions. 
Despite (or perhaps because of) the successful invasion of the continent in June, 1944 saw 
a continuation of the complacency and war-weariness that had characterised Manchester 
in 1943. This, in turn, served only to feed and sustain social divisions in the city. 
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The dawn of 1944 saw great optimism in Manchester that victory would not be 
long delayed, with the Guardian clain-ýng; "This is the year of hope. This is the first New 
Year's Day since the war began on which we have had reasonable ground to say that the 
war in Europe may ... be carried to Victory by the end of the coming year. "I In the early 
months the Allies advanced on all fronts but the main campaign, liberation of Europe, had 
still to be undertaken. Consequently, overconfidence and complacency were still fife in 
the city (national)y, a wave of strikes had hit the country). 2 This was observed by the 
Eymin Nms, which bemoaned; "Poised on the threshold of history's great 
offensive ... the people of Britain are taking things with perhaps 
irritatingly supreme 
confidence and a refusal on the part of most to contemplate much else than a vast horde 
of super-trained troops storn-ling, the coast-line of Europe and marching Berlin-wards to 
victory.,, 3 This over-optimistic attitude was reflected in questions put to the M. I. C. 's 
Question and Answer service; 'What holidays can be expected during the fbllowiný 
year? '; 'Will petrol be available this summer for motor-lawnmowers? ', and most 
remarkably; 'Could not more steel be made available for boning corsets?, 4 The extent of 
complacency was such that M. I. C. acknowledged the need to re-awaken the public to the 
fact that the War had still to be won, and the Southern Divisional Committee urged that 
wireless and cinema reminders about the dangers of careless talk be re-emphasised. 5 
However, the complacency and war-weariness in the city was endemic in the M. I. C. itself 
Although the General Committee continued to hold regular meetings, the Divisional 
Committees rarely met throughout 1944. In March it was reported; "There was a feeling 
that the Divisional Committees were working in a vacuum and the members felt they had 
too little to do. -6 Some Divisional meetings were cancelled because of poor attendance 
and some committees held only two or three meetings throughout the year, partly due to 
apathy at regional and national levels of the Ministry of Information. In April the M. I. C. 
Secretary, Charles Nowell, reported the mood of the Divisional committees to the 
Regional Information Officer; 
Once again grave concern was expressed at the fact that reports and 
suggestions emanating from any of these Committees did not seem to 
produce any results or receive any acknowledgement. The Secretary of 
one Divisional Committee quoted a number of reports that had been sent in 
164 
from his Committee members and in no case had he been able to tell his 
members that any progress had been made. I am sure the enthusiasm of 
members of the Committee is being sadly impaired by this feeling that the 
work they put in and the time they devote to this work is being wasted. 7 
The overconfidence and apathy of the population was recognised by the local 
press and, prior to the invasion of France, the Manchester papers repeatedly carried 
articles warning of the difficulties still facing the Allies. The Evening News, for example, 
warned its readers; "there will be a terrific struggle to secure our bridgehead on the 
continent and that many of our soldiers will be killed or injured, whilst its military 
correspondent argued that the Germans had more compelling reasons to invade Britain in 
1944 than she had in 1940. The least Britain could expect, he suggested, was parachute 
landings and a German counter-blow against communication lines, roads, railways, 
stations and distributing centres. 8 The Evening News itself went further, claiming that 
the invasion of Europe would have major repercussions on British civilian life; 
A starving, scorched, disease-ridden Europe awaits the Allied liberating 
armies. The people must be fed and clothed, given medical help and 
rehabilitated. It must be done from OUR stocks. The pound ofjarn you 
might have had in the larder will, instead, make its appearance in Paris, 
Brussels, Oslo, indeed anywhere. 9 
Despite such efforts, only the launching of D-Day on 6 June shook people out of 
complacency. On that day; 
Manchester received the long awaited news with tempered elation. There 
was no boisterous display. The bells of some suburban churches were 
rung. Wherever men and women met, in workshop, office, street or cafe, 
there was a ready interchange of views or even of the exiguous news itself, 
but feelings had been too well disciplined throughout these waiting weeks 
to allow for more. Churches throughout Manchester opened their doors, 
with the proceedings taking the form of virtually continuous intercession 
with people coming and going as their occasions allowed them. "10 
During the early summer a new phenomenon appeared in British skies, with 
Germany launching her much vaunted secret weapon, V- I and V-2 rockets (or p-planes as 
they were dubbed). The south was obviously in greatest danger and Manchester received 
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evacuees with around 7000 having arrived by mid-August, but the north was not immune 
from attack. On Christmas Eve morning, some 50 Heinkels, adapted to carry the 
rockets, set out to attack Manchester. They outflanked the defences by releasing their 
bombs off the coast between Skegness and Bridlington, with thirty bombs observed to 
cross fire coast. One crashed within Manchester's boundaries, five more impacted within 
six rrýiles of the city centre and a further five within fifteen miles. Thirty-seven people 
, vv, ere killed and sixty-seven seriously injured. 11 Rumours abounded of rockets whose 
greatly extended range would enable them to reach New York. 12 
Although the invasion of the continent and the arrival of the V-rockets re-ignited 
public awareness, this proved only temporary. The mood of war-weariness continued to 
typify Manchester (and elsewhere). One member of the MIC., having conducted a 
public opinion survey, reported; 
If my conversations with various people are typical of the majority the 
trend is somewhat on the following lines: 
(1) If there are so many thousands of women in war factories who have 
so little to do but knit, why is the Ministry of Labour still taking people 
from useful civilian occupations and middle aged women from their 
household duties? 
(2) Do the firms concerned get additional profit from the employment of 
surplus staff? 
(3) Is the regimentation of the people the object? 
(4) No wonder the war costs L15,000,000 a day. 
(5) Why contribute to National Savings? 
He concluded; 
People accepted, often at times of great inconvenience, direction to 
war-work, when they thought they were contributing to the war effort but 
they may resent being taken from their homes, and employers and public 
may resent the calling-up of useful employees unless the rumours of 
idleness in industry are contradicted. 13 
The writer received a reply the following week stating; "At a meeting of the M. I. C. there 
seemed to be general support for what you said. "14 Such complaints were just part of a 
general public temper. The Guardian observed in July; "We are all too eager to think that 
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I everything is in the bag. "'15 Similarly, in October the Southern Division Committee 
stated; "the public generally need rousing again to the fact that the war is not over yet.,, 16 
Against such a background, it was inevitable that 1944 saw a continuation of 
social divisions. Tensions were heightened by the perceived criminal activities of 
children. In 1944 there was major concern about the problem of juvenile delinquency, 
with a widely held perception that juvenile crime had increased rapidly. Indeed 
Manchester had an unenviable reputation in this respect for Hartley Shawcross, the 
North-West Commissioner for Civil Defence, said Manchester and Merseyside, were now 
"probably the worst two regions in the country for damage caused by hooligans. " 17 The 
Guardian observed; "To the children now approaching the adventurous age, peace-time 
standards of civilised behaviour are matters of occasional precept rather than of daily 
experience. "18 Late in the year, Manchester held a Juvenile Delinquency Conference 
attended by representatives of the M. I. C., the Juvenile Panel of City Magistrates, 
Probation Officers, Police, youth organisations and property owners. The Conference 
heard the nature of the damage done: windows broken, fittings and woodwork removed, 
brickwork destroyed and houses rendered uninhabitable or dangerous; "There was no 
doubt about the prevalence of the trouble and it appeared to be generally accepted that 
the damage was caused mainly by young boys. 90 per cent of cases of wilful damage in 
the Juvenile Court came from elementary schools, ages ranged from 9-15, the 12 year 
olds composing the largest group. "19 Among the various causes and remedies discussed 
by the conference were: 
(1) Lack of training in social responsibility. 
(2) Indifference and low moral standards of adults: A national campaign 
was suggested and heartily recommended in order to bring home the 
common responsibility for preserving both dwelling houses and public 
property, as well as the duty of the ordinary citizen to assist the Police. 
Instruction for parents in the upbringing of children was also advocated. 
(3) Natural ebullience and 'devilment'. Greater use of physical training, 
swimming and dancing were urged. A suggestion which found favour was 
an ambitious scheme for the establishment of a Youth Centre, conferring 
facilities for physical training, refreshments and handicrafts. 
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"The Police are too inactive and the magistrates too lenient" was another popular 
perception. 20 
A breakdown of family values was also blamed as attention was given to the 
social consequences of fathers being away on service and mothers working long hours in 
factories. The massive increases in the number of working women had led to a new 
lifýstyle for many, as Wright Robinson observed; 
The effect on many women of this break with family tradition has been 
serious. There has been a large increase of drinking amongst women. 
They do not get drunk or fall foul of the law, but they get careless and the 
cffect on the family is an all-round lowering of the family tone. We men 
have taken liberties because we have taken it for granted that 'everything 
at home is all right', meaning that the wife would hold the fort while we 
took our pleasures abroad. Nowadays some men drink with their wives 
and some wives earning an independent income are allowing themselves 
the liberties their menfolk have always indulged in as their right. Many 
single women join the crowd in the pub near the great works on pay day 
and drink their gill or their pint, or would take short drinks like whisky, gin 
or port if these were not in short supply and too high in price to be played 
with. Certainly there is... a very great increase of drinking amongst 
women. 
Old inhibitions, particularly the religious ones have broken down 
and have not always been replaced by a working code of morals. There is 
less and less belief in the wrath of God. I believe a larger proportion are 
more vulnerable than ever before, the more careless because they have no 
codes, and a more thoughtful section because they befieve that no penalty 
is involved to an unwanted child, it is a matter for personal choice and not 
one for social interference. Little bard observation needs to be undertaken 
to show that under the pressure of war conditions, an increasing number of 
women allow themselves a latitude that would shock their mothers and 
horrify their grandmothers. 21 
The examples of juvenile delinquency and attitudes towards the behaviour of working 
women are reflective of a wider trend of social and class division. As will be seen later, 
Labour Party membership statistics suggested that the social classes were more polarised 
in 1944 than at any previous point in the War. 
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In the early months of the year, with the invasion of the continent imminent, public 
interest in reconstruction was perhaps at its peak, a point acknowledged by both the 
Guardian and the Evening News. The former asserted; 
In politics, both at home and abroad, there has been good progress though 
here again the coming year is one of responsibility no less than of hope. If 
we are right in assuming the bare possibility that the war may end this year, 
there is no time to be lost in laying the practical foundations for a post-war 
world about which we still talk of vaguely. There was a time when our 
plight was such that we might reasonably postpone discussion of domestic 
reforms but with victory corning our way - and we hope soon- we should 
make sure that in 1944 we devote to the task of social betterment the 
stubborn energy and concentration which, as a part of the national 
character, we seem always to produce for purposes of war. 22 
The Evening News similarly commented; "The chief criticism of British policy is the lack 
of it. The mass of the people would like to see the Government clearly proclaiming a 
policy of social and economic liberation at home.,, 23 The Guardian returned to this 
theme shortly afterwards; "The more Mr Churchill and his Government bring the war 
towards a successful end the more do people ask for proof that they are being put on the 
right track for the promised land.,, 24 A survey conducted on a Gorton estate found a 
keen interest in reconstruction issues, and concluded; "The tenants were, generally 
speaking, alive to the possibilities of post-war reconstruction and were eager to give voice 
to their ideas, which were intelligent and practical.,, 25 Housing was still the predominant 
concern of Mancunians with the City News observing; "There is one problem which juts 
out from all others, one problem which takes precedence in the minds of men and women 
serving at home and overseas. It is HOUSING.,, 26 Realising this, the City Council held 
a housing exhibition, where the task facing Manchester was revealed by a former Town 
Clerk, who asserted; "Apart from London, Manchester has the biggest housing problem in 
the country.,, 27 The findings of the M. I. C. suggest this was probably true. The 
Committee was informed by the Council's Tenancy Assistant "how very great were the 
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difficulties and the magnitude of the task. There was a waiting list of 8,500 applicants, 
involving 35,000 people and the vacancies ave rage 7-9 per week. Applicants number 
173 per week.,, 23 Questionnaires found the majority of people preferred detached, or 
serifi-detached dwellings, and deplored what they termed 'houses in rows'. Thequestion 
of block flats was also mentioned with the preponderance of opinion favouring block flats 
orAy for spinsters and bachelors. The numbers visiting the exhibition was further 
evidence of popular interest in housing: in total, 86,110 people attended. 29 
With the end of the War in sight, such public pressure forced the Government into 
action - the Coalition had to bring forward detailed plans before the War was won. 
Consequently, a rash of White Papers were published covering health, employment policy, 
town and country planning, social insurance and education in what has become popularly 
known as the 'White Paper Chase'. Proponents of the consensus thesis regard these 
papers as the crowning point of cross-party agreement, a signifier of a mutually shared 
view of the shape of post-war Britain. Others argue that they were merely compromise 
documents that expressed the views of neither the Labour or Conservative parties, and 
w1fich neither Party intended to implement without change. Education and family 
allowances apart, no reconstruction measure got beyond the legislative stage before the 
end of the War. The revisionist school has the more persuasive argument, for virtually 
every, Bill passed during 1944 provoked fierce disagreement between the Coalition 
partners. In consequence, the need to prevent coalition threatening disagreements 
resuked in a series of vague and occasionally contradictory White Papers. This can 
clearly be seen by briefly examining their political background. 
The White Paper on the National Health Service (published in February) proposed a free 
and universal service, a substantial role for local authorities, a guarantee for the future 
existence of voluntary hospitals, and the suggestion that new doctors be required to 
practice on a full-time salaried basis for a fixed number of years before they could treat 
private patients. A number of these proposals were objected to by one party or the other. 
170 
A draft White Paper, which satisfied neither Labour or the Conservatives, had been 
subnfitted to the War Cabinet by the Conservative Minister of Health, Henry Willink, with 
disputes over the continuation of voluntary hospitals (which Labour opposed), salaried 
employees working in group practices at health centres (disliked by Conservatives), the 
principle of private medical practice (sacrosanct for Tories), and the status of consultants. 
Consequently, although both parties accepted the White Paper, each stated that they did 
not consider themselves bound by its proposals. The Parliamentary Labour Party's praise 
was economical; it was welcomed only as a "great contribution towards the plan which 
weý in the fullness of the time would like to see established in this country.,, 30 The 
emphasis was firmly on future modifications in line with party, not coalition, policy. The 
Conservatives in the War Cabinet and Reconstruction Committee accepted the Paper only 
after the Minister of Reconstruction, Lord Woolton, warned; "If discussion of the whole 
scheme is to be re-opened ... I 
fear that the Labour Ministers may withdraw their support 
of the scheme and stand out for something far more repugnant to Conservative feeling.,, 31 
Woolton was correct, for Attlee warned Churchill that Labour members of the 
Reconstruction Committee had accepted so much that was unpalatable in the White Paper 
that they risked censure within their own party. 32 Even so, Willink was quick to 
re-assure Conservatives that the White Paper was only a consultative document. In the 
words of the leading historian of the Health Service; "Although a skilful cosmetic exercise 
the 1944 White Paper signified little progress in resolving acute disagreements over the 
future direction of poliCy,,. 33 
The Government's White Paper on employment policy (June) provoked similar conflict. 
Often held to represent a shared acceptance of the need to achieve full employment by. 
using Keynesian techniques to regulate demand (the War had proved that Government 
action could sustain full employment by keeping demand high), the White Paper was little 
more than an unsatisfactory compromise between two widely divergent Views. It did not 
even refer to full employment, with the Government pledging only to achieve and sustain 
a '1-ýgh and stable level of employment'. Labour's employment policy, crafted 
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throughout the War, committed the party to a quasi-Keynesian approach with the 
Government regulating demand, alongside 'economic planning' (although no one seemed 
sure what this entailed). As part of this 'planning' Labour would nationalise the 
I commanding heights' of the economy and retain most wartime economic controls. 
The Conservative emphasis, in direct contrast, foresaw a return to free trade and 
the pre-war predominance of private over public enterprise coupled with the removal, at 
the earliest possible moment, of economic controls (regarded by Conservatives as 'war 
socialism'). This theme was stressed by the Nfinister of Production, Oliver Lyttelton, a 
powerful figure in the Conservative hierarchy. The Conservative Party, he argued, 
should aim for a high level of employment and accept some 'positive action' by the state, 
but that this should be kept "down to a minimum. It is quite a delusion to draw the 
inference that because the state in war is highly efficient in industry, that the same applies 
in peace.,, 34 For the vast majority of Conservatives, unemployment was to be avoided, if 
not by a wholesale return to pre-1939 conditions, then by a "heavy reliance on traditional 
remedies such as the stability of sterling, the expansion of the export trade and the 
encouragement of private enterprise.,, 35 Furthermore, as Lowe has pointed out, there 
remained within the Party an undercurrent of feeling that the threat of unemployment was 
necessary to ensure industrial discipline and wage restraint. 36 
With two such divergent party positions, the White Paper inevitably contained 
several contradictory paragraphs as its authors strove to find an acceptable compromise. 
One paragraph ruled out the possibility of deliberately planning for a budget deficit, only 
to be contradicted by a paragraph which stated that Government should not be restricted 
by "a rigid policy of balancing the Budget each year.,, 37 Similarly, the question of the 
future ownership of industry was left in the air; as one economist has stated, it was 
unclear whether the Paper "actually represented any single widely held position. -38 Sir 
William Beveridge, busily working on his own employment proposals, was scathingly 
critical; "The White Paper virtually never mentions full employment and does not define 
it. "39 Privately the Chairman of the Conservative Party, Ralph Assheton, admitted that 
the M employment pledge was a "series of empty shams.,, 40 A further sign of the lack 
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of consensus on this issue came with the document's reception in the two parties, with 
Conservative and Labour M. P. s taVing comfort from opposing parts of the White 
41 Paper. 
The question of land ownership had been beset by difficulties, with Lord Woolton 
admiming; "I cannot remember any Government document that caused so much trouble 
and about which it was so difficult to get agreement.,, 42 Woolton was referring to the 
Uthwatt Report of 1942 which recommended that authorities should have the right to 
take possession of any land (even if privately owned) at 1939 values, with the betterment 
in values accruing to the public purse. The Report had provoked violent disagreement 
between the parties, with Labour supporting its findings, and the Conservatives bitterly 
opposed. "We Conservatives", one M. P. noted, "got as far as coming to the 
conclusion ... that the Uthwatt proposal was a bad one. -43 The consequence of these 
intractable differences was that the Town and Country Planning Bill (published in the 
summer of 1944) fudged the critical issues of development rights and compensation. 
Nevertheless, Conservatives viewed the Bill as an invasion of property rights and sought 
to insert an amendment designed to weaken powers of compulsory purchase, whilst 
Labour M. P. s attacked the Bill for failing to adopt the principle of national planning. 
Indeed, only 10 Labour M. P. s voted for the Bill, with the great majority abstaining. The 
major problems surrounded the compensation clauses, which provoked such partisan 
feeling that Churchill feared for the continuation of the Coalition. A number of 
concessions were made to Conservative opinion but, speaking for Labour, Arthur 
Greenwood condemned the compensation concessions and made it clear that if further 
modifications were made, the Party would vote. against the Bill in its third reading. 44 
The Ownership of Indusiry, 
The future ownership and control of industry remained particularly contentious. Labour 
ministers were encouraging the nationalisation of industry and the railways but, as Lord 
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Beaverbrook told Churchill, Conservatives would not yield to demands for the 
nationalisation of banks, transport and coal. 45 Conservative nfinisters, led by Butler, 
refused to countenance the re-organisation of the electricity industry into a public 
corporation. Butler told Lyttelton that he "objected violently' to a measure that would 
treat private investors in the electrical companies unfair and remove all "responsibility and 
incenfive. -46 These contrasting attitudes had been seen in the Employment White Paper 
where the issue of future control had been left unresolved. The White Paper contained 
no definite suggestions "about what changes should be made in the pre-war balance 
between public ownership and private ownership.,, 47 
Two measures did get beyond the legislative stage, but even here we must be careful not 
to exaggerate the depth of consensus. Butler's Education Act, creating a tripartite 
education system of grammar, secondary modem and technical schools was passed but 
Butler admitted that the Government had "been prompted the way of education because it 
has been very difficult to obtain agreement between the parties on any matters which 
involve property or pocket. -48 Family allowances were also introduced, but although 
appearing to indicate consensus it can be argued that the two parties supported the policy 
for totally different reasons. While Labour welcomed family allowances as part of a 
social reforrn programme, the work of Land and Macnicol on the history of family 
allowances suggests that the Conservatives supported the policy partly to curb wage 
demands and partly to palliate wartime taxation. 49 
Only the White Paper on social security met with enthusiastic support, though this 
did not last long. Upon its publication the Evening News culogised; "Let us praise the 
Government! Let us hail the coalition! Its White Paper on Social Security published 
today is a splendid document. It promises the largest social advance the people of this 
country have ever made at one step. The fear of acute poverty is to be removed. -50 
The Guardian was more guarded, pointing out that the principle of subsistence benefits 
(wanted by Labour, opposed by Conservatives, who feared it would destroy the 'work 
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ethic') was deemed 'not practicable'. The enthusiasm expressed by the Evening News 
disappeared when the Government announced that the Social Insurance Bill would take a 
further five months to draft. This pronouncement was met by incredulity with the 
Guardian groaning; "We can now drop all hopes of any progress towards putting the 
Beveridge scheme on the statute book before the election. The plain man will rot his 
eyes at the stupendous pace at which our civil servants and their ministerial superiors 
work. -51 
Despite the Coalition's efforts, contemporary opinion in Manchester was strongly 
critical of the Government. Far from seeing the White Papers as consensual, the 
Manchester press immediately realised that they were, in fact, unsatisfactory compromises 
between two divergent policy positions that had evaded the most politically contentious 
issues in order to avoid potentially coalition-threatening arguments. In consequence they 
were met with little enthusiasm. Following the publication of the White Paper on health, 
the Evening News observed; "The Government plan for a national health service is so 
comprehensive a compromise that almost all sections of opinion have been able to give a 
cautious welcome, however qualified.,, 52 Similarly, the Guardian commented; "The 
National Health Service outlined in the White Paper is essentially a compromise, an 
attempt to reconcile and unify two widely divergent schools of thought.,, 53 The press 
were similarly unimpressed by the employment White Paper. The Guardian reabsed; 
The Government proposals for preventing mass unemployment after the 
war are both cautious and bold. They are cautious in that they aim at 
evening out fluctuations in business activity without imposing permanent 
control of industry. They are almost revolutionary in committing the 
Government to an active policy of economic management. 54 
The Guardian hit on the core of the problem; the Paper had to be both 'cautious and 
bold' to satisfy the two opposing schools of thought in the Coalition. The Evening 
hTem similarly realised that the parties had been able to agree to the White Paper only 
because it shirked all mention of the future control of industry. 55 The Government's 
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Town and Country Planning Bill was also met with real scepticism, for it had avoided the 
most important issues. The Guardian stated; 
It leaves the Left dissatisfied because it does not in itself make 
comprehensive planning possible, because even the patchwork 
reconstruction it permits will be hampered by a slow and expensive 
procedure for public acquisition, and because even this defective procedure 
will be available for too short a period. It frightens the Right because it 
does not exempt all holders of land and buildings from the general levy on 
property imposed by war finance ... The Government, unable to agree on 
this issue simply procrastinated, until a decision on one particular aspect of 
land policy could no longer be postponed and then hoped to pass an' ad 
hoc' measure on its merits and its urgency without committing itself either 
way on the principles involved ... and it leaves the fundamental one still to be decided. 56 
Of course, the negative reaction of the press was very important, for it helped to 
shape popular responses to the White Papers. Crucially, the White Papers manifestly 
failed to satisfy the demands of the general public, and in reality they served only to 
intensify the degree of public exasperation and cynicism. The Guardian captured popular 
feeling -when, in September (with only the White Paper on Social Insurance still to be 
published), it complained; 
In spite of all the warnings of the last war, the edge of victory finds the 
Government behind with its plans. Not a single major piece of 
reconstruction planning has gone through Parliament except the Education 
Act. This is a shocking reflection on the Government's capacity. How 
much can be put through before the present session ends, and in the 
following session, which may be this Parliament's last? If the Town and 
Country Planning Bill is anything to go by, it may not be much. There are 
White Papers everywhere, either dogs eared or torn through the sectional 
wrangling over them or still in the capatious realm of ministerial promise. 
And there is a wide gap between White Papers and accomplished policy. 
After about 22 months we are about to get the Government's social 
security scheme. The White Paper is only the preliminary to legislation. 
What are the chances of having it ready to operate when the war ends? 
Yet this is what was intended when Sir William Beveridge was 
commissioned to make his report in 1941 and which he urged in December 
1942. And the same holds too of the health service, of local Government 
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reforms, of employment policy, of the physical aspects of planning, and 
above all, of housing. 57 
Cynicism amongst Mancunians was widespread. This was best reflected in the public's 
reaction to the employment White Paper, perhaps the most important of the White Papers 
given that many people faced losing their war-time jobs at the cessation of hostilities. 
Despite this, both the Guardian and the Evening News observed that the White Paper had 
completely failed to ignite the public's enthusiasm with the latter commenting that it "fell 
So flaj. -58 The Guardian argued that this was entirely due to past experience; 
[The pronouncement on a fall employment policyj is perhaps the most 
important declaration we have ever had from a British Government. It is 
as decisive a thing in its own way as the repeal of the Corn Laws. Why 
then has it received so little popular attention? The main explanation, 
perhaps, is that the Government's handling of the Beveridge Report has 
induced a mood of profound scepticism as to the value of any Government 
pronouncement. So when the foundation of the Government's post-war 
policy is announced it finds a public well hardened to official schemes and 
59 distinctly sceptical of them. 
The frustration felt among Mancunians was indicative of the rest of the country, and in an 
October B. I. P. O. poll, 48 per cent of people expressed themselves dissatisfied with the 
steps taken by the Government to deal with post-war reconstruction, against just 31 per 
cent who expressed themselves satisfied. 60 
Such frustration intensified the anti-Conservative swing for, as in 1943, it was the 
Conservative Party, rather than the Government as a whole, that was held responsible for 
the Government's prevarication. This popular mood was captured by the Evening N=s; 
What is the cause of this intrepid war Government's caution when it 
touches post-war plans? The cause is the large Conservative majority 
upon which the life of the Government wholly depends. The coalition can 
travel no faster than the pace which the Conservatives permit. If the end 
of the European War comes as soon as it is hoped and the reconstruction is 
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less well prepared than it might be, the country's difficulties, inevitably 
great, will be magnified and the people will know where to put the blame. 
The Conservative Party has a great responsibility. 61 
By-elections throughout the country highlighted the Conservatives' declining support. 
Conservative candidates consistently neglected domestic reforms, and were consequently 
punished by the voters. As the Evening News observed; 
The coalition is not unpopular when Labour or Liberal candidates are 
standing. The problem, as we have said before, is one for the 
Conservative Party. The Conservative candidate before the electorate 
today is in an unhappy position. He sometimes does not appear to be a 
firm advocate even of the ideas of reconstruction which the Government 
have tentatively advanced. 62 
The two most telling wartime by-elections occurred early in the year; at Skipton the 
Conservative Party lost to Common Wealth, a result that "sent alarm bells ringing among 
senior Conservatives.,, 63 Shortly afterwards came a second defeat at West Derbyshire, a 
quintessential Conservative constituency with a long-standing record of representation by 
the Cavendish family. The Conservative candidate, the Marquess of Hartington, 
however, had little to offer in the way of post-war policy and he based his campaign on 
the themes of national unity and support for the Prime Minister. His opponent, Charlie 
White, (who had resigned as the local Labour candidate to stand as an Independent) 
committed himself to welfare reform. The result was a spectacular victory for White, 
capturing 57 per cent of the vote; the Conservative majority of some 5,000 was turned 
into an independent socialist majority of 4,500.64 
The Manchester press had no doubts that the Conservatives had fared so badly in 
these by-elections because of their reactionary attitudes towards reconstruction. The 
Guardian recorded; "Skipton strengthens the widely held belief that opinion is moving to 
the left. Indeed it would require much ingenuity to find in the result anything else than 
what seems to be the plain lesson [that voters] are resentful of the Government's delays 
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and indecision's on the problems of domestic reconstruction.,, 65 
observed; 
The Evening News 
If Skipton has not gone red it has at least turned robust pink ... Mr Riddiough [the Conservative candidate) talked of national unity and little 
else. National unity to fight the war is not the issue at all. Everybody 
today supports the Prime Minister on his war record. But the peace is 
coming and must be prepared for. The Government which plans one of 
the most tremendous operations in military history, the invasion of the 
fortified continent, with magnificent courage, hesitates timorously before 
66 the mildest schemes of reconstruction. 
After the West Derbyshire result, the Guardian commented; "The majority is too big to 
ascribe to personal popularity. It has a quite clear political significance: the electors of 
West Derbyshire share the growing post-war interest concerning the aims for which we 
are supposed to be fighting and about the present constitution of the House of 
Commons. -67 
In mid-1943 the local press beheved that opinion was siAinging to the left but that 
this was not irreversible. Then, the Guardian believed the electorate was waiting to see if 
the Conservatives would give a lead on reconstruction. However, by-election evidence 
confirmed that attitudes against the Conservative Party hardened during 1944. Labour's 
Northern Voice noted in February; 
There is an extraordinary growth of what is tertned Left public opinion. 
Dismay at the failure of the capitalist order (or should it be disorder) 
resulting in World War number two has caused an examination of pre-war 
economic and moral codes. It is being generally recognised that security 
and employment for every physically fit citizen is cannot be obtained while 
a small owning class can, for their own purposes, play dukes and drakes 
with prices and money values. That the greed and ignorance of 
capitalism's leaders will bring about World War Three unless their 
imperialistic policy is supplanted by one of international co-operation of all 
peoples, black, white, red or yellow. The extraordinary achievements of 
Soviet Russia, both in peace and war have driven home the need for a 
planned social order based upon public ownership and enterprise for the 
welfare of all citizens. 68 
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This hardening of attitudes was also reflected in opinion polls, which revealed that the 
Conservatives were dropping further behind Labour. A poll in February found 37 per 
cent support for Labour and just 23 per cent for the Conservatives, a gap of 14 points. 
This was an increase of 7 points from a poll taken the previous June. 69 By early 1945, 
this lead had increased still further with a poll giving Labour a lead of 18 points. This 
firn-Ay suggests a continuing swing against the Conservatives throughout 1944. 
The evidence of Manchester supports this argument. The Rusholme by-election, 
which will be examined later in the chapter, provided a strong indication of the 
anti-Conservative mood in the city whilst Labour Party membership figures continued on 
their upward trend, increasing by over 8 per cent on the 1943 levels. As in 1943, 
however, Labour's increasing support was still being drawn only from the working-class 
and the young, as staunch middle-class Conservative voters were still proving 
impenetrable to Labour. Indeed, the relative success of socialist independents may have 
increased middle-class concerns about the future, leading them to further identify 
themselves with their natural political guardians, the Conservative Party. This increasing 
polarisation can clearly be seen in a breakdown of the membership figures. Overall, party 
membership in Manchester increased from 4,823 to 5,247, but the entirety of this increase 
came ftom the ranks of the manual working-class. In the four Labour-held 
working-class constituencies of Ardwick, Clayton, Gorton and Platting, party membership 
increased by a considerable 19 per cent (2,968 to 3,497). In middle-class, 
Conservative-held constituencies, membership decreased yet again, by over 5 per cent 
(1,855 to 1,750). Despite the fact that disappointment with the Government was equally 
rife amongst Conservative and Labour voters, the Labour Party was proving totally 
incapable of attracting the support of pre-war middle-class Conservative supporters, with 
party membership in the city's middle-class constituencies now at an all-time low of just 
33 per cent of overall membership. Patently, class considerations were still crucially 
important in defining party support. 
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The evidence also continued to suggest that, as in 1943, it was dissatisfaction with 
the Conservatives, rather than real enthusiasm for Labour or the socialist policies of 
independent candidates, that was responsible for by-election results and Labour's lead in 
the polls. This is very difficult to quantify but it was certainly the opinion of three 
contemporary sources, all from different political persuasions. The comments of the 
progressive liberally-minded Evening News following the West Derbyshire by-election 
spoke of the swing against the Conservatives rather than a swing in favour of socialism; 
Whatever may be deduced from the result of the West Derbyshire election 
it is certainly evidence of the popular revolt against the plutocratic Toryism 
that has held the nation in thrall for more than a decade. The revolt is not 
confined to any one class and it is widely supported outside the ranks of 
the organised political parties. It is due to the resolve that the war shall be 
the prelude to such economic and social changes as will ensure for 
everyone the chance of a decent and di0fied life, to the conviction that 
the necessary changes can be attained by the use of the existing democratic 
machine, to the second conviction that they will be stoutly resisted by the 
party that stands and must stand for privilege and money. 70 
Even Labour's Northern Voice conceded that the War was not converting people to 
socialism, admitting that the Conservatives' inter-war record was the real stimulus behind 
the success of independent socialists. "Does all [by-election evidence] mean that Mr 
Nineteen-Forty is now a fully convinced, crisis proof socialist? I am afraid not. There 
has been a, 
--. 
t the past and the average man is no longer a political fool. He is 
in a critical mood.,, 71 The non-political City News believed that Labour still had much 
to prove; 
Labour will have a tremendous responsibility to fulfil when peace comes, 
no less than it has had during the war. One of the speakers at the May 
Day parade of the Manchester Council of Labour declared that to win the 
peace we must have after the war a Labour movement capable of fulfilling 
the responsibility of governing the country. Have we such a movement in 
Britain today? The man in the street, thinking of recent strikes, of the 
flouting by many thousands of men of the Trade Union leaders who they 
have voted into office, and of the noisy minority who would prefer to 
forget all the solid achievements of Mr Bevin and pillorying him for the 
anti-strike regulation, may well be doubtful of that. 'In unity is strength' - but has the Labour Party sufficient unity within its ranks to be strong?. 
lu 
How far is the strength being frittered away by men who see in the 
movement a way of bettering their own positions? The workers cannot be 
expected to believe in the motives of everybody who joins in the talk of a 
rosy new dawn and a new world - they have heard promises before which 
were never fulfilled. But with a lack of trust and a spirit of cynicism 
among their own party, towards their own leaders, how much can they 
expect to achieve? 72 
Such statements, coming from a variety of different sources, give credence to the 
claim that Labour was prospering from widespread dissatisfaction with the Conservatives 
rather than from any real enthusiasm for their own party. The year had seen a marked 
intensification of the anti-Conservative temper provoked by the Party's negative approach 
to Teconstruction throughout 1943. By the end of 1944 Conservatism was deeply 
unpopular outside its core support, as it was held singularly responsible for the 
Govemment's weak and uncertain reconstruction programme. Many people therefore 
did not want to see a Conservative government returned to office, and turned to Labour 
as the only viable alternative. By the end of the year the Conservatives trailed Labour by 
an almost insurmountable margin, and Labour looked almost certain to win the next 
general election. 
At Parliamentary and party leadership levels, the 'White Paper chase' highlighted the 
strictly limited nature of the wartime consensus. Although able to agree on the 
prosecution of the War, discussions on post-war reconstruction were rancorous, and had 
served only to emphasise the continuing policy differences between the two major parties. 
The same picture continued to typify Manchester politics, where the gap between the 
parties remained even greater than that existent at national level. At the end of 1943 the 
social and economic policies of the major Manchester parties remained fundamentally 
different, and it appeared highly unlikely that either the Conservatives or Labour would 
amend their policy beliefs, allowing a consensus to develop. The chapter will now 
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suggest that 1944 witnessed a further hardening of party attitudes, particularly in the 
Labour Party, which totally eliminated any possibility of consensus emerging. By the end 
of the year, it will be argued, it was certain that the main parties would go to the polls 
offering the electorate contrasting visions of post-war Britain. 
The year represented the nadir of inter-party relations in both Westminster and 
Manchester. At national level, Labour (against the wishes of some party leaders) and the 
Liberals, recognising the groviing popular frustration surrounding the Government's 
approach to reconstruction and the damaging effect this could have on their own parties, 
decJared that they would contest The next general election as independent parties rather 
than participating in a continuation of the Coalition. In Manchester, the Labour Party 
became extremely hostile to the Coalition. Throughout the War the Party had been 
highly sensitive to the dangers of becoming too closely aligned with the Conservative 
Party for fear of losing support to the Communists and this sensitivity intensified in 1944 
with the increasing success of Common Wealth, which had styled its appeal on the policy 
agenda of the Labour Party. As with the surge in support for the Communist Party, it is 
easy to dismiss Common Wealth's success as a purely war-time phenomenon and to 
regard them, as Addison has done, as being simply a Labour substitute that would 
disappear when Labour could re-enter the electoral arena. Crucially, this is not how the 
Party were seen by contemporary observers in Manchester, many of whom predicted a 
bright future for Common Wealth. Early in the year the Evening News observed that 
"Common Wealth is attractive not only to Labour voters but to Labour Party 
members.,, 73 Similarly, in September the Guardian commented enthusiastically on a 
Common Wealth policy document; 
Common Wealth is moving rapidly. 'Common Wealth Policy 1944-45' 
documents the emergence, from its original policy manifesto of a post-war 
programme based not on a political doctrine but on the active human needs 
of the people. Thus harnessed and put to work, its organisation will be a 
force to reckoned with. 74 
Although Labour's position as the pre-eminent party of the Left was unlikely to be 
challenged by Common Wealth, or the Communist Party (who were perhaps now a lesser 
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threat), the success of Common Wealth could lead to a split in the Left vote at the next 
general election, with obvious disastrous consequences for Labour. With Common 
Weafth having a particularly strong base in Manchester, Labour had genuine cause for 
concern. Manchester Labour's frustration with the Coalition steadily increased and the 
Party was desperate to distance itself from an unpopular government, and inevitably they 
began to re-assert their independence even more forcefully than in earlier years of the 
War. Manchester Labour's stance continued to place them to the left of the leadership. 
Any Labour Party activity that was deemed to assist the Conservative Party now 
provoked complete condemnation. At its annual meeting, the Party unanimously passed 
a resolution "deploring the spectacle of Labour M. P. s speaking on Tory platforms in 
by-elections" and "calling on the National Executive Committee to take all steps possible 
to prevent a re-occurrence.,, 75 The Secretary of the Womens' Advisory Council, moving 
the resolution said; "The sending of Labour M. P. s to support the Tory candidate in the 
recent West Derbyshire by-election was a definite violation of the decision of the Labour 
Party Conference regarding the electoral truce. It is turning that truce into a political 
truce.,, 76 The President of the meeting seconded the resolution; 
He expressed the opinion that the appearance of A. G. Walkden in West 
Derbyshire was not by invitation but by a Labour Party Headquarters 
wangle. [Another member] not only attacked the policy of Labour 
members appearing on Tory platforms but roundly criticised Attlee for 
sending letters of support and contended that both actions were a violation 
of the annual conference's decision which only agreed to an electoral 
truce. He said he had been active in the Labour movement since the days 
of the Labour Representation Committee and now he was being asked to 
support Tory candidates. Several thousand Labour voters in West 
Derbyshire had in effect told Attlee to go to hell. 77 
The Party were very reluctant to punish anyone who had broken party rules by opposing 
the Conservatives. A veteran Manchester Labour Party Alderman, Joe Toole, had stood 
as an independent candidate in the Skipton by-election against the terms of the electoral 
truce and, in line with party regulations, the Party decided that "In view of his candidature 
as an Independent in the election [he] be expelled from the party and the 'whip' in the 
Manchester City Council be withdrawn from him.,, 700 However this was only a cosmetic 
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exercise for later in the year he was re-admitted to the Party. The Party's frustration with 
the Coalition was such that, several months before the national party made the decision, 
Manchester Labour were already pleading with the leadership to withdraw from the 
CoaYffion and prepare for the next election. The Party passed a resolution which referred 
to the growth of trade union membership of the Party and "urged affiliated trade unions to 
make efforts to bring about even more substantial increases. " The resolution continued, 
[The success of such efforts is] bound to be affected by the continued 
participation of members of the Labour Party in the National Government 
and their inevitable association with a reactionary foreign policy ... and a 
vacillating policy at home to social reconstruction. The party's 
participation in the National Government should therefore be ended 
immediately. A withdrawal can be affected without prejudice to the 
speedy conclusion of hostilities in Europe. 79 
A second resolution called upon the leadership to "speedily draft a minimum campaign 
programme on which the party intends to fight. -80 
With its concern over Common Wealth and its hostile attitude towards the 
Coalition, the Manchester Labour Party was in its most partisan position of the War. 
There was therefore no possibility of the Party rethinking its core political beliefs. 
Labour remained staunch supporters of the Beveridge Report, land nationalisation and, 
throughout the year, also pressed consistently for a full programme of public ownership. 
This became clear following the publication of the White Paper on employment. In the 
Commons debate on the Paper, Bill Oldfield (Lab, Gorton) stressed; "In my opinion the 
white paper should be definitely laid down upon the lines of full public ownership. "81 
Bill Johnston, the Labour council leader, bemoaned that the compromise represented by 
the White Paper could not solve the problem of unemployment, and stated that only 
public ownership could provide the solution; "The authors of the white paper have been 
weighed down by the difficulty of reconciling a policy that required private ownership 
with a social system based on co-operation. So long as profit and not necessity 
determines production unemployment must inevitably continue.,, 82 John Owen, on the 
far left, described the White Paper as the "funeral dirge of expiring capitalism.,, 83 In 
May, the Manchester City Labour Party called for "the issuing of an invitation to all 
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organisations subscribing to the general principles of social ownership to ally themselves 
under that programme in a coalition of all forces opposed to capitalist monopo y. 94 1 "0 
fn contrast to the local Labour Party, some Manchester Conservatives still hoped 
to see a continuation of the Coalition into the post-war years. Harry Hewlett M. P., for 
example, said; "It is my firm conviction that our post-war problems would be just as 
great, if not greater, than our past problems, and I believe that there should be a 
continuance, though not necessarily in the present form, of the National Government. -85 
Nevertheless, the Conservatives were keen to maintain a party advantage whenever 
possible and, early in the year, they were accused of acting in a purely partisan manner. In 
February, Manchester City Justices rescinded (by 24 votes to 12) a decision they had 
taken some nine months earlier that had introduced proportional representation as the 
voting system to be used at all elections to committees. One member, said; "if I had not 
been assured by successive Lord Chancellors that politics did not enter into magisterial 
duties I would have suspected a party move.,, 86 The Guardian commented; 
It would be news to most of the citizens in Manchester that their unpaid 
maggistracy conducts itself on party lines and has its affairs dominated by a 
Conservative Party caucus. Yet in spit of the supposed independence and 
impartiality of the magisterial office this seems to be the case ... It is devoutly to be hoped that our worthy Tory magistrates act on more 
intelligent principles when they sit on the bench. 87 
Throughout the War Conservathes had seen no reason to amend their policies 
and, crucially, this did not alter during 1944. By-election evidence showing the 
unpopuJarity of the Party was dismissed as misleading and unreliable, whilst opinion polls 
showing a considerable Labour lead were ignored by virtually all parties and political 
commentators. In consequence the Manchester Conservative Party remained a strongly 
reactionary body that showed little grasp of popular feelings. Despite all the evidence 
demonstrating the priority given by the public to issues such as housing and employment, 
the Manchester Conservatives devoted most of their time to foreign and defence policies. 
This was made clear at the annual meeting of the Manchester Conservative Association, at 
which the majority of time was spent discussing these questions with virtually no 
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discussion of domestic reconstruction. 88 Further evidence of the reactionary tendencies 
of the Party was provided by their choice of Lord Mayor. It was the Party's turn to 
nomýinate a candidate for the post, and many expected them to choose the first female 
Lord Mayor, the long serving Miss Mary Kingstnill Jones. Given the major part played 
by women in the war effort it was widely felt that it would have been a fitting gesture of 
recognition, but of the three candidates put forward, the Conservative council group gave 
fewest votes to Miss Jones. This was condemned by some within the Conservative Party 
itself. Among those disappointed were the five women members of the Conservative 
group, one of whom described the vote as "unfair victimisation because of sex", and some 
progressive Conservative men, one of whom said; "If a man had done as much work as 
Miss Jones, and done it as well, he would have been Lord Mayor long before today. "89 
Such views were in the minority and this issue, together with their seemýing inability to 
grasp the crucial importance of reconstruction, demonstrated that reactionary views still 
dominated the Party at this late stage of the War. 
This resistance to change ensured that the whole tone of Manchester Conservatism 
continued to be strongly neo-liberal. This was emphasised on a number of occasions 
throughout the year. One of the city's Conservative M. P. s told a meeting that he 
accepted that "so long as there is a shortage of raw materials, controls in some shape or 
form must continue for some time after Germany is beaten" but added that "I hate 
controls. "90 A ffirther example of Conservative hostility towards any form of 
government economic interference surfaced at a council meeting in July. In 1939 the 
Government had passed the Rent Restrictions Act, which prevented landlords from 
arbitrarily raising rents, and, five years later Manchester Labour councillors put forward a 
motion reading; "This Council is of the strong opinion that the provisions of the Rent 
Restriction Act of 1939 should be continued and that no increase of rent in respect of 
houses ... is justified. "91 Such intervention was not on the agenda of the Manchester 
Conservatives and the motion was rejected, with the Conservatives voting against it en 
bloc. This laissez-faire attitude was particularly evident in the wake of the publication 
of the White Paper on employment. The Party's reaction to the document again 
suggested that the views of the Manchester Conservatives remained to the right of the 
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national leadership. The White Paper (together with Dalton's Distribution of Industry 
Bill) proposed that the Government should direct companies to place new industrial 
investment in areas suffering from high unemployment. Despite having the support of the 
Conservative leadership, these proposals were criticised by the Manchester Conservatives 
on the grounds that it involved too much interference with the workings of private 
enterprise; 
While welcoming steps to secure a balanced industrial development, [we] 
issue the warning that artificial ways of locating industry may bring 
disorder to the industrial fabric of some areas. Nothing should be done to 
disturb natural tendencies which arise from the play of economic and other 
factors. The chief consideration must be 'Where can an industry be 
carried on most efficiently9' and not 'Where is the greatest need of 
opportunity for employmentT Productive efficiency should not be 
sacrificed by allowing the second consideration to prevail when the two 
conflict, and the Government should therefore rely less upon its powers of 
direction than its ability to offer inducements. Action should be positive 
and helpful rather than negative and restrictive. 92 
The Party adopted the same approach to the contentious issue of the future of the coal 
industry. Whilst Labour advocated the nationalisation of the industry, the Manchester 
Conservatives, and their colleagues in business, declared that the industry should be left 
firndy in the hands of private enterprise; 
We believe that only under enlightened private enterprise can the nation be 
assured of the coal it needs. Planners there are in plenty, many of them 
well intentioned, but necessarily ignorant. It is the duty of those who are 
intimately connected with the industry to devise the organisation that is 
necessary. 93 
By the end of 1944, the prospect of the political parties entering the next general 
election with a shared view of post-war Britain had been eliminated. The intensification 
of disenchantment with the Coalition within the Manchester Labour Party, and their 
wariness of the success of Common Wealth ensured that the Party remained firmly rooted 
in their entrenched position. On the opposite side of the political spectrum, the 
Manchester Conservatives remained a staunchly reactionary body. Despite the evidence 
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of by-election and opinion polls, the Party showed no inclination of making concessions to 
popular feelings in the wider community. 
The Rusholme By-Election. July 1944. 
All the political trends explored in this chapter were highlighted and emphasised in the 
Rusholme by-election of July 1944, the city's most important political occurrence of the 
War to date. It will be argued that the b3, -election provided compelling evidence of the 
rear-fionary nature of the Manchester Conservatives, the (at best) unco-operative attitude 
of Manchester Labour and the heavy loss of support for the Conservative Party amongst 
the working-class and the young. 
The election, called after the death of E. A. Radford M. P., took place in a 
Conservative stronghold; in only one election (out of nine) since 1918 had the seat been 
won by another party (the Liberals in 1923), and in the last two elections the 
Conservatives polled 69.3 per cent (1931) and 62.6 per cent (1935). Electoral history 
was very much on the Conservatives' side and so, importantly, was the timing of the 
election. Polling day was 8 July, with campaigning taking place throughout June, against 
the background of the successful Allied invasion of the continent. This success could 
only boost the popularity of the National Government and decrease the desire to 'rock the 
boat', assisting the Conservative (National Government) candidate. This was certainly 
the opinion of the local press. Before campaigning began, the local press had no 
doubt that the Conservatives would secure a comfortable victory. The Guardian assessed 
the propitious circumstances favouring the Conservative candidate, and the difficulties 
facing the other two candidates; 
According to present indications the contest is likely to prove little more 
than a formality. To say this is by no means to disparage the challengers 
or to belittle the causes for which they stand, but merely to emphasise the 
obvious fact that the circumstances of the moment favour tremendously 
the Conservative Party who claim possession under the electoral truce. 
For the time being, at any rate, the public mind has little disposition 
towards platform controversy. Its anxieties are centred on events across 
the English Channel ... In nine contests from 1918 to 1935, the seat has been won eight times by the Conservatives and once by the Liberals ... Once 
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more leaving political considerations out of account, the Rusholme 
94 Division is the hardest nut [Common Wealth] has yet tried to crack. 
The Evening News agreed with the Guardian's analysis; "The Conservative candidate will 
be the official candidate and, on the eve, or in the early stages of the second front [this 
was written four days before D-Day], and at a time when the Government's prestige is 
enhanced by success in Italy and the publication of an employment plan, all the chances 
are his.,, 95 In contrast to earlier war-time by-elections in the city (two of which had 
been unopposed), it appeared that there might be as many as six candidates standing. 
However this was reduced to three when the Communists, the Independent Labour Party 
and an individual independent decided against standing. The main opposition to the 
Conservatives was provided by Common Wealth, and their candidate H. W. Blomerly, a 
Prestwich teacher. The Party's activity in Manchester earlier in the year made their 
decision to stand unsurprising although, as we shall see, this decision was made only after 
consultation with Labour. Alongside the Conservatives and Common Wealth, a third 
candidate was a Mr Cecil John Taylor, a Carlisle businessman. He declared his candidacy 
w1filst there was still much confusion over other candidates explaining; "I am fighting 
because there is so much ambiguity that I think there is a likelihood of the Government 
candidate getting in unopposed.,, 96 Taylor was immediately disadvantaged because of 
his rather tenuous links with Manchester, in comparison to the local men selected by the 
other parties. In an attempt to portray himself as a 'local', Taylor informed the Evening 
Chrozýcle that he had been bom in Stockport and had attended school in Ardwick. 
Furthermore, he pointed out; "I have been described as a Carlisle businessman, but I am 
ordy in Carlisle because of the Blitz. The sales side of the manufacturing chemists 
business with which I am concerned was started in Manchester.,, 97 Despite his 
protestations, Taylor retained his 'outsider' tag. 
As with all by-elections, Rusholme was fought on the 1939 electoral register, 
now five years out of date. It was estimated that, as a result of service calls, workforce 
conscription, removals and deaths, only half of the 45,842 (1939) electors were still in the 
division. 98 Additionally, anyone under voting age in 1939, or people who had moved to 
the area since that date, was not on the register. The Evening Chronicle estimated that 
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up to 13,000 people may have been disenfranchised. 99 The Conservatives were most 
likely to be affected by the changed nature of the constituency as the majority of those 
who had left the area were middle-class citizens who were able to move to safer areas. 
This would inevitably reduce the Conservative vote. 
Labour's Stance. 
The by-election emphasised Manchester Labour's increasing hostility to the 
Coalition and, more particularly, the Conservative Party. The one previously contested 
Manchester by-election, in Clayton in late 1942, had been a model of inter-party 
co, aperation but in Rusholme Labour could barely conceal their antagonism towards the 
Conservative candidate, with the mouthpiece of the Manchester and Salford Labour 
movement, Northern Voi= openly calling for a Common Wealth victory. 
Even though the terms of the electoral truce prevented Labour from putting 
forward a candidate, Common Wealth made it clear that they would step aside if the local 
Labour Party installed a candidate, telling the local press; "Common Wealth's chief aim is 
to ensure that a progressive socialist be returned to Rusholme. If the present prospective 
Labour candidate decides to stand we shall give him our full support. "100 The Rusholme 
Labour Party was the most left-wing of the Manchester constituency Labour parties 
(witnessed by their support for Communist affiliation) and their prospective candidate, 
Lester Hutchinson, was certainly a fellow traveller, and possibly even a card-carrying 
member of the Communist Party (strictly against Labour Party rules). Hutchinson was 
sorely tempted to stand telling the press, without consulting his constituency party, that he 
was awaiting the outcome of a party meeting which would "decide whether or not to 
support me as an Independent Labour candidate. "101 Hutchinson's obvious eagerness 
was misplaced, for Rusholme Labour had no intention of breaking the electoral truce. 
Hutchinson was immediately rebuked by Councillor Thomas, the Chairman of the 
Divisional Labour Party who declared; "[Hutchinson's] statement is an extraordinary one. 
No official Labour Party will support any independent candidate in a by-election while the 
electoral truce is in operation. We shall not support Mr Hutchinson if he stands as an 
Independent Labour candidate. "102 The significance of this statement should not be 
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exaggerated for it was not an attempt to ease the election of the Conservative candidate, 
and was in reality nothing more than a grudging acceptance of party policy. Rusholme 
Labour were merely biding their time. This was conveyed the following day, when the 
Party made known their true feelings towards both the electoral truce and the 
Conservative Party, and their own hopes for the next general election, to the press; 
Although this Divisional Labour Party has always opposed the electoral 
truce it has been confirmed time and again by successive annual 
conferences of the Labour Party. We feel, therefore, that it would not be 
in the best interests of Labour to put forward our candidate, Mr Lester 
Hutchinson, on this occasion. We feel that Rusholme will rally to Labour 
when the troops come home and are confident that it will back us to the 
full in our determination to rid this country once and for all of this 
disastrous Tory Government which has been directly responsible for 
leading the world into its present position. 103 
Labour's decision not to stand may also have been the result of a 'deal' struck between 
themselves and Common Wealth. A fortnight after Labour's decision the Common 
Wea)th candidate, H. W. Blomerly, revealed that he had given an undertaking to Labour to 
stand down at the general election in favour of Hutchinson, providing he was not attached 
to a coalition. 104 Private meetings probably occurred before this, and it seems that an 
understanding' was reached. 
Throughout the remainder of the campaign Labour officially remained impartial, 
and did not endorse any candidate. Privately, however, the Party did not wish to see a 
Conservative victory. This was made clear by Northern Voice; 
If the Tory goes back to Rusholme it will prove, we are told, that the 
country is solid behind the war effort. Rubbish! It will prove, on the 
contrary, that we have learned nothing and that we intend to change 
nothing and that we are no more dynamic in our political outlook than we 
were nine years ago. 105 
Furthermore, Labour's official non-partisan stance should be contrasted with the open 
assistance given by Conservatives to the Labour candidate, Harry Thorneycroft, at the 
Clayton by-election of October 1942. Then, Harry Hewlett M. P. had spoken on 
Thorneycroft's election platform, and urged Conservatives to vote for Thorneycroft as he 
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was the National Government candidate. Labour's refusal to return the favour in 
Rusholme annoyed Conservatives, who did not hesitate to refer to Hewlett's gesture, and 
the contrast between the two elections signifies that any pretence at unity had 
disappeared. Unofficially, the Labour Party split three ways, with all three candidates 
claiming that Labour members were assisting their campaigns, and the evidence suggests 
this was true. One ex-Labour agent for the Division worked for the Conservatives during 
the campaign, as did some other members of the Party who felt bound by the spirit of the 
electoral truce and Hewlett's earlier generosity. 106 However, the Guardian noted; "Mr 
Blomerly, the Common Wealth candidate, has Labour sympathisers in his band of 
workersý', whilst just days before the election Mr G. B. Cherry, the Secretary of the 
Rusholme Labour Party was forced to deny that his party was giving its support to Cecil 
Taylor. 107 
The Conservative Cam. ig 
The choice of candidate, and the campaign run, by the Conservative Party demonstrated 
the extent to which Manchester Conservatism remained dominated by 1930's neo-liberal 
orthodoxy. The Rusholme Conservatives selected Major Frederick Cundiff, the son of a 
former Lord Mayor and a well known local businessman, as their candidate. He 
possessed an exceptionally distinguished military record, making him an ideal war-time 
Government candidate; in the First World War he had served firstly in the Army and then 
as a fighter pilot, whereupon he was shot down and wounded. On the outbreak of the Z: ý 
Second World War Cundiff immediately volunteered and served in the early years as a 
naval lieutenant in the submarine service, seeing action in the Norway campaign. His 
already considerable reputation was enhanced further still when he subsequently spent 
four hours adrift in the sea after his ship was blown up whilst on patrol during the 
Dunkirk evacuation. 108 However, Cundiff was also ultra-conservative and his selection 
said much about the Party's attitudes towards reconstruction. 
Such reactionary attitudes were continually emphasised throughout the campaign, 
ivith the Party revealing a complete lack of understanding of public interest in domestic 
reform. As with most other Conservative by-election candidates in 1944, the main thrust 
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of Cundifrs campaign was not on the need to implement domestic reforms but rather on 
the need to support the National Government and Winston Churchill. He began 
beginning his election address by asking the electorate "to send to Mr Churchill a glorious 
message of confidence that will hearten him in his grave task of leading the nation to 
victory. "I" Cundiff described himself as "an all-out supporter of Mr Churchill and his 
coarition Government. We must have him at the head of the Government when the time 
comes to dictate peace-terms to the cnemy. "110 He attempted to label Blomerly as 
unpatriotic, accusing Common Wealth of "attacking indirectly, if not directly. the Prime 
Minister" by "calling for an election at this time", whilst simultaneously trying to portray 
himself as above politics by claiming he "was not fighting the election on party lines. I 
have seen too much of war and want to win this one quickly, and win the peace too. " III 
Policy issues came a distant second to the culogising of Churchill but, again, they 
provided strong evidence of the Party's hostfle attitude towards reconstruction and their 
continuing commitment to the policies of the 1930's. The Guardian was certainly correct 
in speaking of -the cautious Conservative orthodoxy of Major Cundiff"112 At the 
annual conference of the Manchester Conservatives the Party had concentrated on 
post-war foreign and defence policies, rather than domestic issues. Similarly, Cundiff 
issued a list of policies he would be advocating during the campaign and it is worth 
repeating the most significant of these, both for what Cundiff says and the order in which 
they were prioritised, 
Post-war Delknee: Afy experiences in all services during two world wars 
has convinced me of the necessity for a 'strong right arm'. I feel that 
whatever treaties we might enter into there will always be a clever lawyer 
on the other side who will put a different complexion on them. 
League of Nations: I should want a lot of convincing that a League 
without the backing of armed forces was ever going to maintain 
peace-terms. 
Germany-; We have never appreciated the German mentality. I have 
travelled though Germany and believe you will never convert an adult 
Nazi. You may have a chance of moral re-education with German 
children. Germany led us up the garden path between the two wars. it 
mustn't happen again. 
194 
Peace-terms: This time they will have to be very severe indeed. Unless 
they are I think Germany will strive to rise again and we shall have another 
war in fifteen or twenty years. 
Hospitals: They lack back-room boys and more money will have to be 
given to medical research. Every hospital should have a number of 
full-time pathologists to do this work. 
Housing: We are not going to have a repetition of what happened after 
the last war. Pre-fabricated houses will have to meet a high percentage of 
the demand whilst permanent ones are made ready. 
Beveridge Report There are many good things in it, but I cannot agree 
vAth it all. 113 
Two of the most prominent public demands, housing and Beveridge, were bottom of 
Cundiff s priorities. Cundiff s decision to place foreign and defence issues at the top of 
his list was surely unwise, for although his 'make Germany pay' pledge had a populist 
appeal, this was not a predominant issue in public opinion surveys, in which domestic 
reform remained the overwhelming priorities. Cundifrs comments on domestic issues 
were hardly likely to satisfy the electorate. His equivocal acceptance of the Beveridge 
Report would not convince people still suspicious of government intentions, while his 
strange comments on hospitals gave no mention of the White Paper on the National 
Health Service, published some months earlier. There was no reference to full 
employment, either the goal or the recently published White Paper. Only on the housing 
question was Cundiff in tune with the public, although even here he was careful not to 
make any real commitments. Cundiff s priorities did not alter as the campaign progressed 
and in a major speech he again concentrated on defence and peace-terms. Cundiff hinted 
that hs solution to the problem of post-war Germany would be along the lines proposed 
by the American official, Henry Morgenthau, who advocated the almost total 
de-industrialisation of Germany, turning it into a rural backwater. In another election 
meeting, Cundiff declared himself "convinced that German war potential must be 
destroyed, even if that meant some loss of territory and the occupation of key points. " 114 
On domestic issues, he again emphasised his commitment to pre-war Conservative 
orthodoxy; "One of the Government's first tasks of reconstruction must be to re-establish 
195 
and further extend our export trade", which must "firstly be built up with reciprocal trade 
within the British Empire. " Government economic controls were admitted to be 
necessary in the present circumstances "but should be withdrawn at the earliest possible 
moment. " 115 Tifis emphasis on the removal of economic controls (together with 
Hewlett's comments) highlighted the Party's hostility towards public ownership. 
Furthermore the emphasis on a return to private enterprise, combined with the need for a 
thriiing export trade was the standard Conservative solution to the question of how to 
maintain fiill employment in post-war years. Full employment was to be achieved by 
falling back on traditional economic methods, rather than through government control of 
the economy and planning, as advocated by Labour. 
The Rusholme by-election served to emphasise the reactionary tendencies of 
Manchester Conservatism. Far from pursuing a progressive agenda the Party had offered 
only a re-statement of 1930s orthodoxy. Their prioritisation of policies, with domestic 
reforms coming below foreign and defence policies, highlighted both the Party's complete 
lack of empathy with public opinion and their own continuing hostility to the whole 
question of social and economic reconstruction. This was again emphasised on thq eve of 
the election; in his final address, Cundiff made no reference to domestic issues, appealing 
only for "a big poll so that Rusholme may the more forcibly demonstrate its loyalty to the 
Prime Minister and the National Government. " 116 
The Common Wealth and Independent Campaig 
The Common Wealth Party viewed the by-election seriously enough for the party leader, 
Richard Acland, to stay in Manchester for two weeks prior to polling day to help his 
candidate. Common Wealth based its campaign on exploiting public dissatisfaction with 
the slow process of domestic reconstruction, and with the widespread continuing 
suspicion that this war would see a repetition of the broken promises of the last. In a 
speech made to a public meeting in the Co-operative Hall (attended by around 1,000 
peopl6); 
[Acland] asked if the fruits of the coming victory were to be thrown away 
as they were last time. After the last war we were told a great deal about 
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how the new brotherhood of the trenches was to be carried forward into 
the task of peace. But surely people must remember what actually 
happened. Even so soon as 1920 we had poverty in the nUst of potential 
plenty and unjustifiable wealth. Is that to be allowed to happen again? 
The Govenunent boasted of its achievement and of its plans for the fiiture. 
For all its fine words and phrases it is merely putting patches upon the old 
orders of society. If Rusholme people elect Mr Cundiff they will be giving 
a guarantee that nothing is going to be done this time. 117 
This message was repeated constantly. Eager to seize a major issue of the moment, 
Common Wealth focused particularly on the discontent surrounding the recently published 
emptayment White Paper. Blomerly was sharply critical of the Government's 
unemployment people; "It leaves far too much to unregulated private enterprise and is 
full of reservations which will make it largely ineffective. " 118 Acland told another 
audience; 
Sir William Beveridge condemned the Government's programme as being 
totally inadequate because, he said, you cannot solve the problem through 
the machinery of private ownership. This is precisely what Common 
Wealth has been saying for the last two years. We are asking the 
electorate to show that workers and fighters alike are determined that 
private ownership shall stand out of the way of full employment. 119 
Although Common Wealth's campaign was essentially negative, they did put forward 
their own distinctly socialist policies, proposing the nationalisation of land, all major 
industries, banking and transport, and advocating the redistribution of wealth. To 
emphasise their socialist credentials the Party sought to portray the election as a battle of 
the needs of the many against the private greed of the few; 
[I ask]the electorate to ftee their mind from all the personalities and all the 
red herrings which have been drawn across the land. This election must 
be decided on one straight issue: are the great resources of the country to 
be owned as in the past by comparatively few or are they going to be 
owned and used for the whole of the common people of this country? If 
you decide that they are to be owned by us then it is your democratic duty, 
as it is your democratic right, to turn out and vote for the cause which is 
going to bring the new age of the common man somewhat nearer. 120 
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Blomerly predicted a "very close thing", believing that Common Wealth could "just about 
pull it off.,, 121 
Cecil Taylor's programme was vague and he was seemingly unsure of his own 
policies. At the outset of his campaign, the Guardian noted; "Mr Taylor's handbills show 
his policies do not differ greatly from Common Wealth. "122 He declared himself in 
favour of nationalising the land, railways, mines, banks and heavy industries. After that 
"there is not much left.,, 123 However, a week later the Guardian commented; 
I 
Mr Taylor is something of a puzzle. In an early leaflet he declared himself 
of nationalised mines, banks and heavy industry. In an election address, 
published later, he makes no reference to nationalisation. Asked in what 
respect his nationalisation policy differs from socialism he replies that his 
nationalisation is something different from the doctrine of the Socialist 
Party. 124 
The Result and Analysis. 
The Rusholme by-election provided strong evidence of the class polarisation of the 
electorate. Although the Conservatives retained Rusholme, they had suffered a heavy 
loss of support and some local observers believed that VAth another week of 
electioneering the result may have gone the other way. 125 Tables 5.1 and 5.2 compare 
the bj,, -election result with the 1935 General Election result: 
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Candidate Iqr! y- Votq____ Share of Vote (! /6)__ý 
_ F. Cundiff - __ Conservative 8340 53.3 
H. Blomerly CommonWealth 6670 42.1 
C. Taylor Independent 734 4.6 
Con Majority 1760 
Turnout 15842 34.7 
Table 5.2: The 1935 Rusholme General Election ResulL 
Candidate Party Votes Share of Vote M) 
E. A... Radford Conscn, afivc 19678 62.6 
A. Kiýght Labour 9258 29.4 
Dr P. Mcdougall Ind. Labour 2525 8 
Con. Majojity 7895 
Tumout 31461 69.8 
There had been a swing against the Conservative Party of II per cent, with their share of 
the vote falling by almost 10 per cent, at a time when the military situation was totally to 
their advantage. Nevertheless, the Party had still received 53 per cent of the vote; the 
loss of rniddle-class constituents since the outbreak of war was bound to lower the 
Conservative vote, but this figure suggests that the Conservatives had retained the loyalty 
of the remainder of their core middle-class 1935 support. It was amongst the 
working-class and the young that support for the Party had haernorrhaged severely, a 
point recognised by the local press. It was noted that Conunon Wealth had been 
promised much support from working-class district with "more interest being taken by 
Labour people, whose party is observing the electoral truce, than by any other section7'126 
and that; "The young electors in particular are being attracted by Mr Blomerly. "127 It 
was the combination of these two groups, rather than any defection of traditional 
middle-class Conservatives, that was responsible for the share of the vote of the principal 
opposition to the Conservatives increasing from 29.4 per cent (1935) to 42.1 per cent 
(1944). Furthermore the Conservatives had been sheltered from much of the fall-out 
from youth disenchantment vvith the Party because the out of date electoral register 
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precluded anyone under the age of 25 from voting, and many others were away in the 
services. 
A further crucial point lay in the size of the turnout. Despite hard electioneering, 
it had generally been felt that public interest in the campaign was subdued. A fortnight 
before the election one local newspaper reported; "According to present indications the 
contest for the Rusholme Parliamentary vacancy is likely to create little interest. For the 
moment, people's minds are much more "ith the soldiers than the politicians and at the 
moment the disposition in Rusholine is to regard the contest as pointless. - 128 Onlyinthe 
final week was it reported that interest in the by-election was "developing slowly" 
although even then the level of interest should not be overstated. The day before polling 
began (8 July), the Guardian noted; "Although the eve of the poll has produced a slight 
quickening of the electoral pulse there is no significant change in the Rusholme Division. 
Blood pressure remains abnormally low.,, 129 The Guardian attributed this to the military 
situation and the relative dullness of the candidates; 
Rusholme poHs today and the by-election must count as the tamest for 
many months. It was always expected that once the invasion started, 
interest in internal policies would fall off and the Rusholme campaign has 
shown how smatt our domestic issues seem by the side of the great causes 
that are at stake in the struggle across the Channel. Then again, the 
election has been dull because it has reflected the dullness of the 
candidates. Estimable they may be, but none of them has been exactly 
inspiring. 130 
However, the size of the turnout did not suggest a lack of interest. The Clayton 
by-election of 1942 saw a turnout of just 20.8 per cent, while the contest in Rusholme 
drew a turnout of 34.7 per cent on an even older register. (in the two general elections of 
the 1930s Clayton had a stronger turnout). This suggests that by mid- 1944 there was an 
increasing political consciousness in the city as well as a greater public interest. This 
hypothesis is supported by the fact that the turnout of 34.7 per cent was measured against 
the 1939 electoral register. The effective core of this register was now much less than 
the 45,842 voters of 1939, with the true figures being much nearer 25,000 - 30,000. 
Assuming this, the turnout was actually in the region of 53-62 per cent, a respectable 
figure for a by-election, but how can we reconcile a low-profile, low-interest campaign 
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with a relatively high turnout? If the cause of the low-key campaign was merely 
pre-occupation with the position in France, then one would expect this to have been 
matched with a lower turnout. The most plausible answer is that voting intentions had 
been pre-determined, with the consequence that the campaign had little impact on the 
electorate. Whilst this remains conjecture, if it was indeed the case then it represented a 
real blow to Conservative prospects for the general election. It would suggest that the 
anti-Conservative swing was irreversible. Canvassing returns had presented worse news 
for the Conservatives, having shown that the young were least likely to vote for them. 
The Party had been sheltered from the effects of this in the by-election because of 
deficiencies in the electoral register and service call-ups but in the next general election 
their vote would count, and this could only increase the strength of the anti-Conservative 
vote. This was presciently recognised (Rusholme fell to Labour in 1945), by the Evening 
Nem which claimed; "In post-war elections the Conservatives may find it hard to retain 
the seat. ""31 
In the Rusholme by-election, Conservative orthodoxy had been shown to be 
deeply unpopular with all but their core supporters and only the lack of voting power 
among the young, possibly in tandem with the successful invasion of the continent had 
prevented them from losing the seat. Although the seat was retained, Rusholme was a 
Pyrrhic victory for the Conservatives. The Party was in a critical and almost certainly 
irreversible position. 
Conclusion. 
By the end of 1944, two major conclusions could be drawn about the Manchester political 
scene. Firstly, it appeared inevitable that the Conservative Party would lose the next 
general election. The year witnessed a strong intensification of the anti-Conservative 
mood outside the Party's core support, a point demonstrated by opinion polls, by-election 
results (including Rusholme) and the increase in Manchester Labour Party membership. 
The main stimulus for this intensification lay in the (perceived) unsatisfactory nature of the 
Government's reconstruction White Papers published during the course of the year. 
They were seen not as the basis of real change for post-war Britain but as unsatisfactory 
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compromise documents that evaded all politically contentious decisions, and that were so 
prevaricatory as to be virtually worthless. In consequence, they signally failed to placate 
a general public growing increasingly cynical about the prospects of reforms being 
implemented before the War was won. THis cynicism was perhaps best reflected in the 
wake of the publication of the White Paper on employment policy; despite its importance 
it generated very little public interest simply because it was commonly felt to have little 
rea) value and very little prospect of implementation. As in 1943 it was the Conservative 
Party, rather than the Government as a whole, that incurred the wrath of the electorate, 
but now the anti-Conservative swing appeared irreversible. The quietness of the 
Rusholme by-election, coupled with its relatively high turnout, suggested that many 
people had already decided on their political loyalties and would not be swayed by 
election campaigns. The decline in Conservative fortunes was terminal. However, the 
evidence continued to suggest that Labour's increasing support was drawn from specific 
social groupings, with class considerations preventing the Party from making inroads into 
the core, pre-war middle-class Conservative support. The evidence also continued to 
suggest that there was no great enthusiasm for the Labour Party or socialism, a point even 
acknowledged by Northern Voice. In reality, Labour's lead in the opinion polls and the 
success of Common Wealth candidates was attributable more to the popular revolt against 
Conservatism rather than to any left-wing fervour. 
By the end of the year, it was also safe to conclude that the political parties would 
enter the next general election committed to fundamentally different political principles. 
Any possibility of consensus dissipated as Labour became increasingly hostile to the 
coalition. Aware of the escalating public disenchantment with the Government's 
reconstruction planning, and concerned about the success of Common Wealth and its 
implications for splitting the Left vote, the Manchester Labour Party adopted its most 
partisan position of the War. It openly called for the Party to withdraw from the 
Coalition and prepare an election manifesto. With such a mood dominating the Party, 
Manchester Labour would not accede to, or even contemplate, any dilution of party 
policiies. Furthermore, the evidence of by-elections pointed to the continuing success of 
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candidates espousing Labour Party policies, further reducing the likelihood (and need) of 
Labour amending their policies. 
As was continually emphasised during the year, particularly in the Rusholme 
by-election, the Manchester Conservatives showed no signs of recognising the 
anti-Conservative mood in the country and changing their policies as a result. The Party 
rernimed hostile to notions of reconstruction. The annual conference of the Manchester 
Conservatives and the by-election confirmed that the Party had completely failed to 
comprehend the public's attitude towards reconstruction, with their placement of defence 
and foreign policies at the head of their priorities being the antithesis of the popular mood. 
The Party remained wedded to the dominance of private enterprise and, as was 
demonstrated by their hostility towards the Rent Restrictions Act, a laissez-faire attitude 
towards economic issues. 
The divide between the two major parties in Manchester continued to exceed the 
already significant differences between the national leaderships. With military victory now 
only a matter of time, there was no prospect of their policies converging. 
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An Electoral Blitz@ The 1945 General Election. 
Introduct*on. 
The 1945 General Election campaign and its outcome, the seminal domestic event of 
Second World War politics, confirms the two central arguments of this thesis. The 
manifestos and campaigns of the major protagonists show that the parties, despite similar 
rhetoric, presented fundamentally different visions of post-war Britain to the electorate. 
The whole ethos of the Conservative programme was dominated by a continuing 
commitment to neo-liberat ideology, while that of Labour was underpinned by equal 
commitment to state interventionism. The campaign re-emphasised that the Manchester 
Conservative Party remained to the right, and Manchester Labour to the left, of their 
respective national leaderships and was reflected in their selection of candidates. 
An analysis of the electorate and the election results shows that 1945 was the most 
polarised election to date in Manchester's electoral history. Labour's victory was the 
result of a major increase in support for the Party amongst the working-class and younger 
voters, particularly those serving in the armed forces, while the core 1935 middle-class 
Conservative voters remained loyal in 1945. Labour's success was more attributable to a 
strong mood of anti-Conservatism rather to than any real enthusiasm for Labour Party 
policies which many people did not understand. - 
The 1945 General Election on Manchester. 
By early 1945 the Coalition was near breaking point, with ministers having exhausted the 
subjects on which they could agree, with the ownership of land and of industries proving 
particularly unresolvablc. It was inevitable that the end of the War would provoke a 
general election. The War in Europe ended on 7 May with the surrender of Germany. 
There was no elation in Manchester; "The overriding thing about the end was the 
complete absence of any sort of Mafeking frenzy. "l Churchill, keen to settle the political 
situation, invited (on 18 May) the Labour and Liberal leaders to remain in the Coalition 
until the defeat of Japan, or face an immediate election. Amongst Labour's leadership, 
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gathering for their party conference, Attlee, Bevin and Dalton were prepared to continue 
the Coalition but the remainder of the N. E. C.. rejected this proposal (the only decision the 
party conference would have accepted). Churchill resigned as coalition leader on 23 May 
and created a caretaker government of Conservatives and non-party figures, setting 
election day for 5 july. 2 Polls suggested a majority of the public had wanted the 
Coalition to continue until victory was achieved in the East, and this led the parties to 
blame one another for the Coalition's collapse. The Manchester press entered into these 
recriminations, with the Guardian suggesting; "We shall probably discover that the idea 
[of an election] as soon as possible after VE Day has never been far from the minds of 
Conservative Party organisers. " The Evening Chronicle retorted; "The onus for 
depriving the people [of the coalition] must rest with the Labour Party alone ... The Labour 
Party have decided that they want to return to party politics and cannot wait until the war 
against Japan has been disposed of-3 Whoever was to blame, the scene was set for 
campaigning to begin. 
i) The Conservative Ca 
The Conservative election campaign confirmed the extent to which the Party had retained 
its reactionary outlook and its continuing commitment to neo-liberalism in social and 
economic policies. The election also emphasised that, as had been the case throughout 
the War, the Manchester Conservatives remained further to the right than the party 
leadership. Across Britain the average age of Conservative candidates was 46, but in 
Manchester the average was several years higher; only one Manchester Conservative 
candidate was under the age of 40, three were in their late 50s to late 60s and the 
remainder were in their late 40s. Indeed, John Lees-Jones (Blackley) had intended to 
retire as an M. P. and stayed on only after pressure from his constituency party, whilst in 
Moss Side the combined ages of the Labour and Liberal candidates was still one year less 
than the age of the sitting Conservative M. P., Rostron Duckworth. The relatively high 
average age of the Manchester candidates was reflected in the fact that although across 
the country as a whole the Conservatives fielded more servicemen candidates than 
Labour, in Manchester only three Conservative candidates, Major Jim Currie, Squadron 
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Leader E. L. Fleming and Major F. Cundiff (and he only briefly) served in the armed forces 
in the War (not including the Home Guard). Even here, Cundiff and Fleming had also 
actually served in the First World War. It was not only the age of the candidates that 
suggested a continuation of pre-war attitudes, for their social backgrounds were no 
different than they had been in 1935 with, of course, some candidates standing in both. 
Three, Mrs Nellie Beer (the only woman to be selected by any Manchester party) Harry 
Shýrp and Wilfred Sugden had working-class origins, and they were selected to stand in 
the Labour held seats of Ardwick, Gorton and Platting. Most were, or had been, 
businessmen while two were barristers. In reality, some of the Conservative candidates 
were not of the highest calibre, and after the election the Evening New-, was to comment; 
"Some of their candidates were rather weak. -4 This was perhaps a result of the 
organisational difficulties facing the Party. Of the Manchester Conservative Agents all but 
one served in the armed forces and had been out of political contact with their 
constituencies. Although several had returned home before the campaign commenced 
(agents were allowed special leave), the election agent of Nellie Beer was in a foreign 
hospital with a fractured ankle and was unable to return until part way through the 
campaign whilst another was serving on the Staff in India and could not be released. 5 
One Manchester Conservative official admitted; "The fact that all our agents except one 
who was over-age went into national service at the start of the war has been a 
disadvantage from an organisational point of view. -6 
The Conservatives' priorities, at national and local levels, highlighted a lack of 
commitment to domestic reform. As with the Rusholme by-election a year previously, 
domestic reforms came a distant fourth in Conservative priorities behind the eulogising of 
Winston Churchill, ideological attacks on Labour and explanations of their own foreign 
and defence policies. Given Churchill's massive popularity, it made electoral sense to 
personalise the election; virtually all Conservative election posters featured his 
photograph, accompanied by captions such as 'HeI12 Him Finish The Job', the 
Conservative manifesto was entitled 'Mr Churchill's Declaration of Policy to the Electole 
and the public were continually urged to 'Vote for Churchill'. Candidates and the 
Conservative press trumpeted Churchill, the great war leader, as the only man capable of 
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ensuring a quick victory over the Japanese, and then taking Britain through the first 
difficult years of peace; 
Can we envisage Britain grappling with the mighty problems of the peace 
settlement without Mr Churchill? He is by far the most authoritative figure 
in the English speaking world. To be deprived of his services would in a 
twinkling diminish the influence and prestige of our country. Looking 
around the world at all the problems which face us, can we afford this 
deprivation? The answer, we are confident will be'No! 7 
Across the country as a whole, just over 50 per cent of Conservative candidates began 
their election addresses with a eulogy of Churchill and 95 per cent included it in some part 
of their address. 8 Jim Currie (Hulme) told his constituents; 
I know there are many men in this country today in whose experienced 
hands the higher and more internationally important issues could be safely 
left. But the great majority of the men belong to what is called the 
CONSERVATIVE PARTY, but which I prefer to call the CHURCHILL 
PARTY - the Party which, in representing our country, stood for Pride, 
Race, Courage and Vision in the dark days of 1940. Think well and 
deeply before you make any other man than Mr Churchill the Prime 
Minister ... [The] OVERWHELMING NEED FOR MR CHURCHILL'S EXPERIENCE, SHREWD JUDGEMENT, AND FAR SEEING EYE IS 
SUPREME. 9 
Conservatives unfavourably compared the international standing of the Labour leaders to 
the 'great statesman' figure of Churchill, and suggested that Britain's standing in the eyes 
of the world would greatly diminish if a Labour government was elected. Harry Sharp 
asked; 
What would be the position in this country if a Labour Government were 
elected? Clem Attlee, who is having a bit of fun at the moment with 
Harold Laski, said in 1934: "We have absolutely abandoned any idea of 
nationalist loyalty. " That is the man who hopes to lead this country, and 
to do the negotiating with important people of Foreign Governments ... My [aim] is to ensure that for the next few years those handling foreign affairs 
should be as well known and respected abroad as at home. Take away Mr 
Churchill and Anthony Eden and what have you got left? Have you 
anybody in the country capable of fulfilling those negotiations? Anybody 
of Churchill's calibre who can say 'No' and mean it? Youhaven'taman. 
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The salvation of this country in the present stages lies in the hands of Mr 
Churchill and Mr Anthony Eden and the National Government. 10 
The Conservatives' second priority was ideological attacks on Labour. The 
Conservatives campaigned on a negative platform for, as Addison points out; "Instead of 
taking a positive line about what they themselves would do, they concentrated on 
stampeding the electorate away from Labour. " II This was a high level decision, for in a 
message to all Conservative candidates the Party Chairman proclaimed that they should 
not try to outbid the 'appealing prospects' put forward by their opponents. 12 Drawing 
on the arguments of Hayek's The Road to Serfdom which claimed that economic 
planning necessitated the apparatus of tyranny, the Conservatives sought to characterise 
the Labour Party as doctrinaire, dogmatic, totalitarian and a danger to democracy. 
Voting Labour meant servitude to the state. 13 The Conservative press and candidates 
rarely referred to 'the Labour Party', referring instead to 'the Socialists' in the belief that 
this sounded more sinister and 'un-British'. The tone for this negative style of 
campaigning was set by Churchill in his first radio election broadcast, a broadcast that has 
gone down in history as the 'Gestapo speech'. Churchill told his listeners, an estimated 
49 per cent of the population, that; 
Socialism is, in its essence, an attack not only upon British enterprise but 
upon the right of an ordinary man and woman to breathe freely without 
having a harsh, clumsy and tyrannical hand clapped across their mouths 
and nostrils. A free Parliament - look at that - is odious to the socialist 
doctrine. I will go further. I declare it to you from the bottom of my 
heart that no socialist system can be established without a political police. 
Many of those who are advocating socialism or voting socialist today will 
be horrified at this idea. That is because they are short sighted - because 
they do not see where their theories are leading them. No socialist 
Government, conducting the entire life of the country, could afford to 
allow free, sharp or violently worded expressions of public discontent. 
They would have to fall back on some form of Gestapo ... 
It would stop 
criticism as it reared its head and it would gather all the powers to the 
supreme party and the party leaders, rising like stately pinnacles above 
their vast bureaucracies of civil servants - no longer servants, no longer 
civil. 14 
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Manchester Conservatives eagerly followed where Churchill lead, "Mr Churchill, more 
logical than his opponents, some of whom may not have thought out the ultimate 
consequences of their doctrines, showed very plainly that socialism can lead only to the 
erecfion of an all-powerful state. "15 Midway through the campaign the Conservatives 
seized upon the 'Laski affair' to highlight Labour's threat to democracy. Harold Laski, 
Chairman of Labour's National Executive Committee, implied that despite Attlee's 
presence at the 'Big Three' meeting of Britain, the U. S. A. and the Soviet Union, any 
decisions taken would not be binding for a Labour government because they would not 
have been ratified by the N. E. C.. Attlee was, he claimed, going only as observer rather 
than active participant and this appeared to suggest that it was the N. E. C.. that held the 
real power in the Labour Party. The N. E. C.. was elected by the Labour Conference and, 
therefore, it was pointed out that under Labour the country would be run by a body 
unelected by the vast majority of the people rather than by elected representatives. 
Conservatives shouted "democracy in danger", spoke of "Gauleiter Laski" and cartoons 
depicted Attlee as a ventriloquist's dummy perched on Laski's lap. The Manchester 
Conservatives seized on the issue with gusto; 
Both Mr Attlee and other socialist leaders take the view that there should 
be co-operation between the parties on foreign policy. They are not, 
however, masters in their own home. Professor Laksi's intervention has 
revealed to the world the real attitude of the party caucus - that socialist 
ministers should be subservient to it. That would mean that a socialist 
cabinet, instead of being primarily responsible to Parliament and the nation, 
will be expected to take its orders from an outside body elected by a 
section of the community and having no responsibility to the country as a 
whole. 16 
Mr George Beattie, the senior Conservative agent in the city, claimed; "A tremendous 
constitutional point is at stake in this election. Once the Labour Party got into power and 
applied the principle expounded by Professor Laski we shall not be rid of it without a 
convulsion on the part of the electors.,, 17 
Conservatives argued that a Labour government, with their desire to increase the 
powers of the state, would result in a major loss of personal freedom. Harry Sharp 
(Goywn) warned; "This is the most important contest in this country for many years. 
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The freedom of the individual depends on it ... 
We stand on our feet and say that Britons 
never shall be slaves - but we'll be slaves all fight if we put a Socialist Government in. "18 
Simifarly, George Beattie warned; "if the socialists are returned they would surround 
themselves with a ring of laws which might make them immovable. " 19 Jim Currie asked 
people to "realise from our own knowledge and experience of the world today that, as 
Herbert Spencer [a nineteenth century laissez-faire theorist] puts it 'SOCIALISM IS 
SLAVERY AND THE SLAVERY WILL NOT BE MILD. -20 
A distant third behind the eulogising of Churchill and the denigration of Labour 
came the Conservatives' own policies. Here, the Party demonstrated that it had learnt 
little from the by-election lessons of the previous two years. Throughout the election 
campaign the Conservatives placed foreign and defence policies ahead of domestic plans 
in their list of priorities, a major error given that opinion polls consistently showed that the 
public felt most keenly about housing and unemployment. As Mcallurn and Readman 
point out, the manifesto made it clear that the Conservatives were still thinking 
predominantly in terms of the dangers that lay ahead both in the Japanese war and in 
post-war Europe. 21 The first three items in the manifesto stressed the need for 
continuing concentration on the war against Japan and the creation of a World Security 
Organisation, the maintenance of the British Empire and the need for a strong post-war 
defence policy. Churchill's speeches followed the same pattern. On 13 June he 
broadcast to the nation on "five tasks to come": the completion of the war against Japan, 
demobilization, the re-starting of industry, the rebuilding of exports, and the four-year 
22 plan of 'food, work and homes'. The crucial issues of work and homes appeared to be 
at the bottom of Churchill's priorities. Most Manchester Conservative candidates 
structured their election addresses in the same manner. Nellie Beer, for example, began 
her address with; 
The Empire and Our Allies: I stand for the closest possible 
relations between the Mother country and all parts of the British 
Commonwealth and Empire. Also for all those measures which viill serve 
to develop the resources of our colonies and so promote their general 
welfare. In order to ensure WORLD PEACE AND PROSPERITYfor 
our generation and those following us, there must be sincere co-operation 
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between the three great powers, THE U. S. A., RUSSIA AND GREAT 
BRITAIN together with other Allied Nations. 
Defence: To keep Britain SAFE she must be kept STRONG. In 
order to effect this, pay and conditions in the Navy, the Army and the Air 
Force and the Merchant Navy must be considerably improved and 
opportunities provided for those who wish to make a career for 
themselves in any one of these services. 23 
Jim Currie stated; "My immediate objectives will be to support the strongest possible 
effort in dealing with the Japanese and to work for and support a plan that will ensure that 
the world shall never again be landed in a major war.,, 24 Only two candidates began 
their addresses on domestic policies, with Harry Sharp referring to housing and Phillip 
Smith referring to employment. 25 
On first inspection the domestic policies of the Conservative Party represented a 
fairly progressive agenda. On employment the manifesto stated; "The Government 
accepts as one of its primary aims and responsibilities the maintenance of a high and stable 
level of employment. "; on housing; "In the first two years, as the labour force grows, we 
intend to build at least 220,000 permanent new homes and have a further 80,000 under 
way. ", on social security; "One of our most important tasks will be to pass into law and 
bring into action as soon as we can a nation-wide and compulsory scheme of National 
Insurance. "; finally, on health; "We propose to create a comprehensive health service 
coveying the whole range of medical treatment from the general practitioner to the 
specialist and from the hospital to convalescence and rehabilitation.,, 26 In Manchester, 
MajGr F. W.. Cundiff told his constituents serving in the forces that he wanted them to 
have "On returning home a house to live in, a job to go back to, continuous not 
spasmodic employment ... 
A health service which gives himself, his wife, his children and 
his dependants, the best medical service available fand] the best standard of education 
open to all. 27 Wilfred Sugden pledged a "Great housing drive - the earliest provision of 
decent homes for the people ... 
Full employment ... 
full and adequate pensions for old and 
disabled people ... To give security to the people 
by carrying out complete schemes of 
National Insurance, Family Allowances, improved Health and Hospital services.,, 28 
Harry Sharp pledged; "Good houses for all the people who want them; 52 weeks wages 
every year for every man or woman willing to work; equal educational opportunities for 
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every child, irrespective of station in life; full and adequate pensions for old age and 
disablement.,, 29 Pbillip Snýth stated; 
The spectre of unemployment must never return. Jobs for all must be 
assured ... Industrial 
insurance, social insurance and a National Health 
Service must become part of the life and security of every family and 
home 
... Old age pensions must 
be increased at once. I favour a minimum 
of Ll per week and wish to see old age pensions harnessed to a revised 
cost of living index to ensure that old age does not spell want and 
deprivation. 30 
Only Jim Currie failed to refer to the need for full employment and better housing. 31 
In reality, however, the Conservative manifesto envisaged an essentially 
neo-liberal future, vAth many of their policies remaining dependent on the vagaries of the 
market and the dominance of free enterprise. The Coriservatives insisted their goals were 
dependent on a return to the economic policies of the inter-war years: where the state 
had intervened successfully during the War, it would now have to beat a speedy retreat as 
the Conservatives pledged themselves to a quick return to the pre-war dominance of 
private enterprise. In the Conservative manifesto Churchill stated; 
As against the advocates of State ownership and control, we stand for the 
fullest opportunity for push and go in all ranks throughout the whole 
nation. This quality is part of the genius of the British people, who mean 
to be free to use their own judgement and never intend to be state serfs, 
nor always wait for official orders before they can act. 32 
The system of economic controls was to be speedily dismantled; 
We stand for the removal of controls as quickly as the need for them 
disappears. Control of labour, of materials, and of prices, is necessary in 
war, when we have to give up much of our freedom in order to make sure 
that the war machine gets all that it requires. We intend to guard the 
people of this country against those who, under the guise of war necessity, 
would Eke to impose upon Britain for their own purposes a permanent 
system of bureaucratic control, reeking of totalitarianism. 33 
Industry was to be returned to private ownership, and even in industries acknowledged to 
be failing, private enterprise was to be given the opportunity of correcting their problems. 
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The Manchester Conservatives were even more vigorous in support of a return to 
private enterprise, emphasiýsing their position to the right of the national Party. John 
Lees-Jones told one meeting; 
Under private enterprise, if you are not satisfied with your wages and 
conditions you can appeal to your employers; if you are not satisfied you 
can strike. Private enterprise provides more scope for inventiveness, 
initiative and resourcefulness and demands quick decisions. I defy anyone 
to get a quick decision from any Department of Government. I don't 
blame the civil service. It is part of the systern. 34 
Jim Currie told his constituents that he would "ensure that the individual can express his 
individuality, should he so desire in VIGOROUS, and I repeat VIGOROUS, private 
enterprise. Nationalization means inefficiency or worse, and I will have none of it.,, 35 
Harry Hewlett spoke of a "National Government maintaining a system of free 
enterprise...,, 36 In line with the national manifesto, the Manchester Conservatives called 
for the removal of controls at the earliest possible opportunity. Harry Hewlett pledged; 
"Removal of unessential Government controls over individuals, industry, and trade as 
quickly as the international situation and the elimination of shortage permits.,, 37 
Lees-Jones said; "I am strongly opposed to the continuation of Government control for 
one moment longer than is absolutely necessary. "; Jim Currie promised "To examine to 
the utmost every plan for relieving this country as soon as possible from HATEFUL 
REGLNIENTATION and DIRECTION OF LABOUR.,, 38 Nationalisation, or even a 
continuation of the state's wartime role, was simply not an option for the Manchester 
Conservatives. The Evening Chronicle argued; "[The state) can co-operate with 
industry far more beneficially than it can dictate, for the latter inevitably hampers and, in 
many cases, must destroy individual initiative and enterprise and in doing so must curtail 
the freedom not of one section of the nation but of all of it.,, 39 Shortly afterwards it 
returned to the same theme; 
SociaHsts propose to restrict (private enterprise] step by step and rely on 
[state enterprise], not on any practical worked out plan, but in accordance 
with a pre-conceived and figid formula which must in any event retard our 
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productivity and capture of markets. This attachment to theory for its 
own sake - always a dangerous course in human affairs - is obviously 
perilous and frustrating at the present juncture. It is only too likely to 
prolong scarcity and state effort during the next few years. 40 
For the Manchester candidates full employment could only be achieved by 
reverting to the dominance of private enterprise and the economic orthodoxy of the 
inter-war years. E. L. Fleming said; "The removal of unnecessary controls and regulations 
I shall press for at all times, as the surest way to increase and maintain employment, and 
to reduce income tax, which hits all of us. -41 Wilfred Sugden pledged; 
To support all efforts to increase the efficiency of industry, to ensure 
thereby full employment, a fair place in the markets of the world and 
prosperous days for the workers of the constituency. The reduction of 
taxation is one of the methods to accomplish this, the gradual abolition of 
controls - both of labour and production - another, and the encouragement 
of private enterprise a third. 42 
Lees-Jones stated; 
One of the grounds upon which the success of the National Insurance Plan 
depends is full employment, and the first aim of the National Conservative 
Party will be to maintain a high and stable level of employment, and this 
can best be assured by co-operation between the State and Industry, 
employers and employees, relief from heavy taxation and confidence in 
sound Government. Cheap money must be made available for the 
expansion of business and there must be no State or Bureaucratic 
interference with the conduct of Industries. 43 
F. W.. Cundiff argued; "A vigorous, broadminded policy for full employment is necessary, 
guaranteeing steady and continuous work for all our people. This can only be achieved 
by the promotion and expansion of our home trade and a fair share of world exports 
trade. Only free and unfettered enterprise can secure this trade. -44 Manchester 
Conservatives remained wedded to economic orthodoxy, with no intention of adopting 
Keynesian policies of demand management. Cundiff re-emphasised this point when he 
warned; "if a 'left' Government is returned we would be in for a mad bout of 
squandermania.,, 45 While the Conservatives may have preached the gospel of full 
employment they did not see a direct role for the Government in achieving it. With 
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employment levels left to chance, the Conservatives' support for full employment was 
nothing more than rhetorical bluster. 
The Manchester Conservatives' overwhelming preference for private enterprise 
also conditioned their approach to other critical issues, notably housing. When it came to 
the building of new homes, local candidates advocated a private enterprise solution, only 
grudgingly accepting the official party line that local authorities had a role to play. 
Lees-Jones said; "Private enterprise must be given the fullest opportunity, and be aided as 
generously as Local Authorities are in the building of dwellings. " Duckworth stated; 
"The full resources of the country must be marshalled to meet the urgent need of 
providing HOMES for the people at rents they can pay. To this end PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISE AS WELL AS LOCAL AUTHORITIES must both play their full part. -46 
The whole tone of the Manchester Conservatives in 1945 was strongly neo-liberal, 
to an even greater degree than was true of the national leadership. Private enterprise was 
sacrosanct and was not to be undermined and whilst they advocated full employment and 
a major house building programme, their achievement was to be left, to as great an extent 
as possible, in the hands of private ownership. The state was to stay out of it. This, 
Conservatives claimed, offered 'freedom', in contrast to the 'enslaving' tendencies of 
Labour. Duckworth told the voters of Moss Side; "My policy is ... 
freedom to choose to 
work at your own trade, and in your own district. "; Sharp pledged "The complete 
restoration of the freedom of the individual. ", Lees-Jones said; "Men want to return to 
the freedom which they cherish, and we at home are heartily tired of being directed and 
our lives arranged for us by Government officials. " Harry Hewlett claimed; 
A great struggle lies before us, not now a struggle for survival from war 
but for revival in peace. By revival I mean the restoration of the right of 
all citizens to work and prosper, unfettered and unrestricted except by the 
laws of decency and honesty, so that all may know the full joy of living. 47 
Although the Party was committed to the implementation of the 1944 White 
Papers, the Manchester Conservatives were keen to see their proposals watered down still 
further. Wilfred Sugden, referring to Butler's Education Act, told one audience that 
"several adjustments are needed before the 1944 Education Act will fit in with various 
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sections of the community. -48 As this suggests, the Party remained instinctively hostile 
to major reforms. This was further emphasised in their eve-of-poll addresses, with the 
candidates eschewing all mention of domestic policies and returning instead to their 
concentration on Churchill and attacks on Labour. Wilfred Sugden said; 
I feel it is my duty to ask you to consider the grave and menacing position 
in the world today and to request you to consider to what extent 
dislocation and anarchy would prevail were Britain to become sectionalised 
and weak in the immediate future. The only possible solution of all our 
difficulties is a National Government, led by the man I support, Winston 
Churchill. 49 
Rostron Duckworth believed; 
By far the greater majority are wide awake to the perils which would ensue 
should a socialist government be placed in power, with its attendant policy 
of nationalisation, killing all private enterprise, ruining trade - both 
domestic and export - and with no great statesman-like figure approaching 
Churchill leading them, but only threats of Westminster, the Mother of 
Parliaments, being dictated to by a sectional body. 50 
The 1945 election campaign demonstrated that the War had had no impact on 
policy thinking in the Manchester Conservative Party. They remained hostile to notions 
of major restructuring of Britain's social and economic life, and went even further than the 
national leadership in their total support for a private-enterprise dominated post-war 
Britain. Although they campaigned enthusiastically on the Party's manifesto, the tone of 
their public statements on, for example, the merits of private enterprise suggested that 
they would have preferred an even more right-wing statement of policies. 
ii) The Labour Campaign. 
The Labour manifesto, when compared to that of the Conservatives, served to highlight 
the major policy differences between the two parties. Whilst the Conservatives presented 
the electorate with a programme heavily influenced by neo-liberalism, Labour's manifesto, 
'Let us Face the Future', envisioned a highly interventionist role for government in social 
and economic policies. Although the policy rhetoric of the two parties was not dissimilar 
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(i. e. homes for all, support for full employment), the parties' methods of achieving these 
goals were fundamentally different. 
The campaign also provided further evidence of the Manchester Labour Party's 
position to the left of the national leadership. This strong left-iking sentiment in the Party 
was clearly highlighted by the nature of the candidates selected by the constituency 
parties. Following the selection process, Manchester Labour put forward its youngest 
and most left-Aing panel of candidates in their history. Across the country as a whole the 
average age of Labour candidates was 46 (identical to that of the Conservatives), but in 
Manchester the average was considerably lower. All but one of their seven new 
candidates (three candidates were sitting M. P. s) were under the age of 40 with the 
youngest, Harold Lever, beingjust 31 and this relative youthfulness was reflected by the 
fact that half their candidates (a higher proportion than the national average) had served in 
the armed forces: Lt. Reg Edwards, Lester Hutchinson (who had recently been 
discharged with an injured leg), Lt. Bill Griffiths, Flying Officer Harold Lever and 
Captain Hugh Delargy. The Party's candidates also came from a much broader social 
background than had previously been the case. Traditionally, most Labour candidates 
and M. P. s had been drawn from the trade union movement, but by 1945 this had changed; 
in 1945 only two Manchester Labour Party candidates, Joe Henderson and Fred Lee, 
came from a union background. 51 The other candidates included teachers, an 
accountant, a barrister, a consulting ophthalmic optician and a man active in adult political 
education and journalism. Most importantly, of the seven new Labour candidates, six 
were firmly on the left of the Party, a telling indicator of the mood of Manchester Labour. 
Lester Hutchinson was a fellow traveller of the Communists, and had shown his true 
colours at the Labour Party Conference of 1945 when he said; "The Labour Party should 
dispose and denounce the emigre [Polish] Government in London, composed of Fascists 
who Ebel Soviet Russia and receive finance from the British Government. -52 In the 
post-war Labour Govenunent he was one of three Labour M. P. s who consistently 
followed the Communist line. j3 Hugh Delargy and Bill Griffiths both became members 
of the'Keep Left' group, and were staunch supporters of Aneurin Bevan in the internal 
party struggles of the 1950s. Harold Lever (although later to become a staunch member 
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of the Right) was recommended as a potential member of the 'Keep Left' group, while 
Fred Lee was to be a regular contributor to the left-wing Tribune- Only Jack 
Diamond could be described as coming from the Labour Right. Several of the 
Manchester Labour candidates of 1945 were to become notable names of the future with 
two achieving Cabinet rank and many having long parliamentary careers, and there can be 
no doubt that they were a more talented grouping than their Conservative counterparts. 54 
In a revealing and indicative contrast to the Conservative manifesto, Let Us Face 
the Future addressed the Party's domestic policies at the beginning and foreign affairs at 
the end. Defence was not raised at all. These priorities were reflected throughout 
Labour's campaigning. Broadcasts made by Labour leaders dealt with the issues of 
'food, work and homes', while their election leaflets and posters hammered home the 
same message: a typical example depicted a voting slip which said 'Labour: Total War on 
bad housing, unemployment, poverty, ignorance and ill-health', while another proclaimed 
'Fill Your Basket' and pictured a shopping basket filled with packages labelled 'cheaper 
gas and electricity', 'cheaper food' and 'lower rent'. The Manchester Labour Party's 
own election propaganda focused on the same themes. Their Election News asked; 
Make up your minds - which do you want? 
Houses or Hovels 
Happy Children or Dead End Kids 
Employment or Unemployment55 
Labour would build houses and provide jobs for all; the Conservatives had said the same 
but these issues were seen to be Labour's priorities, rather than an afterthought. 
A central theme of the Labour campaign was a continual reference to the 
conditions of the 1920s and 1930s. The electorate were urged to remember how 
promises were made in 1918 and how these were broken as, under Conservative or 
Conservative-dorninated governments, large areas of Britain suffered mass 
unemployment, poverty and poor housing in the twenty years up to the outbreak of the 
Second World War. The "people"' lost the "peace" last time and this must not happen 
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again; this was the first message of Let us Face the Future and was also picked up with 
relish by Manchester Labour candidates who had observed that these tactics had been 
used by the Common Wealth Party in the Rusholme by-election the previous year, with 
some success. John Diamond (Blackley) was typical; 
What happened after the last war? Again we had a rushed election thrust 
on people by a great war leader in order to make capital out of his personal 
prestige and prevent the public from having time to consider the issues 
involved calmly and without emotion. A reactionary Government was 
elected, and as a result we had a short boom followed by an all-round 
increase in prices. The Tories had absolute control of Parliament for 18 
out of 21 inter-war years and all they gave us was short periods of boom 
(during which most employers did very well) and long periods of 
depression (during which the employed did very badly - the unemployed 
even worse). Poverty, unemployment and slums - these were the 
inevitable results of a Conservative Government in a capitalist society. 56 
What were Labour's policies? On first inspection, many of the policies endorsed 
by Labour appear little different from Conservative pledges, which helped promote the 
belief that a political consensus had emerged from the War. Let us Face the Future 
advocated the creation of a comprehensive system of national insurance, a national health 
service, a great housing drive and full employment, as had the Conservatives. In 
Manchester, Harry Thorneycroft pledged; 
Given power Labour will make the fullest use of Parliamentary time to give 
to the people a National Health Service and will pass early legislation 
extending social security for all. It will give better pensions to our old 
folks to enable them to enjoy the evening of their lives free from want and 
anxiety, and to our young people the best education at the disposal of the 
state. 57 
Bill Griffiths pledged; "A housing drive until every family has a well built and comfortable 
home - built for the people with The speed and ingenuity that built the tanks, planes and 
Mulberry harbours (used during the Normandy campaign] and the best education to give 
all children a fair start in life. -58 Joe Henderson said; "We want to provide a DECENT 
REGULAR JOB at good wages ... 
We want aM INSURANCE SCHEME to protect and 
aid us in case of sickness or accident', 59 Harold Lever told voters; "The Labour Party 
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intends to institute a comprehensive state medical service which will ensure that every 
man, woman or child in this country (irrespective of jobs or position) shall be entitled to 
the best medical attention at all times.,, 60 These policies appear remarkably similar to 
those of the Conservatives, but underneath this superficial similarity there remained 
fundamental differences. Conservative candidates pledged themselves only to the 
proposals outlined in the various White Papers and hinted that even these could yet be 
further watered down, whilst Labour regarded them as only the starting point for 
legislation. On social insurance Labour's manifesto commitment was to a more 
far-reaching scheme based upon reinstating the principle of subsistence-level benefits, a 
principle dropped from the White Paper on Conservative insistence. On housing and 
town and country planning Labour committed themselves to implementing the Uthwatt 
Report as the best means of ensuring effective long-term planning of the environment (ie 
housing) whilst the Conservatives avoided the land issue altogether. On medical reform, 
Labour advocated a state salaried health service (which would include the abolition of 
private practice), while the Conservatives stood firmly behind the Willink plan, which had 
emphasised the need for 'thriving voluntary hospitals' and the importance of private 
practice. Under the Conservatives private provision was to remain paramount. 61 
It was, however, in the field of economic policy that Labour differed most from 
the Conservatives. While the Conservatives advocated a return to private enterprise and 
financial orthodoxy, Labour pledged themselves to a mixture of physical control socialist 
planning and Keynesian-style demand management. Key industries (fuel and power, 
inland transport and iron and steel) were to be taken under public ownership, war-time 
economic controls were to be retained and consumer demand was to be kept at a constant 
level. 62 The Bank of England was to be nationalised and the operations of other banks 
were to be'harmonised' with industrial needs. Monopolies and cartels not brought under 
public ownership were to be subject to strict public supervision "with the aim of 
advancing industrial efficiency in the service of the nation.,, 63 Land was to be 
nationalised. By adopting these policies all of Britain's productive capacity could be 
utilised to the benefit of a central plan that would end the boom and bust economic cycle. 
Furthermore, Labour would be able to use state action to achieve and maintain full 
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employment. Under a Labour government, employment would not be left to the vagaries 
of the market. Labour pledged not only to maintain a constant level of purchasing 
power, but also to create a National Investment Board which would determine social 
priorities and promote better timing in private investment. The location of new factories 
was to be controlled and where necessary the Governnient itself would build new factories 
to ensure there was no return to the depressed areas of the 1930s. Despite similar 
rhetozic, Hugh Delargy succinctly explained that the Conservatives advocated a very 
different approach to the creation of employment; 
All parties pay lip service to the idea ofjobs for all. The Tories favour full 
employment - provided they can get it without interfering too much with 
private enterprise, without interfering with what they choose to call 
"economic freedom. " This peculiar freedom of theirs is freedom for a tiny 
minority and it is bought at the cost of idleness and misery for millions, at 
the cost of dole queues which are a constant market for cheap labour. 64 
On housing, the building of new homes would not be left in the hands of private 
enterprise, but would come under the direct supervision of the state, which could ensure 
that all necessary materials were made available at reasonable prices; 
Only the Labour Party is ready to take the necessary steps -a full 
progranune of land planning and drastic action to ensure an efficient 
building industry that will neither burden the community with a crippling 
financial load nor impose bad conditions and heavy unemployment on its 
workpeople. Labour's pledge is firm and direct - it will proceed with a 
housing programme with the maximum possible speed until every family in 
the island has a good standard of accommodation. That may well mean 
centralised purchasing power and pooling of building materials and 
components by the State, together with price control. 65 
The message of Labour's manifesto was clear: industry was to be run, or controlled, by 
the state in the interests of the people, not the interests of the private companies and their 
shareholders. 
Manchester's Labour candidates firmly committed themselves to their party's 
economic policies, with the emphasis firmly on the need to harness the powers of the state 
to achieve their goals. Lester Hutchinson told his constituents; 
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Labour intends that the major industries and services of the nation shall be 
controlled by the nation in the interests of the nation. The whole of the 
national resources will be used not in the interests of the profiteers and 
speculators but in the interests of the people. In this way wages and 
buying powers will be kept high and prices reasonable. Big Business and 
Finance will be controlled and the nation's wealth will be invested in 
essential industries, houses, schools, hospitals etc. 66 
Fred Lee told Hulme; 
In the Labour Party we have long recognised that there is ultimately no 
wealth other than that produced by the labour of men and women. 
Therefore we want public ownership and control of the banks, mines and 
the railways and the great iron and steel industries, because we want the 
way made clear for the wealth to be produced by the total employment of 
our entire productive capacity. Once we can sweep away any of the 
treacherous selfishness of powerful interests the road to this goal will be 
clear and simple. We will produce not for profit but for the need of the 
nation, and heaven knows we will have more than enough work then. 67 
All the candidates pledged themselves to maintaining a constant level of purchasing power 
and the creation of a National Investment Board*to ensure full employment. 68 
This fundamentally different approach to economic policy effectively shatters the 
consensus thesis. Whilst the Conservatives re-iterated their orthodox economic mantra, 
Labour pledged to use extensive state action to ensure their objectives in industry, 
employment and housing. 
Aware that their programme represented a major break with pre-war orthodoxy, 
Labour took great care to present themselves as a moderate party so as not to frighten 
floating voters. The ideological aspects of nationalisation, socialism and planning were 
therefore played down by the Labour Party. Nationalisation, as a means of increasing 
working-class power, may well have alienated floating voters, and so the justification for 
planning and public ownership was entirely on the grounds of industrial efficiency. 
Labour's leaders were strove to counter any charge that public ownership was an end in 
itself Nationalisation was simply a tool. 69 The retention of economic controls was not 
a means of promoting socialism but would protect the 'man in the street' from 'ruthless 
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exploitation' by greedy bosses. To mollify wary voters, Labour were keen to 
demonstrate that their policies had been implemented in other countries without any of the 
Hayekian horrors foreseen by the Conservatives, whilst others suggested that their 
poYicles simply involved the maintenance of the wartime position. JR. Clynes, for 
example, told the Conservative-supporting Daily Dispatch; 
Many fantastic and fearfUl things have been spread abroad on what will 
happen under state ownership of industries. [In reality] the position 
would be similar to the war-time position of many industries and to the 
peace-time controls and practices in the case of the Post Office (the largest 
single employer in the country), the Admiralty, Woolwich Arsenal and the 
thousands of public properties possessed by local authorities. 70 
The Party was quick to suggest that, in contrast to their own commitment to reform, the 
Conservatives were already backtracking on earlier promises. Fred Lee claimed that 
there were already sinister intentions afoot amongst "Big Business" and their 
Conservative allies that would thwart the people's wishes in the post-war years; 
The great employers are already launched on a set policy of forcing down 
wages and the background to such a campaign is a large volume of 
unemployment. Hungry men, men anxious with family responsibirities, are 
not in a position to bargain. It seems incredible but that is the cynical aim 
of those hard-faced men who today find members of the Conservative 
Party ready to champion their sinister wishes in the House of 
Commons ... We must destroy the power of the Conservative Party, that old 
general staff that directs the campaign and fights the battle of those great 
interests. And this is no reckless propaganda - these are facts, and facts 
that cannot be disputed. Whilst our newspapers splash headlines extolling 
the glorious advance of our brave men, there are cunning moves behind the 
scenes. Those who have always had their hands on the ropes of prMlege 
are prepared to fight the battles of peace and defeat all our hopes for a 
better future. Are they again to crush our aspirations from well prepared 
and advantageous positions? They will be lavish with their money. In 
1935 each Conservative candidate spent 1750 on the election, as against 
1360 spent by Labour candidates. They made frantic efforts to gain a seat 
in Parliament. They did this for twenty years before the war, and they 
were so successful that we had hunger marches, long queues at Labour 
71 Exchanges, poverty, malnutrition, and we had war. 
He emphasised that the Conservatives had already made alterations to the all-party White 
Paper on health and warned; 
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The Conservatives are destroying the health plan: You have heard 
about the Health Plan we were promised. A Medical Service was to be 
provided for every man, woman and child in the country. Each town was 
to have a Health Centre, housing the latest equipment, worked by skilled 
doctors and specialists. We welcomed this great promise, and thousands 
of young doctors were anxious to work in it; but now it is to be 
destroyed. 72 
Indeed, Manchester Labour's attacks on their Conservative rivals went much further than 
the national party and one can sense a real hostility in some of their comments, again 
suggesting that Manchester Labour was to the left of the national leadership. Some 
candidates suggested that the Conservatives, and the interests they supposedly 
represented, had not just been negligent or plain wrong about the threat of Germany in the 
1930s, but were actually "friends of Fascism". Harry Thomeycroft claimed; "War-time 
investigations have revealed that some of [the] British and American monopolies have 
been working in close co-operation with the interests of their Nazi counterparts.,, 73 
Harold Lever was particularly vehement in his criticisms. He spoke of the need to 
nationalise the Bank of England, "whose sinister part in the financing of the Nazi War 
Machine should in itself be enough to make the public determined to take the tremendous 
power this financial giant wields out of the hands of the big bankers who at present 
Control it.,, 74 He went on to claim; 
The military defeat of Fascism is not enough. Unless we are vigilant it will 
spring up again in one disguise or another, and it will no doubt enjoy the 
active support which the Tories gave to the Nazis and Fascists before the 
war. Even in England the friends of Fascism are already again at work. 
They have many secret supporters in the highest Conservative Party 
circles. 75 
The Labour Party manifesto and campaign clearly highlighted the fundamental 
differences between themselves and the Conservatives. In complete contrast to the 
Conservatives' neo-liberalism, Labour advocated a much greater interventionist role for 
post-war governments. Industry was to be controlled by a combination of public 
ownership and economic controls under a system of "planning". The provision of jobs 
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and houses was also to be predominantly the task of the state and would not, as the 
Conservatives advocated, be left primarily in the hands of private enterprise and the 
vagaries of the market. Social policies were to be expanded beyond those envisioned in 
the 1944 White Papers while the Conservatives suggested a further watering down of 
their proposals. The campaign also re-emphasised that Manchester Labour remained to 
the left of the national leadership, a point particularly borne out by the impressive 
left-wing credentials of their candidates. 
iii) The Liberal Campai n. 9H. 
Throughout the War the Manchester Liberal Party had appeared more reluctant to push 
for major social reforms than had the national leadership. This internal schism, however, 
was set aside in 1945 as the Manchester Liberals threw themselves behind 'The Twenty 
Point Manifesto of the Liberal Party7. A brief analysis of the Liberal manifesto and 
campaign is warranted, for their programme helped to highlight the major differences 
between Labour and the Conservatives. 
The Liberals focused predominantly on domestic issues: 'food, work and homes' 
were the major concerns, but Liberals claimed they offered a different approach from the 
two major parties. Liberals presented themselves as a 'half-way house' between Labour 
and Conservatives, advocating the use of state power to a greater extent than was 
envisioned by Conservatives, but to a lesser extent than Labour proposed, with Liberals 
(echoing the Conservatives) claiming that Labour's economic planning and controls 
would lead to a diminution of personal freedom, the very essence of Liberalism. 
Consequently, their manifesto was a hybrid. This was best revealed in their stance over 
the central question of private enterprise versus nationalisation. The Liberals portrayed 
the Labour Party as dogmatically committed to nationalisation and the Conservatives as 
equally dogmatically attached to private enterprise, with themselves in the middle judging 
cases on merit and believing both systems had an important role to play. Their manifesto 
claimed; 
Liberals believe that the controversy for and against nationalisation is out 
of date. They approach individual problems without economic prejudice 
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and since they represent no vested interests of employers or employed, 
they can plan in the interests of the whole community. They believe in 
private enterprise and the value of individual effort, experiment and a 
willingness to take risks. But where public ownership is more economic, 
Liberals will demand it without hesitation. Where there is no room for 
further expansion or usefiA competition in an industry, or where an 
industry or group of industries has become a private monopoly, Liberals 
say it should become a public utility. 76 
This equidistant stance was emphasised in Manchester by Leonard Behrens (Withington), 
who stressed that the private/public ownership debate; 
[R]eally was 'dead as mutton'. Neither nationalisation nor private 
enterprise is a sacred principle: each of them is only a way of doing things. 
Liberals believe that free competition makes for greater efficiency and for 
wider freedom, but when competition goes and monopoly comes in, then 
Liberals would use the state to prevent exploitation. 77 
The Liberals proposed that railways and power should be treated as a public utility; coal 
was to become a public service, although control would be decentralised with freedom to 
experiment in different coal undertakings, with the industry paying its way without 
subsidies from the taxpayer. 78 
In common with the other main parties, Liberals claimed that they were the party 
of full employment, social security and housing. On full employment, however, the 
Liberal manifesto was vague, again steering a course between Labour and Conservative 
policies, stating; "Our national resources, labour, power and skill of brains, are our most 
precious national assets, and Government and private initiative alike must ensure that 
none of them stands needlessly idle. -79 In Manchester, Donald Moore pledged; "More 
jobs than people to fill them -a real basic wage - 14 days holiday with pay - control of 
location in industry - no direction of labour - preserve fundamentals of a free society. "80 
Phillip Oliver (Blackley), put forward a Keynesian solution; 
Insufficient demand in an age of increased mechanical power is the true 
cause of unemployment and has been a constant factor except in time of 
war when demand is unlimited ... [I advocate] the creation of a General Economic Staff .. to maintain purchasing power thiough a 
high basic wage 
and by the encouragement and stabilisation of investment and by a 
long-term programme of development [to] ensure year by year a total 
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outlay sufficient to employ the whole productive resources of the country, 
so that men shall not wait for jobs but jobs shall wait for men. 81 
On housing, the Liberals were much closer to Labour than the Conservatives, on the role 
of the state. The manifesto stated; "Local authorities [are] to be encouraged and we 
must control the costs of building materials so as to keep down the prices and rents of the 
houses we build. -82 The Liberals stressed that the energies the state had used to produce 
war materials would now be put into the building of houses; "Houses: On the provision 
of these the whole resources of the State should be concentrated as they were 
concentrated on the Normandy landings. No vested interests of land, of capital or of 
labour must be allowed to stand in the way. -83 Moore promised to "Treat housing like 
I tanks' and 'planes' - Minister for Housing - full internal equipment on a mass produced 
components basis - real houses with sufficient living space. -84 The acquisition and value 
of land was crucial to the housing issue and again the Liberals were closer to Labour. 
The Liberals pledged; "Development rights outside built up areas should immediately be 
acquired for the public and there should be a periodic levy on all increases in site 
values. '^005 The Liberals also proposed to go further than the Conservatives on social 
security. Beveridge had declared himself a Liberal and was standing in the election as a 
Liberal candidate, and the Party as a whole stood for the full implementation of the 
Beveridge Report, rather than the 1944 White Paper. 
On other issues the Liberals were closer to the Conservatives. On taxation, the 
Libera)s joined vAth the Conservatives in seeking a "progressive reduction in the burden 
of taxation. -86 On econon-dc controls, the Liberals committed themselves to their 
removal as soon as possible, with Behrens stating; "Controls must be continued long 
enough (but no longer) to give the right of re-entry for those whom the war compelled to 
give up business. -87 Controls were to be removed as part of the Liberals' emphasis on 
free trade. Their manifesto pledged the Party to the "elimination of tariffs, quotas, 
exchange restrictions and other barriers to trade. -88 In Manchester, the home of free 
trade Liberalism, Heric Kenyon claimed; "Every restriction on trade impoverishes some 
part of the world and so, in the end, the whole. Policy must be directed towards 
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lowering and removing all trade barriers in a speedy but orderly manner, until there is a 
free excbange of all the produce of the world. "85 
The Manchester Liberals were divided on what they wanted to happen afler the 
elecfion. Leonard Behrens was clearly seeking a Liberal government, telling one 
meeting, "It is a long time since we had a Liberal Government; now the chance has come 
again. "90 PKillip Oliver, however, hoped that a new coalition government would be 
formed, with Churchill at its head, until the war with Japan was over. He described 
ChurcWtll as "the obvious leader in the war against Japae' and stated, 
While we are at war [the interest of the nation] demands the drive and 
energy of Winston Churchill in the struggle against Japan, his participation 
in conference with the Great Powers and his presence at that final 
settlement of the peace ... After the Conservative Party is defeated and a 
more progressive majority is established in the House let him lead a new 
all-party Government, reinvigorated by contact with the people until 
victory against Japan. When that end is achieved the Government can be 
reconstituted according to the majority opinion in the House. 91 
The aim of the Liberal campaign was clear. As well as motivating their traditional 
support, they attempted to attract the floating voters and, particularly, disaffected 
Conservatives who did not want to see the Conservatives return to power, but who were 
wary of voting for Labour. Importantly, by adopting a centrist position on many of the 
key areas, the Liberal campaign highlighted the divergent views of the Conservative and 
Labour parties. 
The Electorate and the 1945 General Election. 
What effect did the parties' campaigning have on the electorate? Although the 
Conservatives regdmed some ground during the campaign, the mood of the bulk of the 
electorate remained strongly anti-Conservative, particularly in the anned forces. The 
relati-ve quietness of the election has been wrongly interpTeted as indicating apathy; in 
234 
reality, there was a keen interest in the election, with its quietness indicating that the 
majority of the electorate had already decided for whom they would vote. 
The Conservative election campaign has often been denigrated by historians, many 
of whom argue that it was a contributory factor in the Party's defeat or, at least, the scale 
ofthedefeat. Sibley and Shaw, to name just two, suggest that the final result would have 
been closer had the Party not adopted an essentially negative campaign. 92 However, the 
evidence clearly suggests that the campaign was successfW in rallying many wavering 
middte-class voters back to the Conservative cause. Harold Mellor, the Evening 
Chronicle's Special Reporter, toured all the Manchester constituencies and found; 
[T]he certainty that Professor Laski's intervention on Mr Attlee's 
participation in a Big Three Conference has done the Labour cause 
irreparable harm, at least for this election. A prolonged silence on the 
details of the proposed nationalisation has made a naturally Conservative 
nation even more suspicious of the revolutionary change.,, 93 
The Evening Chronicle itself reported; "Reports reaching the Evening Chronicle in the 
last day or so say that there are unmistakable signs that the waverers, the floating vote, 
are swinging to Mr Churchill's side, consolidating the solid support which the Prime 
NErfister's case had already received. ', 94 Of course, coming from the mouthpiece of 
Manchester Conservatism, it is easy to dismiss such observations as a desperate attempt 
to boost party morale but national opinion polls gave credence to such views, with Gallup 
finding a narrowing in Labour's lead in 1945. In February a poll gave Labour their 
biggest lead yet (19 per cent) with 42 per cent saying they would vote Labour, 24 per cent 
for the Conservatives, II per cent for the Liberals, II per cent for other parties and 12 
per cent 'don't knows'. 95 In June this gap had closed considerably, with Labour on 40 
per cent, the Conservatives a much increased 34 per cent, the Liberals 8 per cent, 2 per 
cent for other parties and 16 per cent 'don't knows', a Labour lead of just 6 per cent. 96 
A comparison of these two polls demonstrates that the increasing support for the 
Conservatives came from the Liberals and 'other parties', so the campaign had succeeded 
in winning back the support of wavering middle-class voters who had not wanted to vote 
Labour, but who had given tentative support to other alternatives. 
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Amongst the bulk of the electorate, however, the Conservative campaign had no 
such effect. Across the country as a whole 68 per cent of those asked by Gallup felt that 
the 'Gestapo Speech' had been "bad". 97 Similarly, in Manchester, the campaign had 
struck completely the wrong chord with most voters; 
The national Conservative campaign appears to have had little effect on the 
minds of the electors in the north, except to disgust some of them with 
some of Mr Churchill's advisers and supporters and - what is most to be 
lamented - with democratic politics in general. In this part of the world 
we knew hard times between the wars and the electorate are not in the 
mood to listen to fantasies about the revolutionary nature of the Labour 
Party or the dictatorial role of its executive committee. They want to 
know how the parties propose to find work for all, how they will ensure 
that our shabby homes and wardrobes can be restocked, how international 
trade wifl be developed and how, generally, the standard of life in this 
country can be raised. 98 
On balance of probability, the Conservative campaign did not cost the Party many votes, 
simply because a strong mood of anti-Conservatism already gripped much of Manchester, 
a mood canalised in the city by the Guardian and Evening News, who were fiercely hostile 
to the Party throughout the election. 99 Amongst Mancunians it was noted that; "There 
is 
... a general opinion that there 
has been a big swing to the left. Conversations, 
especially, suggest that there is a big, floating, progressive vote. "100 The campaign, 
therefore, probably served only to intensify dislike of the Party amongst those who had 
already decided not to vote for the Conservatives. 
The whole popular image of the Conservatives was of a negative and reactionary 
party. Among many Mancunians there continued to exist a strong feeling that the 
Conservative Party would, if elected, fail to implement the progressive measures that the 
electorate had supported since the early days of the War. This belief had existed since 
early 1943 and during the campaign it mattered little what the Conservatives now said, for 
few believed them. This mood was captured by the Guardian following Churchill's 
second election broadcast; 
It is hard, with the best will in the world, to accept this picture of a 
Conservative Government all fired with enthusiasm for social reform. Mr 
Churchill can speak with sincerity of his own record - thirty years ago as a 
Liberal and in brief intervals since - but he speaks as one handicapped by 
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his friends. He orates admirably and warmly on social insurance but it 
cannot be forgotten how his Govemment, and still more the Conservative 
Central Office, treated the Beveridge scheme. That is Mr Churchill's 
misfortune - to put himself forward as a progressive when the instrument 
through which he has to work, and it is a very powerful one, is so unfitted 
for the task he sets for it. 10 1 
A fortnight later the Guardian raised the same points about Churchill's 'Four Year Plan'. 
It condemned the Party as "reactionary", stating; 
The Four Year Plan, for what it is worth, is an agreed but extremely 
incomplete agenda. In the hands of Liberal and Labour n-dnisters it would 
mean something; in the hands of Mr Churchill's ministers (dependant on 
and conditioned by a Conservative majority) the promise of the White 
Papers will be whittled away. We should inevitably get back to the snail's 
pace in social and economic reform of the days of the last 'National 
Government. '102 
The basis of this popular mistrust lay not only in the experiences of this War but in 
recollections of the rapid abandonment of similar promises made after the First World 
War; 
There are the same vague promises of social reform. It would be an 
exercise in the ironies of history to go through the 1918 manifesto and 
note the subjects on which the Government was 'preparing plans' to deal 
with this or that on a 'large scale' or on 'broad and comprehensive lines' 
and to compare that promise with the performance by that Government 
with its colossal majority. "Industry will rightly claim to be liberated at 
the earliest possible moment from Government control" said the manifesto 
of 1918. And we know what followed - the orgy of inflation, wages 
vainly chasing prices until the country was overwhelmed in a cruel 
depression. "We stand for the removal of controls as quickly as the need 
for them disappeare' more cautiously says the manifesto of 1945" but Lord 
Beaverbrook prefers the 1918 version and perhaps puts the right 
interpretation on what the words of 1945 mean. Soon the more innocent 
of us (with the help of Mr Churchill's Coupon) may be persuaded to 
believe that we ought to have a one-man Government for its own sake. 
We had one in 1918 and we know what a mess of things it made both of 
our foreign relations and of the condition of Britain. Must we repeat the 
hazardous experiment? 103 
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The strongest degree of anti-Conservatism was felt to exist in the armed forces with the 
Evening News' correspondent, following a Visit to the Manchester Regiment (serving 
overseas) commenting; "One cannot accurately predict the political opinions of the 
Forces, but it is certam that there is little enthusiasm for the Conservative Party" and 
attributed this to the fact that; "This must be the most well-informed army that has ever 
taken the field in defence of Britain. Broadcasts, current affairs lectures and discussions, 
Penguin Books, a spate of pamphlets and access to newspapers have given them a 
background of knowledge that was unobtainable by their fathers in the last war. " 104 
The Conservatives were clearly distrusted by much of the electorate. 
Furthermore, their programme was widely felt to be inadequate to deal with the problems 
facirkR the country. Throughout Britain, domestic issues were overwhelmingly 
predominant in the minds of the electorate. A Gallup poll inquired; 'What questions do 
you think will be the most discussed in the general electionT, which yielded the following 
response: housing 41 per cent, full employment 15 per cent, social security 7 per cent, 
nationalisation 6 per cent and international security 5 per cent. 105 As this poll shows, 
housing was by far the most dominant issue for the electorate, and this was certainly the 
case in Manchester. As we have seen, in 1942 68,000 dwellings, one-third of 
Manchester's total housing stock, had been deemed unfit for human habitation and it is 
therefore little surprise that housing should have dominated the election in Manchester. 
William Hodgkins, writing for the City_Ntws, said; "Housing is Britain's greatest social 
problem. It is the major issue of our time. "106 The Evening Chronicle's Staff 
Correspondent was dispatched to Clayton and Gorton to ascertain people's priorities, and 
concluded; "Overshadowing all other links is the problem of housing. Against the wider 
background of national and international questions which form the respective party 
programmes, housing stands out as home front question number one in both divisions. "107 
The Gorton Conservative candidate, Harry Sharp, agreed, remarking that housing was the 
issue most put to him during his canvassing of the area. 108 Housing was also seen as 
critical to the female and service vote. Marjorie Cooke's Weekly Article on women's 
issues, in the City News claimed; 
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Countless women are thinking these days about houses. Their hopes of 
happiness for years to come are conditioned by their chances of starting a 
home; and with a house - for how otherwise can it ever be a home in the 
happiest sense? ... A political party which could convince women 
it was able 
to provide these things, would sweep the board. 109 
One serviceman told a local paper that "news items regarding the housing problems are 
followed with keen interest by us all and have provided material for many debates and 
discussions on this vast problem that lies before us. "110 Crucially, on housing and other 
key issues, the bulk of the electorate preferred Labour's state-led programme to the 
Conservatives' emphasis on private enterprise. A national opinion poll asked which party 
would handle housing best; 42 per cent believed Labour would, as against 25 per cent 
Conservatives and 13 per cent Liberals. III Similar evidence can be found in Manchester. 
The Conservatives' policy of leaving the building of new homes predominantly in the 
hands of private enterprise met with no positive response from the electorate. The 
Eveninp. News political correspondent, having attended a number of meetings, recorded; 
"The campaign for sweeping away controls has found a limited response and has had to 
be modified. " 112 In reality, many favoured Labour's pledge to use extensive state action 
to solve Britain's housing problem. Across the country as a whole Home Intelligence 
had noted at the end of 1944 that the public wanted the state to tackle housing as it had 
organised the war effort. 113 This certainly appears to have been the attitude of most 
Mancunians in the election campaign in 1945. The Gorton Reporter noted that the local 
Labour candidate received his biggest cheer at one public meeting when he asserted that 
housing problems would be dealt with by his party in the same way that "difficulties in the 
war had been overcome. " 114 
The Conservatives did, of course, have Winston Churchill as their electoral ace, 
and the Party undoubtedly did attract support because he was party leader. Mass 
Observation found the most frequently stated reason for voting Conservative was loyalty 
to Churchill. 115 One Manchester Labour canvasser recalls that the most oft-cited reason 
given to him by those who intended to vote for the Conservatives was that "Churchill has 
done well for us in the war and so we should vote for him now". 116 Churchill was 
239 
undeniably popular in Manchester, and this was reflected in the huge welcome given to 
him when he visited the city, on 26 June, as part of his election tour; 
It was the loudest, the sincerest expression of loyalty and appreciation yet 
in the one thousand mile, fifty-odd speech tour of the great leader. 
Piccadilly - nor all Lancashire for that matter, has ever before seen 
anything like this. There was a triumphal mood everywhere - the honest 
outpourings of a people to a leader who exalts free institutions above state 
regulations. Four miles out, in the suburbs, the smiles, the cheers and the 
shouts began. They were taken up to swell into a mighty roar from the 
wildly enthusiastic multitude packing Manchester's industrial heart. It 
was a fluttering mass of red, white and blue along the whole length of 
Mosley Street and York Street. 117 
Photographs 2.1 and 2.2 (overleaO show Churchill on his visit to the city: 
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Pholnmph 6. k- Manchesler Greets Churchill. 26 June 1945, 
Photograph Ue Tlic-CLiuiTLi ills' Campaign in Man hester, 26 Julie 1945 
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However, the extent of anti-Conservative feeling was such that even Churchill was unable 
to turn the tide. It was widely recognised that the huge welcome he had received 
reflected popular appreciation of his role as war leader, rather than support for his 
position as Conservative leader; 
It would be dangerous and unreal to suggest that these belated V-E Day 
Celebrations - for that is what they are - represent anything more than the 
gratitude of the people; an overwhelming curiosity to see and to thank the 
man who has borne such a disproportionate part of the burden of war and 
who is now disposed to shoulder an equally heavy responsibility in the 
peace. The election tour of the Prime Mnister's is providing abundant 
evidence of his popularity but it is not at all clear what part of this 
allegiance also belongs to the party of which he is head ... It would indeed be a brave man who would profess to find in find in their happy faces a 
reliable index to their political opinions. Had they possessed tails they 
would have wagged them all together and still concealed from Mr 
Churchill and everyone else the secret of their vote. 118 
The anti-Conservative mood of much of the city remained unaffected by Churchill, and 
this mood was again captured and expressed by both the Guardian and Evening News 
shortly before polling day. Both argued that the return of a Conservative government 
was the worst thing that could happen to Britain; 
Mr Churchill fears that a small Conservative majority would mean 
weakness. On the contrary it is, short of a Conservative defeat, the only 
tolerable thing that could happen, both for Britain at home and abroad. 
The least we can do is to limit the powers for mischief of another 
Government like that of 1935-37 and in spite of Mr Churchill's excellent 
intentions, that is what his'great majority' would give us. 119 
On polling day it added; "if Mr Churchill were given what he demands [a large majority], 
the outlook for the British people would be extremely grave ... Nothing could be worse 
than another House of Commons in which the Tory Party was all powerful.,, 120 The 
most eloquent analysis of the Conservatives' unpopularity was made by the Evening 
Nmy-s, which argued that the Party simply could not be trusted to implement social and 
economic reforms, and pleaded with the electorate not to vote Conservative. Their 
statement deserves full quotation; 
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Though we are free of all party ties, we are nevertheless devoted to certain 
political principles and have the most definite ideas about the progress of 
reconstruction which the country needs. The first thing that needs to be 
said is that these principles and this programme are not those of the 
Conservative Party - or the 'Nationals' as they prefer to call themselves. 
In our view they have little conception of the role of Government at this 
crucial time. We cannot build a new Britain on old ideas, and nothing less 
than a new Britain is needed. The Conservatives, it is true, acknowledge 
the White Papers which promise the framework of some important social 
legislation and Mr Churchill has told us of his four year plan to put them 
into effect. But the White Papers were never good enough. They were 
compromises. There is a vital omission from most of them. The Tories 
for example, offer not social security but social insurance. They will not 
provide freedom from want but fixed benefits which are quire inadequate 
when measured against the cost of living. The Conservatives promise to 
build houses but they have never been able to agree on a policy for the 
acquisition of land. They promise too full employment; but the White 
Paper on this subject, far though it be an advance of Conservative policy 
during the grim regimes of Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain, is 
hampered by financial orthodoxy and restricted by fear of intervening in 
business. The Tory plan for preventing unemployment is simply to spend 
money on public works and it is not good enough. There must be 
direction, too, of private investment if this country is to provide work for 
all and an increased standard of living. Political parties, of course, must 
be judged not merely by their promises, but by their past and by the men 
who lead them. Can anybody believe that the Conservatives will, when a 
slump once more threatens, prevent it by spending and the encouragement 
of spending? Would they rather not cut wages, I economise', retrench? 
In short would they not retreat to old orthodoxy which, though 
condemned by every economist of standing, is still firm in the minds of the 
ignorant or timid politicians and businessmen who see public finance in the 
terms of a private profit and loss account. We honour Mr Churchill for 
his wartime achievements; but the reward he demands, the return of a 
Conservative Govenunent is one, we believe, which the nation cannot 
afford to pay. It is to be hoped that wherever there is a straight fight 
against a Conservative, the Liberal or Labour electors will use his vote to 
keep the Tories out. 121 
The campaign may have confirmed popular perceptions of the parties but the 
Conservatives' fate was sealed long before the campaign began, with the Conservatives 
defeat having become inevitable before the end of 1944, The 1945 election was perhaps 
the quiletest in recent memory, and this has been equated with apathy. Tom Harrisson, 
the founder of Mass Observation, claimed the election was characterised by a "dispirited 
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electorate considering its options under a 'cloak of apathy"' and the first Nuffield gcneral 
elecfion study found; 
Many observers considered that the quietness of the campaign was largely 
due to apathy, especially during the early stages. The campaign was slow 
to warm up. Many electors were thought to be resentful that an election 
should be held in the summer, during the holiday season. Attendance at 
meetings tended to be disappointing throughout the campaign, except in 
London. Elsewhere, observers noted the unemotional response of 
electors to the election, and their lack of fervour. Conservatives were 
particularly concerned about these signs of apathy. The Labour Party, on 
the contrary, tended to deny that they had experienced apathy in their 
constituencies. 122 
The 1945 election in Manchester suggests a very different reality. 
One must immediately start by drawing a distinction between reactions to the 
election among servicemen and civilians. Amongst the armed forces the election came a 
distant second in their order of priorities to demobilisation; "In the main, they are just not 
interested. Chief topic is 'When am I going to get home to the wife and kids? ... 123 A 
month later, less than two weeks before polling day, the Guardian's Cairo correspondent 
made the same findings; 
The number one interest among servicemen is not the general election but 
'When shall I get homeT Partial demobilisation and alterations in the 
python scheme have increased discussion on this question and therefore the 
election remains only of secondary interest. The majority have their 
chosen party and nothing said now is likely to shake their allegiance, 
particularly as so many seem to have grown extremely cynical about 
politics. At present it is safe to say that there is very little interest. 
Paradoxically, however, there is genuine interest in the ultimate result. 124 
These reports are very much in line iAith national findings among servicemen. During the 
summer of 1944 it was discovered that many members of the home based forces had not 
registered to vote. it seems that if left to their own devices about three-quarters of 
soldiers would have failed to fill in the appropriate form. 125 In the election itself, out of 
three million service voters, only about 1.75 million (59.4 per cent) actually cast a 
vote. 126 However, it is perhaps significant that there was genuine interest in the final 
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DAMAGED 
TEXT 
N 
ORIGINAL 
result, for an apathetic electorate would have little interest in the outcome. 
With 
servicemen having been home only fleetingly in the previous few years, it would have been 
remarkable tiact tneir overwfielming priority not been coming home as soon as possible 
ana it was pemaps mis, rarner nian apaiby, Mat caused a relatively low service turnout. 
1411"IJ9 lfjýý U""11" 1H N1dH16liUbtt: r ttttitudc3 were very different. Ift - W- -4 -b, 
undoubtedly, 't vtTY quiet c1cetion. 127 A week before polling day, the Chief Conservative 
t120 O; ty, G"Ors" Deattie, said that "It is the quietest election I have know,, i, 
yparo. -128 It ;, a, 
In 
"PortQ-t, however, not to mistake quietness with apathy, as "Ot h the JOC21 Pressand candidates Of'211 Parties commented on the interest be ng sho by the voters 
i wn 
, 
Leonard Behrens, for example, found "people serious and interested in their attitude and questions.,, 129 The Labour and Liberal candidates for Moss Side, Lt Bill Griffiths and Donald Moore, "both rePortfed] a newly awakened interest in politics among the electors.,, 130 After the election Wright Robinson wrote; "The election itself Was unlike any I had any part in. People were keenly interested 
... 
But they were so quiet; so undemonstrative yet business like, coming to meetings, reading literature.,, 131 It was also generally agreed that the Manchester 
electorate Of 1945 had a higher degree of Political awareness than had Previously existed; "There seems to be no doubt that the electorate is Politically far more 
1935. "132 
knowledgeable 
and instructed than the electorate of 
The size of the turnout in 1945 also suggests that apathy was not Prevalent in the 
city. In 1945 the Manchester 
turnout was 70.37 per cent which was, admittedly, 
fractionally 
down 
on the 1935 turnout of 71.46 Per cent, but a combination 
of two factors 
suggest that the actual turnout was higher in 1945 
. 
servicemen 
voted and as their votes were counted as par of 
FrstlY, 
Only 60 Per cent of would have the eff t the constituency turnout, this 
ect of reducing the overall turnout r re . 
gu Secondly, 
the short Period 
between 
the end of the war with German 
and election day meant that work on a revised 
electoral register, now six years out 0y unsatisfactory. f date, had to be rushed and was, inevitably, 
descri6ed 
as 
All Parties complained 
of the inadequacy 
of the register, which was 
"shocking" 
and "a scandal. -133 Many people in Manchester 
complained that 
they had not been put on the register and had been unable to vote, therefore it is safe to 
245 
assume that many names were still on the list even though they were no longer in the 
constituency. These two factors render the official turnout unreliable and the real turnout 
in Manchester was almost certainly higher than in 1935. When searching for reasons to 
explain the relative quietness of the campaign the most plausible hypothesis is that voters 
had already decided for whom they would vote before the campaign had even 
commenced. A Nuffield sponsored public opinion survey found that 84 per cent of 
people had made their minds up on how to vote before nomination day. 134 
It was perhaps the quietness of the election that was responsible for the difficulty 
contemporaries had in predicting the outcome. Few observers accurately predicted the 
likely result, with many expecting the Conservatives to win. Throughout the campaign 
the Conservative leadership remained confident of winning the election, although 
accepting it would be with a reduced majority. Churchill advised the King to expect a 
Conservative majority of between 40-60, and the leader of the Tory Reform Group, 
Quentin Hogg, who had long argued that the Conservatives had to change, still believed 
that his party would win by a narrow margin. 135 Only a handful of Conservatives, 
including Butler and Macmillan, believed the Conservatives would lose. Manchester 
Conservatives were even more confident than the party leadership and were actually 
thinking seriously in terms of increasing their representation. The Daily Dispatch said; 
"There is no evidence of any real swing to the left ... Whatever the odds in the rest of the 
country, it is slightly more than 6 to 4 on the Government candidates going back to 
Parliament. " 136 Its political correspondent, Frederick Truelove, claimed; "The trend is 
still reported to be in the right direction and a comfortable majority for the Government is 
predicted. Whether that majority will be over or below a hundred is anyone's guess. " 137 
Harold Mellor, the Fvening Chronicles Special Correspondent, said; "It is unwise to 
forecast election results. Nevertheless, what I have seen prompts me to believe that 
Lancashire and Cheshire on the whole will prove to be pro-Conservative.,, 138 
Conservative Headquarters in Manchester reported to Central Office that they had good 
hopes of increasing their representation. 139 
Yew in the Manchester, or national, Labour Party believed that Labour would 
actually win the election. Labour never felt under threat in any of the four constituencies 
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(Ardwick, Clayton, Gorton and Platting) they had won in 1935; "It appears reasonably 
certain that Labour will be returned for at least four of Manchester's ten seats. "14'0 The 
Labour Party Organiser in Manchester, R. E. Thomas, was even more confident declaring; 
"I do not think there is the possibility of us losing a single seat in the city.,, 141 However, 
this view was held by only a minority of the Manchester Labour Party and after the scale 
of Labour's victory became known, Wright Robinson noted in his diary; 
Up to the count I expected a Tory Government with a barely working 
majority, with sufficient Liberals to be a balancing party. I discerned no 
signs of a landslide, and did not expect a Labour majority. Only a very 
few people did. Leeming gave 370 Labour, 250 Conservatives, and 20 
others a fortnight before the election. Reg Wallis was of the same mind as 
I was on the eve of the count. 142 
Manchester's non-Conservative press expected a very close result; a hung Parliament or a 
narrow Conservative majority were thought the likely outcomes. A Labour victory, let 
alone a landslide, was discounted at the outset of the campaign, and it remained unaltered. 
On polling day, the Guardian said; "We should remember that the scales are heavily 
weighted in favour of a Conservative majority. The chances (or danger) of a clear 
Labour majority to carry out a socialist programme are slender, almost remote. " 143 The 
Evening News believed that no party would get a majority, 
What effect [Churchill's popularity] will have is impossible to estimate, but 
it must be considerable, despite Churchill's loss of prestige as a result of 
his election antics. The Left swing may, therefore, have been halted, 
possibly even slightly reversed, but I think it is still there sufficiently strong 
to prevent the Tories getting a clear majority. I think therefore that the 
Conservatives will lose their majority [losing] 120 seats, 90 to Labour, 30 
to the Liberals. This would give the Conservatives and their ffiends about 
300 seats, Labour and its ffiends about 285, Liberals about 50 and 5 
oddments. 144 
The Outcome. 
The election result provides conclusive evidence in support of the argument that Labour's 
victory was overwhelmingly due to the votes of the working-class and first time voters of 
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all classes and that pre-war middle-class Conservative voters stayed loyal. Labour gained 
a massive 227 seats, increasing their representation from 166 seats in 1935 to 393 in 1945 
whilst the 1945 election was very much the "Waterloo of the Conservative Party". 145 
Their representation had fallen from 361 seats to just 189, a loss of 172. Only twice had 
the party been reduced to a lower Parliamentary strength, in 1832 and 1906. The 
Conservative allies, the Liberal Nationals, saw their representation fall from 27 to 13, a 
loss of fourteen seats. The Liberal Part), lost eight, failing from 20 to 12. Labour 
therefore had an overall majority of 146 over all other parties. In terms of numbers of 
votets, however, Labour's victory was not quite as impressive. Labour received 
11,967,746 votes (a 30 per cent increase on their 193 5 support), while the parties forming 
the Conservative alliance received 9,972,010 (a decrease of 16 per cent). In percentage 
terms, Labour had received 47.6 per cent of the total vote (as against 38 per cent in 
1935), and the Conservatives 40 per cent (53 per cent in 1935). There had been an 
impressive 12 per cent swing from Conservative to Labour. The Liberal Party had most 
cause for complaint. Their vote had increased from 1,443,093 to 2,252,430 between 
1935 and 1945, an increase of 46 per cent, with their share of the vote rising from 6.5 per 
cent in 1935 to 9 per cent in 1945, but their representation had decreased to 12 M. P. s. 
Manchester followed the national trend, with Labour candidates sweeping into 
office throughout the city. In 1935 out of the ten Parliamentary seats, six had been won 
by the Conservatives and four by Labour. In 1945 nine were won by Labour (five was 
their previous best) and only one, Withington, by the Conservatives. On a turnout of 
70.37 per cent, down on the national average of 73 per cent, Labour retained Ardwick, 
Clayton, Gorton and Platting with ease; won Hulme for only the second time; gained the 
newly configured, largely working-class Exchange constituency for the first time; and, 
also for the first time, won the pre-war middle-class strongholds of Blackley, Moss Side 
and Rusholme. Rusholme was one of the closest results in the country, for it took four 
recounts to decide that Lester Hutchinson had won by ten votes. 
Labour's performance in the city surpassed that of the Party nationally whilst the 
local Conservatives fared worse than the national Party. 146 In 1935 Labour had received 
135,084 votes in Manchester, but this increased to 168,188 in 1945, an increase of 33,104 
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(20 per cent) on a reduced electorate. In terms of share of the vote, in 1935 Labour had 
polled 39.17 per cent of the votes cast, but received 52 per cent in 1945, up 13 per cent. 
Their share of the vote was 4.5 per cent higher in 1945 than the Party as a whole. 
Conversely, the Conservative vote of 182,785 in 1935 fell sharply to 123,136 in 1945, a 
decrease of 59,649. The Conservatives' had therefore lost one-third of their support. In 
1935 11he Conservatives had received 53 per cent of the total vote, dropping to just 38 per 
cent in 1945, a fall of 15 per cent. Their share of the poll was 2 per cent lower than was 
ac, bleved by the Party nationally. Overall, the swing from Conservative to Labour in 
1945 in Manchester was 14 per cent, 2 per cent higher than nationally, and 4 per cent 
higher than the figure for Lancashire. 147 As in the rest of the country the Liberal Party 
increased their vote in Manchester from 24,419 (7 per cent) in 1935 to 31,803 (9.8 per 
cent) in 1945. However this was almost entirely due to the fact that they fielded two 
extra candidates in 1945 and two of their candidates, Donald Moore and Heric Kenyon, 
actually lost their deposits. 148 Tables 6.1 and 6.2 compare the electoral data of 1935 and 
1945: 
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Constituency Turnout Conservative Labour Liberal 
Ardwick- 71.40 14,556 (47.21%) 16,364 (52.9%) 
Blackley 78.10 15,355 (44.30 %) 9,370 (27.1 %) 9,893 (28.6%) 
Clayton 77.00 16,557 (46,30%) 19,225 (53.7 %) 
Exchange 63.30 15,956 (54.1 %) 8,313 (28.2 %) 5,228 (17.7%) 
Gorton 77.70 15,833 (44.1%) 20,039 (55.9 %) 
Huhne 66.70 17,072 (60.3%) 11,221 (39.7 %) 
Moss Side 63.20 15,199 (58.7%) 10,694 (41.3 %) 
Platting 76.50 17,015 (49.1%) 19,352 (51.9 %) 
Rusholme 69.80 19,678 (62.6%) 9,258 (29.4 %) 
Withington 70.9 35,564 (62.3%) 12,248 (21.4 %) 9,298 (16.3%) 
Totals: 71.46 182,785 (53 %) 135,084 (39.17 %) 24,419 (7.00%) 
_ 
Constituency Turnout (%) Consen-ative Labour Liberal 
Ard, aick 68.20 8093 (36 'Yo) 14,360 (64 I/o) 
Blacklcy F-74.90 14,747 (33.7 %) 19,561 (44.7 %) 9,480 (21.6 %) 
Cla)-ton 69.60 9,883 (30.6 %) 22,401 (69.4 0/6) 
Exchange 70.20 7,050 (35%) 11,067 (55 O/o) 2,018 (10%) 
Gorton 75.50 
I 
10,799 (30.9 */6) 24,095 (69.1 %) 
I 
Hulme 64.70 9.600 (44.4 %) 1 12,034 (55.6 O/o) 
Moss Side 59.20 7,423 (36%) 10,201 (49.5 'Yo) 2,525 (12.3 'Yo) 
Platting 72.60 9,262 (36.1 1%) 16,427 (63.9 %) 
Rusholme 74.60 15,398 (43.4 %) 15,408 (43.4 %) 4,673 (13.2%) 
Wititington 74.20 30,881 (46.3 'Yo) 22,364 (34 %) 13,107 (19.7%) 
Totals: 70.37 123,136 (38 %) 168,188 (52 %) 31803 (9.8%) 
250 
The 1945 election saw the electorate polarised along class lines to an extent never 
previously witnessed, shattering the myth of a people united by war. Originally it was 
believed that a significant number of middle-class voters had switched their support from 
Conservative to Labour but more recent research suggests this has been exaggerated, and 
Labour's victofy was due to unprecedented support from the working-class. 149 This is 
suppoTted by evidence collated by Gallup: 
Table 6.3: Voting by Social Group/ Occupation in 1945 General Election (%). 
6oup Labour 
- - 
Conservative Liberal Other 
Pmfession 7 26 al 60 12 2 
Salaried 1 30 53 16 1 
Small proprietor 21 71 8 - 
Waged, industnal 77 15 6 2 
Waged, agricultural 53 34 11 2 
Waged, other 55 35 8 2 
The most significant movement of opinion had occurred not in the middle-class but in the 
manual working-class, so Labour's victory "was principally the result of wage earners 
[voting Labourj. "I" Amongst industrial workers, over three-quarters voted Labour. 
Mddle-class voters varied considerably in their response to Labour. Only about 10 per 
cent of top business people and 15 per cent of higher professions voted Labour. 151 
Amongst the middle-class, Labour support was concentrated in the lower echelons of the 
group, and particularly among the young, "The Labour Party's best fliends are the clerks, 
typists, canvassers and agents. " 152 Almost a third of such people had voted Labour, but 
even here, the section of the middle-class in which Labour did best, almost. twice as many 
had voted Conservative. It is therefore essential not to exaggerate the level of 
middle-class support for Labour in 1945, or in the War. 
Manchester bears out these national trends. The percentage of working-class 
voters supporting Labour increased dramatically at the expense of the Conservatives, with 
one Labour canvasser remembering; "There was almost total support for Labour in the 
factories. "153 The increase in the Labour vote in the city's five working-class 
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constituencies (Ardv6ick-, Clayton, Gorton, Hulme and Platting) appears unimpressive, 
increasing from 85,201 (1935) to 89,317 (1945), a rise of just 4,116 (4.8 per cent). 
Indeed, in both Ardwick and Platting Labour retained the seats whilst receiving less votes 
than in 1935 but the combined electorate of these five seats had fallen from 224,578 
(1935) to 194,354 (1945), a decrease of 30,000 (13.3 per cent), and the turnout was 
almost 4 per cent lower in 1945 than in 1935 (70-46 per cent against 74 per cent). The 
most telling statistic concerns the Conservative vote, which fell from 81,033 in 1935 to 
just 47,637 in 1945, a fall of 33,396, so the Conservative working-class vote fell by a 
massive 42 per cent, the vast majority of whom switched directly to Labour. This strong 
swing among Manchester's working-class is perhaps best illustrated by the result in 
Hulme. Although tl-ýs was a predominantly working-class constituency, it had been 
represented by the Conservative M. P. Sir J. Nall, f6r all but two years since 1918 
(1929-31). In 1935 Nall received 17,072 votes (60.3 per cent) against his Labour 
opponent's 11,221 (39.71 per cent), but this substantial majority was overturned easily in 
1945. Fred Lee, in a reduced electorate and poll, received 12,034 votes (55.6 per cent) 
against Jim Currie's 9,600 (44.4 per cent). This demonstrates the strengthening of the 
core Labour vote among the working-class and the respective percentage shares of the 
vote highlights the Labour gain was at the Conservatives' expense. In 1935 Labour 
received 51.25 per cent of the vote, the Conservatives 48.74 per cent; in 1945, Labour 
received 65.21 per cent, with the Conservatives down to 34.78 per cent. 
In the middle-class constituencies, Labour fared well. The Exchange constituency 
is excluded from this analysis because a change in voting rules makes any comparison Xvith 
1935 uninformative. 154 In Blackley, Labour more than doubled their vote from 9,370 to 
19,561 to come from third place in 1935 to win the seat in 1945; in Rusholme, Labour's 
vote increased from 9,258 in 1935 to 15,408 (an increase of 66 per cent) to win the seat 
by 10 votes in 1945, and in Withington their vote increased from 12,248 to 22,634 (an 
increase of 84 per cent) in the same period, although still coming second. Combined, 
these three seats had provided Labour with 41,570 votes in 1935 and 67,804 in 1945 (an 
increase of 61 per cent), with their share of the poll increasing from 28.23 per cent to 
40.90 per cent. 
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However, very few middle-class people who voted Conservative in 1935 deserted 
the party in 1945. Although their share of the vote had fallen from 55.2 per cent (1935) 
to 41.80 per cent (1945), the number of votes for the Conservatives in these three seats 
remained remarkably stable; 65,014 votes in 1935 and 61,026 in 1945, a decrease of only 
6 per cent. Furthermore, many of those who did switch their allegiance voted Liberal 
rather than Labour- in Rusholme the Liberals received 4,673 (13.2 per cent) votes in 
1945, having not fielded a candidate in 1935. Had all these voted Conservative, the Party 
would have recorded more votes in 1945 than they had in 1935. InWithingtonthe5,000 
decline was almost matched by a 4,000 increase in the Liberal vote. 
Labour's improved performance in these constituencies is explained by changes in 
the areas' social character in the War. Their electorates had increased from 210,916 to 
230,573 between 1935 and 1945, largely due to an influx of war workers, with Blackley's 
electorate, for example, increasing from 44,314 to 58,437. Assuming that many of these 
workers were drawn from the existing working-class, this represented a dilution of 
Conservative support and, in line with trends, Labour would also have received increased 
support from existing working-class voters in these constituencies. These factors alone, 
however, cannot fully explain Labour's significantly improved performance. The rest of 
Labour's support came from first time (anyone under the age of 30) middle-class voters. 
The service turn-out demonstrates that the young were the least likely grouping to vote, 
but those who did voted solidly for Labour. Butler and Stokes calculated that 61 per 
cent of new electors voted Labour in 1945 (up from 45 per cent in 1935) with younger 
middle-class men more likely to vote Labour than young'working-class men were to vote 
Conservative. 155 Observers at the Rusholme by-election in July 1944 had noted that the 
young were particularly anti-Conservative in their views, and therefore it is reasonable to 
argue that the increase in Labour's vote in these seats was, in part, due to young, 
middle-class people voting Labour rather than established Conservative voters switching. 
The evidence of Manchester supports recent research which plays down the extent of 
established middle-class Conservative support for Labour. 
Outside the Party's long-standing core support, the motives behind those voting 
Labour are difficult to establish, but anti-Conservatism, rather than real enthusiasm for 
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Labour, was the main driving force. Following the election, it was a common assumption 
that Labour's victory represented widespread support for the Labour programme, with 
The Economist typical in asserting; "Beyond any possibility of a mistake, the country 
wants a Labour Government and a Socialist programme. " Is(' This view, as we have 
seen, is shared by a number of historians. Of course, many people undoubtedly "did hope 
- manual working class and middle class alike - that Labour's support for welfare reform 
was genuine. By implementing Beveridge and building houses they trusted that Labour 
would stand a good chance of preventing Britain returning to pre-war and misery. "157 
Nevertheless positive support for Labour was limited. One must be careful not to 
exaggerate the level of Labour support; "In 1945 Labour won just over one-third of the 
votes of those eligible to exercise the franchise. Yet the impression is given that the 
Party was swept to power on a tidal wave of left-wing fervour. "158 Since 1918, six 
Governments had been elected with a higher share of the vote than Labour received in 
1945. Thanks to Britain's simple plurality rule electoral system, Labour had won 61 per 
cent of the seats with 47.6 per cent of the vote while the Conservatives and allies 
(including the Ulster Unionists) had just 33 per cent of seats on 40 per cent of the vote. 
In Manchester, the Conservatives had aI per cent greater share of the poll in 1935 than 
Labour achieved in 1945. Secondly, post-election polls indicated very few people had 
voted Labour because of their policies. An August 1945 poll found that only 9 per cent 
cited Labour's policies (usually housing), 19 per cent thought it was 'time they had a 
chance', 9 per cent claimed to have always voted Labour, and 51 per cent were grouped 
together under a range of different motives ('best for the working-class, 'belief in 
socialism', 'the best party', 'they promised so much'). 159 Many people did not even 
understand Labour's policies. Despite making it a centrepiece of their campaign, the 
policy of nationalisation attracted very little interest with a Manchester Labour canvasser 
remembering; "Outside of Labour activists, and by no means all of these, there was very 
little real understanding of what nationalisation would entail. "160 Oral evidence, 
contemporary comments and poll data suggest a confused Manchester electorate, "The 
people [were] almost painfully anxious to do the right thing if only they could find out 
what that was. "J61 This supports Sibley's view that, at best, people identified with 
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Labour in a vague and general way. 162 Local observers found considerable residual 
disquiet about the Labour Party in 1945. The Gorton Reporter acknowledged in early 
August (the same month as the poll cited above) that; "After the unexpected landslide of 
the General Election, the country awaits with interest mixed with a certain anxiety. " 163 
Labour won in Manchester because of the deep unpopularity of the Conservative 
Party (outside their core support), a finding supported by recent studies suggesting that 
anti-Conservatism was the dominant factor behind Labour's national triumph. Thus; 
Labour's 1945 victory owed much to the way the Second World War led 
many voters to regard the Conservatives in a new and critical light. As a 
few, more perceptive commentators noted, a large number of people 
supported Labour for the first time because they actually disliked the 
Conservatives more than Attlee's party. Labour's supporters were not for 
the most part enthusiastic about the cause of 'socialism' - as some in the 
Party considered. They were not even particularly sympathetic to 
Labour's nationalisation programme. 164 
Similarly Fielding argues that there was, 
[T]he strong impression that many first time Labour voters gave the party 
their support despite multifarious misgivings. Simply put, an as yet 
unspecified number of Labour voters did not want the return of a 
Conservative Government - at least with its 1935 majority intact - because 
of the party's hostility to the Beveridge Report. In such a context - with 
the Liberals, Common Wealth and Communists not serious contenders for 
power - Labour was the only possible choice. 165 
Media coverage of the election in Manchester by the two main non-Conservative 
newspapers, the F-vening Nem or Guardian does not show any real enthusiasm for 
Labour policies and both campaigned almost exclusively on the need to keep the 
Conservatives out of power. Both, of course, were essentially Liberal newspapers. On 
polling day, both concentrated on the dreadful, as they saw them, consequences of 
re-electing a Conservative government and barely mentioned the other parties. 'Do not 
vote Conservative' was the dominant message. In the aftermath of the election, local 
observers were united in their view that anti-Conservative sentiment had been critical to 
Labour's performance in the city; "That this is a vote for any rigorous application of 
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socialism is certainly not true. What is more likely is that it is prompted first by a 
vAdespread desire to give Labour a chance, as the only available alternative to the 
Tories. "166 The Evening News concluded that Conservatives; 
[W]ere wrong in the first place because they never understood the 
fundamental nature of this war. It was never purely a national struggle. 
It was never a simple war 'For King and Country'. Itusedtobeasked 
'What are our war aimsT And the Tories would answer in some 
platitudinous phrase'Our war aim is victory' or'We are fighting for 
survival'. It was true that for many Conservatives - and they fought 
gallantly and sacrificed willingly nevertheless - this war was fought for 
negative aims. But the people of this country and of all Europe saw 
Fascism not merely as the menace of foreign gangsters but as the effect of 
reaction everywhere to use tyranny to stifle the swelling demands for 
progressive reform. They felt themselves to be on the verge of a great 
stride forward - and here was a black barrier holding them back. That is 
why the simple radio speeches of Mr Priestley, the idealism of Henry 
Wallace, and the practical scheme of Sir William Beveridge evoked such 
enthusiasm. The Daily Mail is right when it says today that Mr Churchill's 
supporters seemed to be completely out of touch with feeling in the 
country. Mr Churchill had, it is true, a five year plan that met some of the 
aspirations of the people. But neither he nor his supporters showed much 
enthusiasm for it. When the electorate was wondering where the bread 
was to be got the Conservatives presented them with a choice between an 
idol and a bogey, as if the people of Britain were children or a primitive 
tribe. The nation's vote is a condemnation of the past of the Conservative 
Party, of its' failure to produce a programme to fit the times we live in and 
in favour of radical change. 167 
Labour won the 1945 election as a result of unprecedented support from the 
industrial working-class and the votes of the younger members of the middle-class; they 
were unable to attract established middle-class Conservative voters, who overwhelmingly 
stayed loyal to their party. Labour attracted little new positive support, with many 
first-time Labour voters voting for the Party in order to keep the Conservatives out of 
office. This anti-Conservatism had allowed Labour to win the 1945 General Election 
despite continuing deep misgivings about their own party. 
The 1945 General Election highlighted the significant differences in the Conservative and 
Labour parties' visions of post-war Britain for, despite not dissimilar rhetoric, the political 
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principles underpinning their programmes were fundamentally different. This was 
certainly the view of most contemporary observers in Manchester; "there were 
fundamental differences of opinion. " and; "There are certainly wide differences of 
principle between the parties. " 16ýý The Conservative Party remained firmly wedded to the 
tenets of financial orthodoxy and private enterprise. In contrast, Labour pledged little 
shor-t of a structural overhaul of the pre-war economy. This fundamental difference 
benveen the parties was accompanied by other, more subtle, differences in social policies. 
On housing, social insurance and the health services the amount of common ground 
between the parties was more than matched by continuing disagreements. 
In Manchester the divide between the parties was even greater than that separating 
the national leaderships. Both the main Manchester parties campaigned loyally on their 
national manifestos but the tone of their campaigns and, most notably, the nature of the 
candidates, suggested that the Manchester Conservative and Labour parties remained, 
respectively, to the right and left of their national leaderships. 
The election demonstrated that Labour's victory was due to unprecedented levels 
of support amongst the working-class, around half of Manchester's 1935 working-class 
supporters switched directly to Labour, and the votes of many younger middle-class 
electors. The Conservatives' pre-war middle-class supporters remained loyal to their 
Party, and here the Conservative campaign was considerably more successful than is 
commonly allowed, with poll evidence indicating that it succeeded in wooing back such 
voters. Excluding younger middle-class voters, the British electorate polarised along 
class lines and many of those voting for Labour for the first time did so with great 
reservations. Few voted Labour because of their policies. More did so out of a rather 
vague identification with the Party and, crucially, because they did not want to see a 
Conservative government returned to power. The 1945 election in Manchester and 
nationally was much more an anti-Conservative vote than pro-Labour statement from the 
electorate. 
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This thesis has sought to address two central questions. It has firstly addressed tile War's 
impact on the nature of party politics in Manchester and, in particular, has asked whether 
the War instigated a local cross-party consensus on social and economic issues. It has 
secondly asked how one can explain Labour's progress from its subordinate position in 
1939 to a position in which it won all but one seat in Manchester in 1945. What 
conclusions can be drawn? 
The evidence presented in this thesis has demonstrated that the Addison model of 
wartime party politics is inapplicable at grass-roots level. At national level profound 
differences between the coalition partners remained and Addison and his acolytes have 
unquestionably exaggerated the degree of cross-party consensus in Westminster (a point 
Addison has subsequently acknowledged), but the divide between the parties at local level 
was greater still. A high level of continuity, rather than change, characterised Manchester 
politics during the Second World War, with party political tensions and party policies 
remaining fundamentally unchallenged by the unique pressures of total war. Despite 
almost six years of total war and five years of coalition government, by 1945 there was no 
policy consensus between the Manchester political parties, or even any discernible 
lessening of differences. Although public and press pressure necessitated a degree of 
compromise (however unsatisfactory) at Parliamentary level, parties at local level faced no 
such compunction. In consequence, throughout the duration of the War, Manchester 
Conservatives remained to the right, and Manchester Labour to the left, of their respective 
party leaderships. 
The Manchester Conservative Party remained deepl y reactionary throughout the 
War and maintained their commitment to neo-liberalism in social and economic issues. In 
essence, the political philosophy of Manchester Conservatism in 1945 was no different 
from that expounded in the 1935 General Election. Their irreducible reluctance to 
embrace the new policy agenda was evident on numerous occasions, but was perhaps best 
typified by their hostile reaction to the Beveridge Report. Although publicly supportive 
of the Government's approach to the Beveridge scheme, their private views were much 
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less favourable, as was demonstrated in the city council debate on the issue and at tile 
Rusholme by-election the following year. The mindset of the Party simply could not 
accept such a seemingly revolutionary step. This reactionary tendency was 
re-empbasised by the Party's choice of Lord Mayor (1944) and by the nature of the 
Parhamentary candidates selected by the Party in 1945. Indeed, such was the extent of 
hostility, "ithin Manchester Conservatism towards major social and economic reform that 
a long-standing Conservative councillor defected to the Labour Party in late 1943. 
Neo-liberalism continued to dominate policy thinking within the Party throughout 
the War. Manchester Conservatives remained overwhelmingly wedded to the tenets of 
financial orthodoxy and private enterprise. Economic controls were continually attacked 
by party representatives, who promised to eradicate them as speedily as possible, and the 
Government's 1944 White Paper on employment policy was strongly criticised on the 
grounds that it provided for too much state interference with the workings of private 
industry. In the 1945 General Election the Manchester Conservatives exceeded the party 
leadership and election manifesto in their enthusiastic support for private enterprise. On 
the critical issues of housing and employment, Manchester Conservative candidates 
continually emphasised the importance of private initiative and played down the role of 
local authorities and the state in their provision. Laissez-faire attitudes were clearly 
deep-rooted in the Party, and were only grudgingly modified in line with the national 
leadership. 
In contrast, the Manchester Labour Party advocated a highly interventionist role 
for government in post-war Britain. The language of the two parties was not dissimilar 
(i. e. jobs and houses for all) but this masked fundamentally different views of how these 
goals were to be achieved. Whilst Manchester Conservatives were championing the 
merits of private enterprise, Manchester Labour was comn-dtted to widespread 
nationalisation (to a greater extent than the national leadership), the maintenance of 
wartime economic controls and the use of quasi-Keynesian demand management. With 
the adoption of such policies the whole economic life of the country could be 'planned' 
and full employment could be maintained. This approach to economic policy was the 
very antithesis of the Conservatives' and therefore shatters the view that the parties had 
268 
reached a consensus on economic management. One must look behind the parties' 
election rhetoric and the differences become real and substantial. On social policy the 
parties differed less, but the differences remained substantial enough to suggest that the 
appropriateness of the term consensus on social issues remains highly debatable. Labour 
advocated the full implementation of the Beveridge Plan, a state-salaried national hcalth 
service and significantly increased powers for the state over land ownership. The 
Conservatives were committed to none of these. Had a Conservative government been 
returned in 1945 there would have been an enhanced welfare system, a national health 
service and probably some form of land policy but they would not have been as 
comprehensive as those created by Labour after 1945. 
The War had no significant impact on the political differences dividing the 
Manchester Conservative and Labour parties, and at the 1945 General Election the parties 
presented fundamentally different visions of Britain's future to the electorate. But, one 
asks, how could such a cataclysmic event, affecting all of society, have so little impact on 
politics? In reality, the complete failure of a consensus to emerge in Manchester is of 
little surprise, for the basic nature of party politics remained untouched by the War. One 
must see local politics continuing in a vacuum, remaining unaffected by wider events, 
regardless of their severity. This becomes clear when one considers local party attitudes 
towards the Coalition itself From the outbreak of war political co-operation at national 
level, from the electoral truce to the creation of a full-blown coalition government, was 
seen as a necessary, but strictly temporary, expedient by the Manchester parties. There 
was absolutely no consideration amongst the city's political class that the wartime 
Coalition could lead to a long-term realignment of British politics. This was simply not 
an option. A future return to 'normal' party politics was taken for granted and was 
regarded as desirable by the parties. In consequence the parties felt little pressure to 
amend their customary positions and all three major parties continued to play the party 
political game. Within days of the declaration of war, the Manchester Labour and Liberal 
parties were stressing the need to maintain organisational structures and continue party 
meetings whilst the Conservatives, slightly later, were already bracing themselves for the 
political battle to come when hostilities ceased. This pattern was continuous throughout 
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the War. Any political co-operation with the Conservative Party provoked howls of 
discontent from sections of the Manchester Labour Party; Labour continued to put out 
party propaganda with the aim of attracting new members and saw visits to the city by 
prominent Labour ministers (such as that by Herbert Morrison) as primarily party, rather 
than government, missions, and meetings of the City Labour Party and other prominent 
party groupings, such as the Labour Women's Advisory Council continued on a regular 
basis. Manchester Labour were clearly still acting as a single and distinctly separate 
political entity. This continuing political activity is often contrasted with the supposed 
lethargy of the Conservative Party. However the evidence of Manchester suggests that it 
is wrong to argue, as have Ramsden and Addison, that the Conservatives were politically 
quiescent during the War. Although some local Conservative wished to see the Coalition 
continue into the first difficult years of peace, they were unrepresentative of the Party as a 
whole. Although much of the Manchester Conservatives' machinery was closed down, 
this did not signal a diminution of their determination to pursue party interests. On the 
contrary, local Conservatives were firmly resolved to maintaining their pre-eminent party 
position in the city throughout the War. This was most clearly evident in their strident 
battles with Labour over the allocation of Chairmanships and Deputy-Chairmanships in 
1940 and 1941, and later with the appointment of magistrates. Party advantage in the 
city was to be preserved, whatever the situation in Westminster. To claim that the 
Conservatives patriotically set aside party loyalties and interests for the good of the nation 
whilst Labour feverishly pursued their own political agenda is clearly fallacious. 
With the basis of party politics surviving unchallenged by the War, public pressure 
for parties to present a united front At national level inevitably had little effect on 
inter-party relations in the city, and Manchester politics remained resiliently partisan 
throughout the War. Even at times of the greatest national peril, including the 
summer/autumn of 1940, inter-party conflict was unremitting and oflen bitter. Some 
local observers felt that the War had actually worsened relations, perhaps evidence of the 
parties determination to maintain their separate identities. Although early wartime 
by-elections in the city appeared models of political co-operation, with the three major 
parties standing firmly behind the electoral truce, they presented a misleading picture. 
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Fierce city council arguments, particularly those over the enlargement of the Emergency 
Committee (1940), the chairmanships' of council committees (1940 &1941), tile 
implementation of the Beveridge Report and the honouring of Winston Churchill (both 
1943), allied with public statements made by all three parties on a variety of issues 
demonstrated the real intensity of local political conflict. 
In seeing the electoral truce and the Coalition as strictly temporary measures, the 
possibility of a local consensus emerging was distinctly limited from the outbreak of the 
War, for the Manchester political parties could cling to their independence and beliefs in 
the expectation that 'normal' politics would resume. There was therefore no pressure on 
the parties to co-operate and reach a shared vision of the future. Crucially, other factors 
reduced the possibility of consensus still further, with the two main parties having their 
own (differing) reasons for defending their political beliefs. 
It is easy to be scathingly critical of the Manchester Conservative Party for failing 
to rethink its political philosophy. Could not the Party see that in remaining committed 
to its pre-war beliefs they were heading towards electoral disaster, as demonstrated by all 
opinion poll and by-election evidence? This is, of course, an entirely justifiable line of 
argument but is reached with the benefit of hindsight. In reality, the reluctance of the 
Conservatives to reconsider its policies was entirely understandable. The inter-war years 
had proved a remarkably successful period for Conservatism, with the Party dominating 
Manchester politics. Throughout the period they were the largest single party on the City 
Council and on two brief occasions enjoyed an overall majority whilst, in terms of 
Parliamentary representation, the Conservatives had won 58 per cent of the Parliamentary 
seats between 1918-39 (Labour won only 32 per cent). In the two most recent general 
elections, the Conservatives had won a staggering sixteen out of twenty seats. They 
enjoyed overwhelming support amongst the middle-class following the demise of 
Liberalism and also won a substantial proportion of the working-class vote. Ifulme, one 
of the city's poorest constituencies, only once failed to return the Conservatives in the 
inter-war period. With such an impressive record behind them, it is of little surprise that 
the Manchester Conservatives felt no need to amend a highly successful formula amidst 
the unique circumstances of total war. Evidence pointing towards electoral defeat was 
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easy to dismiss. Opinion polls were in their infancy and were ignored by all political 
parties and commentators, whilst by-elections were held on antiquated electoral registers 
and could be regarded as protest votes rather than as signposts of longer-term electoral 
intentions. The wartime political mood was misread by the vast majority of observers; 
even on the eve of the 1945 General Election, politicians (of all parties) and political 
observers overwhelmingly expected a Conservative victory. 
To expect the Conservatives to have launched a radical change of policy in the 
middle of the War is therefore entirely unrealistic. Political history, even if one takes only 
the period since the War, demonstrates that only electoral disasters prompt such major 
self-examinations, as witnessed by the Conservatives after 1945, by Labour after 1983 and 
by the Conservatives again after 1997. 
At national level, participation in the Coalition presented the Labour Party with 
serious difficulties. Firstly, having secured key positions in the Governrnent the party 
rank-and-file expected the leadership to make concrete gains in line with party policy, but 
coalitions necessitate compromise and Labour was never going to achieve enough to 
satisfy activists. Such expectations limited the leadership's room for manoeuvre, for 
party leaders had to remain in touch with grass-roots opinion. Secondly, and most 
importantly, by participating in the Coalition Labour was inevitably associating itself with 
a government that became increasingly unpopular as the War progressed. Although, as 
the 1945 Election demonstrated, it was the Conservative Party rather than the 
Govemment as a whole that was held responsible for the failure to implement measures of 
reconstruction, this could not be known with any certainty earlier in the War. In such 
circumstances, exacerbated by the Party's inability to contest by-elections against the 
Conservatives, Labour faced a threat posed by the Communists and later by Common 
Wealth. It is easy to dismiss, with hindsight, the rise of the Communist Party and the 
emergence of Common Wealth as purely wartime phenomena but to contemporaries in 
the Labour Party they represented a real threat. The massive tide of support for the 
Soviet Union dramatically increased Communist membership with the Party holding 
positions of influence throughout Manchester's factories and workshops, whilst Common 
Wealth won a number of by-elections, performed well in many others and were regarded 
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by the Manchester press as having a highly promising future. In such a climate it would 
have been very surprising had Manchester Labour not been seriously concerned for, 
although unlikely to supplant Labour as the main party of the Left, the Communists and 
Common Wealth could cause a serious split in the Left vote once full-scale electoral 
politics resumed. It was this scenario that prompted the Manchester Labour Party to 
oppose any dilution of party policy - an action which, it believed, would only increase the 
attraction of other socialist alternatives. The Party was determined to remain a distinct 
political entity, if only to protect its hold on its core support. This was most clearly seen 
with the furore over the Education Act, which provoked real disquiet within Manchester 
Labour for it involved considerable compromise with established party education policy. 
The determination to maintain its independence increased as the War progressed and the 
popularity of the Government waned. This was emphasised by the 1944 resolution 
calling on the national leadership to withdraw the Party from the Coalition and by the 
selection, in 1945, of the most left-wing panel of candidates ever selected by Manchester 
Labour. 
Even had Labour faced no competition for its support, its view of the Coalition as 
a strictly temporary expedient made it unlikely that the Party would have found common 
ground with the Conservatives. However, the threat provided by other leftist parties 
ensured that Manchester Labour was in no mood for compromise and reaching a 
consensus. 
The lack of consensus between Manchester political parties can therefore be 
attributed to two major factors. Firstly the unchanging nature of party politics in the city, 
with the parties seeing the Coalition as purely temporary, removed any pressure for the 
parties to engage in detailed co-operation. Instead they could look forward confidently 
to a return to 'normal' politics in a few years' time. Secondly, each party had its own 
reasons for remaining committed to its pre-war policies. The Conservatives saw no 
reason to change a highly successful formula, whilst Labour faced the threat of losing 
support to other socialist alternatives. The combination of these factors eliminated any 
Possibility of a consensus emerging. 
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The Popular Political Mood and the Rise of Labour. 
The second strand of this thesis has analysed popular political views in 
Manchester, and has asked how one can chart and explain the movements in public 
opinion leading to the Labour Party's landslide victory at the 1945 General Election. The 
conventional view of Labour's electoral success suggests that the Party came to power on 
the crest of a radical population and with the goodwill of the broad cross-section of the 
electorate -a popular mood that had existed from 1940 onwards. This thesis has 
challenged many of the perceptions still surrounding the wartime popular political mood, 
and a number of conclusions can now be asserted. Firstly, this thesis has dismissed 
Addison's contention that Labour's 1945 success was inevitable from the summer of 
1940, supporting instead the Jefferys/Lowe hypothesis that 1943 was the critical turning 
point in popular political views. The Allied war effort can be divided into two distinct 
phases: a long period of reverses with only occasional successes until the victories at El 
Alamein, Guadalcanal and Stalingrad in late 1942/early 1943, followed by a steady march 
towards final victory marred only by rare setbacks (such as Arnhem and the Ardennes). 
Wartime public attitudes towards the issues of social and economic reconstruction and 
politics can be divided into the same two time-phases. This suggests an incontrovertible 
(and perhaps unsurprising) relationship between the Allies' military progress and public 
attitudes towards post-war politics and policies. MIC. public opinion reports, combined 
with newspaper commentaries, unquestionably demonstrate that the early years of the 
War generated widespread public interest in the shape of post-war Britain. Mancunians, 
both civilian and in uniform, did not see themselves as fighting solely to sustain the stallis 
quo. However, throughout the first phase of the War, such impulses were vague and 
unfocused; certain policy areas, particularly housing, employment and education were 
frequently noted in public opinion surveys, and it was reported that many expected the 
state to play a greater role in post-war years, but popular post-war aspirations largely 
remained no more specific than the building of a 'better Britain'. Such aspirations were 
accompanied by a considerable degree of cynicism, perhaps greatest among servicemen. 
The broken promises of the last war were recalled and many interpreted talk of reform as 
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a carrot with which the Government sought to extract maximum effort out of the 
population, and which would be conveniently forgotten once the War was won. 
Crucially, throughout the first phase of the War such cynicism was subjugated to 
an overwhelming desire to'win the War first', with MIC. files revealing remarkably little 
public pressure for evidence of the Government's sincerity in tile form of tangible 
measures of reconstruction. Although the Guardian and Evening News both pressed for 
action, they were unrepresentative of the city's mood, with opinion surveys highlighting 
the extent of popular support for Churchill's 'reconstruction later' approach. With the 
military situation remaining perilous throughout the period, the public evidently did not 
wish to see high-level discussion of social reform dominate war-matters. 
Addison, Adelman and Morgan have argued that public interest in social reform 
quickly translated itself into support for the Labour Party (or, at least, Labour 
I substitutes'). Labour's 1945 victory, Addison suggests, was inevitable from the summer 
of 1940 onwards; indeed, he argues, such was the strength of left-wing fervour between 
194042 that had an election been held in this period, Labour would have won a bigger 
majority that they achieved in 1945. The evidence of Manchester fatally undermines this 
contention. Throughout this phase of the War, Mancunians' willingness to put aside 
social reforms until later was matched by a correspondingly low level of interest in 
politics. With the War going badly party political activity and conflict, whilst satisfying 
hardened activists, held no attraction for the vast majority of local people, who viewed it 
as an unwelcome and unnecessary distraction. This apolitical sentiment was expressed in 
the city on a number of occasions; the Clayton Labour Party admitted in 1940 that there 
was no public desire for a general election to be held, the M. I. C. made exactly the same 
finding in the summer of 1942 and the Clayton by-election of late 1942 witnessed a 
turnout of only 20 per cent. In this apolitical climate public interest in social reform was 
supra-party political. The public did not, at this stage, identify any political party with 
future social reform and during this period Labour were widely perceived to be exploiting 
the reconstruction issue for party advantage at a time of national crisis, creating 
resentment and anti-Labour sentiment outside its core support. Addison's hypothesis is 
275 
unsustainable; Labour's election victory was by no means assured by the end of 1942, let 
alone in the summer of 1940. 
The evidence presented in this thesis suggests that the publication of the Beveridge 
Report in December 1942, coinciding with a decisive upturn in the Allies' military 
fortunes, was the pivotal event in changing public attitudes towards social reconstruction 
and politics. In the months following the Report's publication Mancunians steadily 
abandoned their acceptance of the Government's cautious approach to social 
recýcnstruction as the generalised desire for a 'better post-war Britain' was crystallised 
into a massive public clamour, across socio-economic boundaries and political loyalties, 
for the full and immediate implementation of the Beveridge Report. Throughout 1943, 
press commentaries and M. I. C. public opinion reports consistently recorded widespread 
demands for Government action to be taken without delay. The Government's 
prevarication, inevitable given the intractable differences between the major parties, 
consequently provoked enormous disillusionment amongst the general public. The latent 
cynicism of earlier years, repressed then by the seriousness of the military situation, 
erupted on to the political scene. For the remainder of the War, with the military position 
improving steadily, the popular mood was one of frustration, cynicism and anger at the 
lack of visible progress across the whole spectrum of reconstruction. This mood, if 
anything, intensified in 1944 as the end of the War grew closer and even the publication of 
policy White Papers, notably that dealing with post-war employment policy, met with 
little positive response from the public. By that stage, the level of cynicism was such that 
few believed Government pronouncements on post-war reconstruction. Inevitably, the 
changed popular mood had political ramifications. Throughout this second phase of the 
War an increasing political awareness developed in the city, with 1943 witnessing the first 
wartime increase in Labour Party membership figures and the Rusholme by-election of 
rnid-1944 producing a considerably higher turnout than the Clayton by-election of late 
1942, despite the electoral register being almost two years older. Popular perceptions of 
the parties were now crucial. Labour were seen as committed to the Beveridge Report 
and other reconstruction measures, whilst the Conservatives were perceived as hostile to 
Beveridge and the entire concept of reconstruction. It was this difference in the popular 
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images of the parties that determined the outcome of the 1945 General Election. 
Throughout the remainder of the War it was the Conservative Party, not the Government 
as a whole, that bore the brunt of public frustration and cynicism. The Party fared badly 
in by-elections and opinion polls during 1943 whilst, in 1944, the same sources of 
evidence demonstrated that the strong mood of anti-Conservatism had strengthened 
further. By the end of that year, electoral defeat for the Conservatives was inevitable. 
This thesis has not only challenged the conventional view of the timing of the 
'Swing to the left', but also the extent and depth of support for the Labour Party it 
produced. The study of Manchester has provided strong evidence to suggest that the 
popular image of Labour winning the 1945 election on the back of massive public support 
and goodwill is highly misleading. In reality, we can conclude, Labour owed their victory 
not to a broad cross-class support, but to an unprecedentedly high level of support 
amongst the working-class combined with the votes of younger members of the 
middle-class. In short, support for Labour came from specific social groupings, with the 
electorate as a whole riven along lines of social class. The importance of the 
working-class vote has been identified by Fielding, Thompson and Tiratsoo, and is 
supported by the 1945 election statistics in Manchester. In 1945, Labour acquired the 
support of 65.21 per cent of the working-class vote in Manchester, against 5 1.25 per cent 
in 1935. In the corresponding period the Conservative working-class vote fell by a 
massive 42 per cent. In contrast, pre-war middle-class Conservative voters proved 
totally impenetrable to Labour. With Labour increasing its grip on the working-class and 
the Conservatives maintaining theirs on their core support, the 1945 election was the most 
class-polarised in history. Class polarisation, of course, had begun in the inter-war period 
but the 1945 election result demonstrated that it had been considerably intensified by the 
War. How can this be explained? The idea of wartime national unity is well-worn and 
remains an evocative image of the Second World War; the belief that in times of grave 
crisis people forgot their differences and 'all pulled together' is, undeniably, an appealing 
one, but the evidence of Manchester suggests that revisionist historians, most notably 
Fielding, Thompson and Tiratsoo, are correct to play down the extent to which British 
society united. Contrary to contemporary (and continuing) myths, far from bringing 
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people closer together, unique phenomena such as rationing and the evacuation of school 
children served only to intensify existing social divisions. Amongst the working-class 
existed a widespread suspicion that they were shouldering disproportionate levels of 
hardship and sacrifice whilst those higher up the social ladder were living much as they 
had in peacetime. Amongst the middle-class, the appalling discoveries made during the 
evacuation of children in 1939, far from provoking sympathy and a determination to 
improve social conditions, merely confirmed and strengthened their existing 
(unfavourable) prejudices concerning their poorer neighbours. These tensions existed 
throughout the period of greatest peril but, if anything, increased as the military position 
improved and war-weariness became a greater factor. The continuing class tensions 
intensified working and middle-class identification with 'their' Parties, a point bome out 
by the membership figures of the Manchester Labour Party. In middle-class areas 
membership of the Labour Party decreased continuously throughout the War, but 
increased considerably in working-class areas from 1942 onwards. Over the six years of 
war, middle-class Labour membership fell by over 56 per cent. As a proportion of 
overall Manchester membership, middle-class constituencies provided almost half the total 
figure in 1939, but under 30 per cent in 1945. Only amongst young first-time voters, 
who were the most fervent supporters of major social and economic change (and 
invariably members of the armed forces) did Labour increase its middle-class support. 
With the population so divided, it is imperative not to exaggerate the extent and 
depth of support for Labour. In reality, the Labour Party received a lower percentage 
share of the vote in Manchester than the Conservatives achieved ten years previously. In 
total, only 37 per cent of all those eligible to vote did so for Labour - hardly constituting 
an overwhelming endorsement of the Party. Labour's landslide performance, in terms of 
seats, bore no resemblance to the actual number of votes cast. This leads us to a further 
conclusion surrounding the popular wartime political mood. Although the image of 1945, 
particularly amongst those on the left, remains one of immense enthusiasm for Labour's 
radical programme, more recent studies such as England Arisel and Fielding's own 
surveys of popular political opinion have done much to shatter this myth. The evidence 
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presented throughout this dissertation supports their argument that, even amongst those 
who voted for Labour, the Party did not inspire great enthusiasm. In reality Labour's 
electoral success owed more to the unpopularity of the Conservative Party than to any 
great socialist fervour. Following their negative stance towards the Beveridge Report, 
the Conservative Party became increasingly disliked and distrusted throughout the 
country, a point borne out by a survey of newspaper commentaries and quantitatively in 
the shape of by-election results (including Rusholme). The Party was widely (and 
correctly) perceived as reactionary and hostile to nostrums of social and economic 
change, a disastrous image to present to the electorate at this time. In such a climate 
Labour could hardly fa to prosper but, crucially, the Party was attracting support for 
negative, not positive, reasons. The attitude of the press is revealing on this point. 
By-election results in 1943 and 1944 were commonly regarded as anti-Conservative 
statements, rather than as evidence of popular support for the Labour-stYle policies of 
independent candidates. Furthermore, Labour struggled to inspire favourable comment. 
The Manchester press were scathing about the Party's 1943 Conference and was little 
more enamoured with the Party in 1944. The 1945 General Election also suggested that 
positive support for Labour was distinctly limited. The main policy focus of the Labour 
manifesto, the nationalisation of essential industries and of the transport system, was 
widely ignored and even less understood (even by activists). At best people voted 
Labour through a very vague, general identification with the Party, as a post-election poll 
demonstrated. However, most first-time Labour voters voted for the Party as the only 
means of keeping the Conservatives out of power. The constant message of the 
Manchester press throughout the campaign was the need to defeat the Conservative Party, 
not to the need to elect a Labour government and the ultimate result was, again, 
interpreted as a vote against the Conservatives. Anti-Conservatism was the main driving 
force behind the 1945 election result with Labour winning, as Fielding, Tiratsoo and 
Thompson have argued, simply because they were less unpopular. 
This study of popular political moods in Manchester during the Second World 
War has supported many revisionist arguments. It has dismissed the argument that 
Labour's electoral victory was inevitable from 1940 onwards and has demonstrated that 
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the extent and depth of support for Labour has been too readily exaggerated. As the 
evidence of Manchester can reliably be transposed on to other urban electorates, it is clear 
that many powerful perceptions still surrounding the 1945 General Election are misleading 
and insupportable. 
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